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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A RIGHT
TO EDUCATION UNDER THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION: A BEGINNING TO
THE END OF THE NATIONAL
EDUCATION CRISIS
Susan H. Bitensky*
INTRODUCTION
Education may justly be called the lifeblood of a free people. The
underlying logic of this observation stems from freedom's inevitable de-
pendence upon knowledge. Justice Cardozo once wrote in this regard:
"We are free only if we know, and so in proportion to our knowledge.
There is no freedom without choice, and there is no choice without
knowledge-or none that is not illusory. Implicit, therefore, in the very
notion of liberty is the liberty of the mind to absorb and to beget." 1 This
freedom of mind, made possible by education, has long been extolled by
the nation's intelligentsia as an integral and quintessential component of
American national identity.2
Beyond its role in potentiating the inner life of the individual, how-
ever, the educated mind is a prerequisite to another American value and
modus operandi, democratic government. At the inception of the nation,
Thomas Jefferson hailed an enlightened citizenry as an indispensable
* Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. B.A., Case Western Reserve University,
1971; J.D., University of Chicago Law School, 1974. I am especially grateful to my colleagues
Charles Clarke, Martin Kotch, Robert McCormick, and Matthew McKinnon for their valuable
comments and advice on earlier drafts. I also would like to thank law students William Asimakis,
Michael Behan, and Lawrence Oliver, II for their outstanding research assistance.
I BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 104 (photo. reprint 1982)
(1928).
2 See, e.g., RALPH W. EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in RALPH WALDO EMERSON: SELECTED ES-
SAYS 175, 178-81, 203 (Larzer J. Ziffled., 1982) (1841); THOMAS PAINE, The Rights of Man, in THE
THOMAS PAINE READER 201, 218-20, 260 (M. Foot & I. Kramnick eds., 1987) (1791-92); HENRY
D. THOREAU, Civil Disobedience, in THE PORTABLE THOREAU 109, 127, 133, 136-37 (C. Bode ed.,
1977) (1849); Walt Whitman, One's-Self I Sing, in LEAVES OF GRASS 31 (Signet Classics 1958)
(1855); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger C. Weightman (June 24, 1826), in THOMAS JEFFER-
SON: WRITINGS 1516, 1517 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). For a less sanguine view of the Ameri-
can preoccupation with individualism and freedom, see ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE
AMERICAN MIND 85-88 (1987).
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safeguard of democracy. 3 It is an idea that has endured, receiving con-
tinuing homage from the United States Supreme Court and other govern-
mental bodies.4 Thus, whether the general population has been
cognizant of it or not, education has come to undergird that individual
freedom which, both on a personal and political level, Americans con-
sider their birthright.
Not wont to leave aspirations for public edification in the realm of
rhetoric, education's proponents began to put in place an infrastructure
and legal regime for universal schooling of the nation's children even
before the turn of the century.5 Today, every state has enacted laws
mandating the education or school attendance of children within certain
age ranges. 6 Every state also provides free public elementary and secon-
dary schools, presumably to enable the education of these children. 7
Yet, in spite of these real achievements and the strong sentiments
that inspired them, something has gone terribly wrong. Unacceptable
numbers of children have been emerging from the public schools un-
dereducated and frequently unprepared to join the work force even in
low-level jobs. 8 An unmistakable phenomenon has surfaced: the public
schools are ailing and ailing profoundly-not just in this or that hamlet,
but across the country.9 There is a crisis in public education of such
3 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Billfor the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, in THOMAS JEFFER-
SON: WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 365.
4 !Eg., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-78 (1979);
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 221 (1972); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); WILLIAM BENNETT, OUR
CHILDREN AND OUR COUNTRY: IMPROVING AMERICA'S SCHOOLS AND AFFIRMING THE COM-
MON CULTURE 212-15 (1988) [hereinafter BENNETT, OUR CHILDREN]; NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM
7 (1983) [hereinafter NAT'L COMM'N, NATION AT RISK]; TASK FORCE ON EDUCATION, NATIONAL
GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, EDUCATING AMERICA: STATE STRATEGIES FOR ACHIEVING THE NA-
TIONAL EDUCATION GOALS 7 (1990) [hereinafter GOVERNORS' ASS'N, EDUCATING AMERICA]; see
also President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 26
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 146, 147, 149, 150 (Jan. 31, 1990).
5 IRA KATZNELSON & MARGARET WEIR, SCHOOLING FOR ALL: CLASS, RACE, AND THE DE-
CLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL 28 (1985); see also LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCA-
TION: THE METROPOLITAN EXPERIENCE, 1876-1980, at 544, 546-47 (1988).
6 E. GORDON GEE & STEPHEN R. GOLDSTEIN, LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 11 (2d ed.
1980). By 1918, all forty-eight states then in the Union had enacted compulsory education or school
attendance laws. CREMIN, supra note 5, at 297. Following the school desegregation decision in
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), some states repealed their compulsory schooling laws
in order to thwart racially integrated public education. However, all of these states, except Missis-
sippi, re-enacted such laws during the ensuing decade. LAWRENCE KOTIN & WILLIAM E. AIKMAN,
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 34 (1980). In 1987, Mississippi,
too, finally returned to the fold with a new compulsory school attendance statute. MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 37-13-91 (1990).
7 KOTIN & AIKMAN, supra note 6, at 90-91; E. EDMUND REUTTER JR., SCHOOLS AND THE
LAW at v-vi (4th ed. 1980).
8 See infra notes 32-34, 41-43, 51-54 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 31-37, 40-44, 50-66, 288-93, 317 and accompanying text.
86:550 (1992)
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menacing proportions that not only is the national self-concept of a free
and independent people imperiled, but the very economic and political
pre-eminence of the nation has been jeopardized. 10
Alarmed by these developments, state governments have experi-
mented with an array of education reform measures.II Their efforts have
been complemented by exhortations and proposals from national polit-
ical leaders 12 and by a wealth of studies and reports issued by education
experts. 13 In spite of these efforts, the crisis has persisted with an un-
nerving intractability. 14
With such vital interests at stake, intractability is simply not an op-
tion and, of necessity, must provoke inquiry into whether all viable edu-
cation reforms have been considered. A natural question for the legal
community is whether the crisis' invincibility represents, at least in part,
some failing or distortion of the legal system. It is the thesis of this Arti-
cle that certain ingrained and automatic assumptions about the United
States Constitution in its relation to education have unnecessarily limited
the search for meaningful reform. I refer, in particular, to the assump-
tion that there can be no affirmative right to education under the Consti-
tution and that, as a consequence, the provision of education is a matter
reserved primarily to state and local governments by the Tenth Amend-
ment, with the federal government relegated to a supplemental role.15
This supposition has denied reformers at least two important advan-
tages in their struggle to reverse the crisis. Were education to be recog-
nized as an affirmative right under the Constitution, those doing battle
against the crisis would be armed with a potent pedagogical message-
that education is a national priority of the first magnitude and that, as
such, children, parents, teachers, administrators, and policymakers must
treat their respective responsibilities vis-a-vis education with commensu-
rate dedication and activity. 16 Besides acting as an agent of moral sua-
sion, the right would also have the singular effect of making the federal
government the ultimate guarantor of education for school-age children
holding the right. 17 Such a restructuring of the constitutional architec-
ture would institutionalize greater flexibility in allocating education re-
sponsibilities between the state and federal governments, thereby creating
the potential for a national approach more immediately responsive to the
crisis' exigencies.18 Reform efforts could be freed from the hobbling
strictures of state and local governments' piecemeal and often resource-
10 See infra notes 50-58, 293 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 40-41, 44-47, 468 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 31-41, 44-47, 75-76 and accompanying text.
13 See infra note 29.
14 See infra notes 41, 44-47, 50 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 90-144, 429-31 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 478-85 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 471-76 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 471-76 and accompanying text.
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poor responses, 19 as the federal government would bring its uniquely na-
tional perspective, powers, and resources to bear upon what has become,
in scope and consequence, a truly national problem. 20 Recognition of the
right would work the kind of systemic change without which progress in
ameliorating the crisis may be needlessly retarded or altogether
frustrated.21
Of course, policy reasons for desiring a right to education under the
Constitution are not, by themselves, a basis for recognizing the right.
The Constitution itself is silent on the issue of education. Nevertheless,
this is an instance where policy can be well served by law. Doctrines
interpreting the Constitution are rich with possible theoretical bases for
asserting an unenumerated affirmative right to education. Specifically,
the right may be found implicitly to arise from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause2 2 and Privileges or Immunities Clause, 23 the"
First Amendment's Free Speech Clause, 24 and from another implied con-
stitutional right, the right to vote.25 These theoretical bases, each suffi-
cient on their own, are further supported by principles of constitutional
construction derived from the Ninth Amendment,26 the role of interna-
tional human rights law as a source of constitutional values,27 and from
19 See infra note 469 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 50-62, 288-92, 316-17 and accompanying text.
21 Of course, the blame for the education crisis cannot be laid exclusively at the schoolhouse
door. Nor is the legal architecture of the relationship between children and education the only
impediment to overcoming the crisis. The fact of the matter is that the public schools are confronted
with the daunting task of educating children who are all too often the victims of poverty, family
instability, crime-ridden environments, and other societal ills. L. Stanley Chauvin, Jr., Startling
Statistics About Children, 76 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990, at 8; Schools Are Not Families, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
4, 1991, at A16; T. Berry Brazelton, Why is America Failing Its Children?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 40; U.S. Panel Warns on Child Poverty: 'Staggering National Tragedy' Seen
as Threatening the Future for the Young, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1990, at A22; Julie Johnson, Child-
hood is Not Safe, Congress Study Warns, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1989, at A12.
It is a tall order to expect schools to successfully educate children whose stomachs are empty or
whose psyches are traumatized. Susan Chira, Schools New Role"7 Steering People to Services, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1991, at Al; Suzanne Daley, School Chiefs Are Dropping Out, Plagued by Urban
Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1990, at Al; Joseph Berger, Social Ills Pull Educators' Concern to
New Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1989, at B10. But, dare we relinquish this expectation? "Students,
even from the most difficult backgrounds, can academically and socially succeed." CARNEGIE
FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, AN IMPERILED GENERATION: SAVING
URBAN ScHooLs, at xv (1988) [hereinafter CARNEGIE STUDY]. That deleterious social conditions
need remedying cannot justify giving up on the schools' mission and further aggravating the plight of
these children. It is reform on multiple fronts, rather than a general abdication, which the education
crisis would seem to warrant.
22 See infra notes 194-277 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 325-77 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 278-302 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 303-24 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 407-28 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 379-406 and accompanying text.
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the historical evidences of original intent.28
This Article is divided into four parts elaborating and developing
the points made above. Part I surveys the nature and scope of the educa-
tion crisis. Part II analyzes the current status of the right to education
under the Constitution. Part III examines each of the federal constitu-
tional bases for recognizing an affirmative right to education. Finally,
Part IV considers the ways in which the right to education may have a
palliative effect upon the crisis.
I. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE EDUCATION CRISIS
It would be impossible within the confines of this article, nor is it my
purpose, to give a comprehensive description of the education crisis. It is
a multifaceted and complex problem that has engendered voluminous
documentation and commentary during the past decade.29 However, in
order to grasp fully the legal and policy arguments set forth, respectively,
in Parts III and IV of this Article, it is necessary that the reader have at
least a nodding acquaintance with the parameters and symptomology of
the crisis as well as with the attitudinal context in which the crisis
arose.
30
28 See infra notes 429-59 and accompanying text.
29 Eg., WILLIAM J. BENNETT, AMERICAN EDUCATION: MAKING IT WORK (1988) [hereinafter
BENNETT, MAKING IT WORK]; BENNETT, OUR CHILDREN, supra note 4, passim; ERNEST L.
BOYER, HIGH SCHOOL: A REPORT ON SECONDARY EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1983); CARNEGIE
STUDY, supra note 21, passim; GOVERNORS' ASS'N, EDUCATING AMERICA, supra note 4, passim;
DAVID T. KEARNS & DENNIS P. DOYLE, WINNING THE BRAIN RACE: A BOLD PLAN TO MAKE
OUR SCHOOLS COMPETITIVE (1989); NAT'L COMM'N, NATION AT RISK, supra note 4, passim; OF-
FICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT URBAN SUPERINTENDENTS NETWORK,
U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DEALING WITH DROPOUTS: THE URBAN SUPERINTENDENTS' CALL TO
ACTION (1987); DIANE RAVITCH & CHESTER E. FINN, JR., WHAT Do OUR 17-YEAR-OLDS
KNOW?: A REPORT ON THE FIRST NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF HISTORY AND LITERATURE
(1987); DIANE RAVITCH, THE SCHOOLS WE DESERVE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EDUCATIONAL CRI-
SES OF OUR TIMES (1985); STEVEN SCHLOSSTEIN, THE END Of THE AMERICAN CENTURY 217-300
(1989); THE GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE: WHICH WAY FOR AMERICAN EDUCATION? (Beatrice Gross
& Ronald Gross eds., 1985) [hereinafter GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE]; THOMAS TOCH, IN THE NAME
OF EXCELLENCE: THE STRUGGLE TO REFORM THE NATION'S SCHOOLS, WHY IT'S FAILING, AND
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE (1991).
30 The discussion is confined to an examination of the crisis as it is manifested at the elementary
and secondary school levels. This is not meant to imply that all is well with preschool or postsecon-
dary education. Indeed, there is evidence to indicate quite the contrary. With respect to preschool
education, see, for example, Edward B. Fiske, Governors Panel Asks Broader U.S. Role in Preschool
for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1990, at A22; Fred M. Hechinger, About Education: Early Child-
hood Education: Helping Determine the National Fate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1990, at B6; Fred M.
Hechinger, About Education. Why France Outstrips the United States in Nurturing Its Children,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1990, at B8. With respect to postsecondary education, see, for example,
BLOOM, supra note 2, passim; JOHN BRADEMAS, THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION: CONFLICT AND
CONSENSUS ON CAPITOL HILL 65-73 (1987); THE ALMANAC OF HIGHER EDUCATION 1989-90, at
1-3 (Editors, The Chronicle of Higher Education eds., 1989); Anthony DePalma, Study Urges Col-
leges to Return to Original Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1990, at BI5; Anthony DePalma, Graduate
Schools Fill with Foreigners, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1990, at Al. Nor is the exclusion meant to imply
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In April 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Educa-
tion, appointed by then U.S. Secretary of Education, Terrel H. Bell,
jolted the nation with a report that disclosed shocking inadequacies in
American public education. 31 The Commission found that a substantial
percentage of the public school student population was not acquiring
even basic knowledge and skills, let alone scholarship of a higher order.32
Vast numbers of American children were actually growing up function-
ally illiterate.33 Testing revealed that there also had been a steady and
significant decline in their knowledge of mathematics, science, English,
and other subject areas over the course of the preceding two decades.34
The Commission cited as a major cause of the crisis the fact that the
public schools had set academic standards too low. Instead of striving to
provide students with an excellent education in a challenging environ-
ment, the public school systems operated upon the premise that no more
than the minimum need be taught. Students consequently internalized
this standard, thereby losing any inclination to learn beyond the mini-
mum. 35 The Commission observed that this should occasion no surprise
"because we tend to express our educational standards and expectations
largely in terms of 'minimum requirements.' "36 The Commission's diag-
nosis was dire: the minimal requirements ethos had eroded the educa-
tional foundations of the country. The prescribed cure implied rigorous
measures: only pursuit of excellence in education could put schooling
back on a solid footing.37 And, while excellence as a panacea has had its
critics, 38 there is no gainsaying that the Commission's focus on it became
that there can be no federal constitutional right to preschool or postsecondary education. This arti-
cle does not address that issue.
31 NAT'L COMM'N, NATION AT RISK, supra note 4, at 5-15, 18-23.
32 Indeed, besides finding that large numbers of students lacked rudimentary reading, writing,
and computation skills, the Commission concluded that many 17-year-olds did not possess the
"higher order" intellectual skills normally associated with that age group. Id. at 9. Nearly 40% of
these children could not draw inferences from written materials; only 20% of them could write a
persuasive essay; and only one-third of them were capable of solving a mathematics problem entail-
ing several steps. Id. at 8-9.
33 In its 1983 report, the Commission related that in the United States some 23 million adults,
13% of all seventeen-year-olds, and up to 40% of all minority youth were functionally illiterate. Id.
at 8. The Commission's figures on illiteracy may be conservative. Two years later, Jonathan Kozol
estimated that there were some 60 million Americans who were functionally illiterate and that the
United States ranked forty-ninth out of the 158 member nations of the United Nations with respect
to national literacy rates. JONATHAN KoZOL, ILLITERATE AMERICA 5, 10-11 (1985).
34 NAT'L COMM'N, NATION AT RISK, supra note 4, at 8-9.
35 Id. at 13-15; see also KEARNS & DOYLE, supra note 29, at 7, 67.
36 NAT'L COMM'N NATION AT RISK, supra note 4, at 14.
37 Id. at 12-15.
38 Eg., Irving Howe, A Plea for Pluralism, in GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE, supra note 29, at 361-
62; Fred L. Pincus, From Equity to Excellence: The Rebirth of Educational Conservatism, in GREAT
SCHOOL DEBATE, supra note 29, at 329-44; Lawrence C. Stedman & Marshall S. Smith, Weak
Arguments, Poor Data, Simplistic Recommendations: Putting the Reports Under the Microscope, in
GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE, supra note 29, at 83-105.
86:550 (1992)
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highly influential in shaping the education reform movement throughout
the 1980s. 39
In 1988, the succeeding Secretary of Education, William J. Bennett,
again evaluated the condition of American education, this time after five
years of state education reform efforts that had been inspired by the 1983
report.40 Overall, his assessment was not encouraging. While noting
that the free-fall of educational quality had been arrested, he opined that,
"Our students know too little, and their command of essential skills is
too slight. ' '41
It is the hard facts underlying Secretary Bennett's conclusions,
though, which convey the real extremity in which the public schools
have left the nation's children. A representative sampling of the data
upon which he relied include such findings as that, by 1988, fewer than
forty percent of young adults between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-
five could read well enough to interpret a newspaper article; fewer than
five percent of all in-school seventeen-year-olds possessed the level of
reading skills necessary to understand primary-source historical docu-
ments; fewer than twenty-five percent of all seventeen-year-olds tested
were able to complete adequately writing tasks considered indicative of
the ability to engage in academic study, business, or professional work;
American students consistently rated at or near the bottom in most inter-
national comparisons of mathematics performance; fifty percent of a na-
tional sample of seventeen-year-olds did not know that F. Scott
Fitzgerald authored The Great Gatsby and fifty percent of them were un-
aware that George Byron, John Keats, and William Wordsworth were
poets; one in three seventeen-year-olds did not know that it was Abra-
ham Lincoln who issued the Emancipation Proclamation; and one-third
of seventeen-year-olds tested did not know that the Declaration of Inde-
pendence signaled the American colonists' revolt against English domi-
39 TOCH, supra note 29, at 3-4, 55-71; see also ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION
UNDER LAW: LEGAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL POLICY IN THE POST-BROWN Era 12, 198 (1986)
(also stressing that a commitment to equality in educational opportunities accompanies America's
drive for excellence in its schools); Chester E. Finn, Jr., The Drive for Excellence: Moving Towards a
Public Consensus, in GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE, supra note 29, at 74-82. Indeed, the educational goals
adopted by the governors in 1990, pursuant to the directives of the Jeffersonian Compact, reflect
continued acceptance of the need to attain excellence in education. The governors include among
their goals that, by the year 2000, the following will be accomplished: the high school graduation
rate will increase to at least 90%; American students will befirst in the world in mathematics and
science achievement; every adult American will be literate and possess the knowledge necessary to
compete in a global economy and to exercise the rights and responsibilities of citizenship; and stu-
dents will leave grades four, eight, and twelve having demonstrated competency over challenging
subject matter such as English, mathematics, science, history, and geography. GOVERNORS' ASS'N,
EDUCATING AMERICA, supra note 4, at 37; see also American Education Gets a C, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
4, 1991, at A30 (opining that academic standards must be raised in order to bring American educa-
tion up to par).
40 W. BENNETT, MAKING IT WORK, supra note 29.
41 Id. at 2.
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nation.42 The fact is that even if children escaped functional illiteracy,
they still stood a good chance of growing up "culturally illiterate"-un-
familiar with that basic core of factual knowledge comprising society's
shared heritage. 43 This, then, is the sort of educational deprivation
which had become a fixed feature of public schooling by the late 1980s.
Evidently concerned that progress in turning back the crisis was not
proceeding rapidly enough, President George Bush took the unusual step
of convening an education "summit meeting" with the fifty state gover-
nors in 1989. 44 At the end of this conference, the President and the gov-
ernors issued what they called a "Jeffersonian compact to enlighten our
children and the children of generations to come."'45 The enumerated
purposes of the compact included establishing a process for setting na-
tional education goals; seeking greater flexibility and enhanced accounta-
bility in the use of federal resources to meet these goals; and
restructuring the public education system.46 The ultimate objective of
the compact was, again, that of educational excellence, of enabling "all
children [to] reach their highest educational potential." 47 The parties to
the compact still have much to achieve, for in 1991 the National Educa-
tion Goals Panel concluded that students had still failed to make ade-
quate academic gains.48 A similar assessment was also made by the U.S.
Department of Education which found that students had just reached in
1991 the achievement levels that their predecessors attained in 1970,
leaving upcoming generations unprepared for the demands of the twenty-
first century.49 In short, despite substantial efforts by the states through-
42 Id. at 8-14 (setting forth the data upon which Secretary Bennett relied, some of which is
highlighted in the text above).
43 E. D. Hirsch defines "cultural literacy" as follows:
To be culturally literate is to possess the basic information needed to thrive in the modem
world. The breadth of that information is great, extending over the major domains of human
activity from sports to science. It is by no means confined to "culture" narrowly understood as
an acquaintance with the arts.
E.D. HIRSCH, JR., CULTURAL LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW at xiii
(1988). The findings of Mr. Hirsch and other education experts confirm that during the 1980s cul-
tural illiteracy became commonplace among public school students in the United States. Id. at 18-
19; RAVITCH, supra note 29, at 79; RAVITCH & FINN, JR., supra note 29, at 43-120.
44 Joint Statement Following the Education Summit with Governors in Charlottesville, Virginia,
25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1487 (Sept. 28, 1989) [hereinafter Jeffersonian Compact]. The edu-
cation "summit meeting" is only the third time that a United States President has summoned all of
the country's governors to address a single issue. Kenneth H. Bacon, Education Summit Gets a Good
Report Card Well in Advance of Next Week's Opening Bell, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1989, at A26.
45 Jeffersonian Compact, supra note 44, at 1489.
46 Id. at 1487.
47 Id. at 1488.
48 Susan Chira, Report Card on Educational Goals: At this Rate, the Nation is Flunking, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 1991, at B8 [hereinafter Chira, Nation Flunking]; Karen DeWitt, First Report Card
Issued on U.S. Education Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1991, at A18 [hereinafter DeWitt, First Report
Card]. The National Education Goals Panel was comprised of six governors, four members of the
Bush administration, and four members of Congress. DeWitt, First Report Card, passim.
49 Karen DeWitt, Pupils in America Reverse Declines, Analysis Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1991,
86:550 (1992)
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out the preceding decade, "an enormous gap exists between current per-
formance levels and those required to secure our future."' 50
The effects of the crisis have, indeed, extended far beyond the
schoolhouse door so as to jeopardize our prospects as a nation and a
people. Some of the most unsettling symptoms of the crisis have come
from the business community. Many corporate executives have ex-
pressed consternation upon finding themselves faced with an evolving
work force that is so poorly educated as to be unqualified to perform
entry level jobs.51 Employees' individual educational shortcomings have
been collectively transmuted into a continuing and widespread syndrome
impairing industry's vitality and capacity for development.5 2 David T.
Kearns, chairman of the Xerox Corporation and Deputy Secretary of
Education, lamented that "[p]ublic education has put this country at a
terrible competitive disadvantage" in relation to the world economy. 53
So ominous is the threat to American competitiveness that many compa-
nies have become heavily involved in providing basic education to the
incoming work force as well as bestowing assistance upon the public
schools.54
at Al, A18; see also Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, A Nation Running in Place: Tests Show No
Progress in a Competitive World, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14, 1991, at 54 (reporting that while American
students perform at 1970 levels, other countries have developed curricula designed to prepare their
students to compete in an increasingly technological global economy). But cf. American Education
Gets a C, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991, at A30 (opining that although the federal report reveals that
current student performance is not good enough for the demands of the next century, the fact that
students are presently performing at 1970 levels is "not as bad as some might think" because black
and Hispanic children have made some gains).
50 GOVERNORS' ASS'N, EDUCATING AMERICA, supra note 4, at 7.
51 JACK E. BOWSHER, EDUCATING AMERICA: LESSONS LEARNED IN THE NATION'S CORPO-
RATIONS 229 (1989); KoZOL, supra note 33, at 14; Edward B. Fiske, Impending U.S. Jobs "Disas-
ter": Work Force Unqualified to Work, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1989, at Al [hereinafter Fiske, Work
Force Unqualified]; Ellen Graham, Retooling the Schools: The System Needs a Complete Overhaul,
and Not Just More Tinkering, WALL ST. J. REP., Mar. 31, 1989, at RI; Julie A. Lopez, System
Failure: Businesses Say Schools Are Producing Graduates Unqualified to Hold Jobs, WALL ST. J.
REP., Mar. 31, 1989, at R12.
52 EDUCATION COMMITTEE OF THE HUMAN RESOURCES TASK FORCE, THE BUSINESS ROUND-
TABLE, BUSINESS MEANS BUSINESS ABOUT EDUCATION 2 (1989) [hereinafter BUSINESS ROUND-
TABLE]; KOZOL, supra note 33, at 14-15; Karen DeWitt, Bush Pushes Education Goals at Math
Educator's Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1991, at B8 [hereinafter DeWitt, Bush Pushes Education
Goals]; Work Force Failing to Meet Math Needs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1990, at B8; Steven A.
Holmes, School Reform: Business Moves in, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1990, at Dl; Joseph Berger, Com-
panies Step in Where the Schools Fail, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1989, at Al; Fiske, Work Force Unqual-
ified, supra note 51, passim; Lopez, supra note 51, passim.
53 KEARNS & DOYLE, supra note 29, at I. Other analysts have reached the same conclusion.
BOWSHER, supra note 51, at 18-19; BRADEMAS, supra note 30, at 104-06; SCHLOSSSTEIN, supra note
29, at 217-300; Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 49, at 54; Holmes, supra note 52, passim; Ann
McLaughlin, Education and Work- The Missing Link, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1989, at A19.
54 See, e.g., BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 52, at 2-41; Don J. DeBenedictis Project Might,
76 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990 at 27; Nabisco Awards $9.7 Million in Grants to 15 Schools, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 1991, at A19; Claudia H. Deutsch, Businesses Profit by Job Illiteracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
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In addition, although the United States' armed forces performed ad-
mirably in the recent war with Iraq, military leaders also have com-
plained that they must spend millions of dollars on remedial education in
basic skills such as reading, writing, spelling, and computation.5 5 Their
complaints apparently are well-founded, since, in 1987, forty percent of
high school graduates entering the armed forces read at or below the
ninth grade level.5 6 This is a sobering statistic in light of the fact that
over one million pages of technical reading material are needed to sup-
port the operation and maintenance of the B-1 bomber.5 7 Equally disqui-
eting is the possibility that students' lack of exposure to foreign language
and international studies may endanger national security by making it
more difficult for Americans to comprehend other cultures and political
systems and, therefore, to engage in effective diplomacy and avert mili-
tary confrontations.58
Even the safety and tranquility of America's streets have been ad-
versely affected by the crisis, for there appears to be a strong correlation
between educational deprivation and elevated crime rates. Up to sev-
enty-five percent of imprisoned youths in the United States are function-
ally illiterate.59 Only one in four prisoners has a high school diploma.6°
Statistics also show that states with the highest dropout rates have the
highest per capita prison populations while states with the lowest drop-
out rates have the smallest prison populations.61 This relationship be-
tween the lack of adequate education and criminal activity is no small
matter for a society where one out of every four households is affected by
crime every year.62
While the education crisis has been wreaking havoc on a societal
scale,63 it also has been a source of personal tragedy for those individuals
1991, § 4A (Education Life), at 42; Holmes, supra note 52, passim; Berger, supra note 52, passim;
Lopez, supra note 51, passim.
55 NAT'L COMM'N, NATION AT RISK, supra note 4, at 9.
56 W. BENNETr, MAKING IT WORK, supra note 29, at 10.
57 KOZOL, supra note 33, at 82 (quoting from THOMAS H. DuFF'y, LITERACY INSTRUCTION IN
THE MILrrARY (1983)).
58 BRADEMAS, supra note 30, at 103-14.
59 Patricia Puritz, Juvenile Justice: Teaching Literacy Through Law-Related Education, 75
A.B.A. J., June 1989, at 124.
60 Edward B. Fiske, Lessons: Can Money Spent on Schools Save Money that Would Be Spent on
Prisons?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1989, at B8 (citing estimate of the Correctional Education Assoc., a
group of educators who work in prisons) [hereinafter Fiske, Money Spent on Schools].
61 Fiske, Money Spent on Schools, supra note 60, passim.
62 BOWSHER, supra note 51, at 15-16; cf Violent Crime up 10% with Cities Hardest Hit, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1990, at A15 (F.B.I. reports violent crime up dramatically in first half of 1990).
63 The societal ramifications of the crisis described in the text are by no means exhaustive. For
example, child welfare and unemployment compensation costs rise when workers are unqualified to
work. KOZOL, supra note 33, at 13; see BOWSHER, supra note 51, at 17-18. There are less obvious
societal costs as well, such as medical expenditures necessitated by the inability of illiterate adults to
properly use medication or preventive health care measures. KOZOL, supra note 33, at 14.
86:550 (1992)
HeinOnline -- 86 Nw. U. L. Rev.  559 1991-1992
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
who either drop out of school,64 or who graduate from high school with a
substandard education. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out
over three decades ago in Brown v. Board of Education, "[i]n these days,
it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education. '65 What was written
then is even more true now, for, as the twentieth century draws to a
close, the "information age" has dawned, making expertise and informed
intelligence the sine qua non of meaningful human endeavor. 66
In fact, the poorly educated are thwarted at every turn. They face
the likely prospect of circumscribed earning power 67 and they may well
be rendered politically ineffectual. 68 Just as egregious, they are bereft of
their heritage, of mankind's greatest intellectual and artistic achieve-
ments.69 The insidiousness of this intellectual impoverishment is that it
not only makes inaccessible the profound and the beautiful, but it also
64 Over twenty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that inferior education induces children
to drop out of school. Gaston County, N.C. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 295-96 (1969). If the
Court is correct, dropout rates in the public schools are another indicator of the severity of the
education crisis. In 1988, U.S. Secretary of Education Bennett characterized the national school
dropout rate as "alarmingly high." BENNETT, MAKING IT WORK, supra note 29, at 20. It has
stayed high. Indeed, as of February 1990, public high schools nationwide were graduating only 71%
of the students who entered as freshmen. Michael D. Hinds, Cutting the Dropout Rate: High Goal
but Low Hopes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1990, at Al. Apparently, when they are older, some of these
students do eventually obtain a high school diploma or its equivalent. Data from the National
Center for Education Statistics show that between 1975 and 1990, the number of 19- and 20-year-
olds who received a diploma or its equivalent rose to 83% from 81%. DeWitt, First Report Card,
supra note 48, passim.
65 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
66 NAT'L COMM'N, NATION AT RISK, supra note 4, at 7; see also GOVERNORs' ASS'N, EDUCAT-
ING AMERICA, supra note 4, at 7; HUDSON INSTITUTE, WORKFORCE 2000: WORK AND WORKERS
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 97-101 (1987).
67 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1982); BOWSHER, supra note 51, at 16-18; KOzOL, supra
note 33, at 13; Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the
Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 45-46 (1987); Stephen W. Gard, San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez: On our Way to Where?, 8 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 19 (1973); Robert E. Godwin,
Comment, Equality and the Schools: Education as a Fundamental Interest, 21 AM. U. L. REV. 716,
731 (1972) [hereinafter Comment, Equality and the Schools].
68 HIRSCH, JR., supra note 43, at 12-13; KEARNS & DOYLE, supra note 29, at 85-88; KOZOL,
supra note 33, at 32-34; NAT'L COMM'N, NATION AT RISK, supra note 4, at 7; Edelman, supra note
67, at 33-34; Penelope A. Preovolos, Rodriguez Revisited: Federalism, Meaningful Access, and the
Right to.Adequate Education, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 75, 89, 95, 98-99 (1980); R. George Wright,
The Place of Public School Education in the Constitutional Scheme, 13 S. ILL. U. L.J. 53, 54, 61-63
(1988); Comment, Equality and Schools, supra note 67, at 732. In fact, there is an apparent correla-
tion between lack of education and a disinclination to vote. See infra note 317 and accompanying
text. And, those who do vote may exercise the franchise with very little understanding of the Ameri-
can political system, thereby robbing the vote of its politically purposive content. See infra notes
323-24 and accompanying text.
69 BLOOM, supra note 2, at 239-40; RAVITCH & FINN, supra note 29, at 203; RAVITCH, supra
note 29, at 42-44.
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hides from its victims the heights to which they might aspire,70 and the
freedom of mind which they might traverse.71 "Rage, rage against the
dying of the light" could have justly been the poet's protestation against
ignorance as well as against death.72
Such is the nature of the education crisis. Its toll has been a high
one. The states, as the governmental entities with primary responsibility
for education, have tackled the problem for more than ten years with
only marginal success. The governors of these states as well as education
experts have begun to question whether fundamental alterations in the
design and structure of the system for providing education must be
made.73 However, there is considerable controversy over what the na-
ture of those alterations should be. Proposals have ranged from priva-
tization to enhanced governmental involvement, with a host of variations
in between.74 In formulating its education policies, the Bush administra-
tion has mirrored this debate, assuming an unprecedented interventionist
and leadership role in relation to education, 75 while simultaneously at-
tempting to cede increased responsibility for schooling and school reform
to the private sector.76
70 BLOOM, supra note 2, at 239-40; RAvITCH & FINN, supra note 29, at 203; RAVITCH, supra
note 29, at 25.
71 See CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 104.
72 DYLAN THOMAS, Do Not Go Gentle into that Good Night, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF
DYLAN THOMAS 128 (New Directions Publishing Corp. 1957).
73 E.g., GOVERNORS' ASS'N, EDUCATING AMERICA, supra note 4, at 8, 33-35; JOHN E. CHUBB
& TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990); MYRON LIEBERMAN,
PRIVATIZATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE (1989); Educational Visions Team, New World
Found., Progressive Federalism: New Ideas for Distributing Money and Power in Education, in
GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE, supra note 29, at 419-35; Task Force on Educ. Excellence, Nat'l Educ.
Ass'n, The NEA's Plan for School Reform, in GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE, supra note 29, at 405-18;
Ernest L. Boyer, For Education: National Strategy, Local Control, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1989, at
A31.
74 Compare GOVERNORS' ASS'N, EDUCATING AMERICA, supra note 4, at 8, 30-35 (calling for
the cooperative participation of federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector
and voluntary organizations, in ameliorating the crisis; and noting the need to strengthen and per-
haps change the federal government's role) with CHUBB & MOE, supra note 73, at 215-25 (promoting
the market mechanism of giving parents and children "choice" in selecting schools without priva-
tization of public schooling) and with LIEBERMAN, supra note 73, at 4-5 (urging choice with priva-
tization of public school systems) and with Educational Visions Team, New World Found., supra
note 73, at 419-35 (proposing expanded social and fiscal responsibilities for education at all govern-
mental levels and a redefinition of governmental roles so as to increase the federal government's
financial contribution to the schools).
75 Education issues analyst Edward B. Fiske has highlighted the unprecedented national ap-
proach taken by the framers of the Jeffersonian Compact: "The goals they [the framers] set were
ambitious, and political veterans could not recall any previous occasion on which the White House
and the National Governors' Association had agreed on a set of goals for anything, much less an
enterprise that is generally considered to be a local affair." Edward B. Fiske, Lessons: With Bright
National Goals for Schools Set, Governors Puzzle Over How to Attain Them, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
1990, at B8 [hereinafter Fiske, Bright Goals].
76 In April 1991, the White House issued a wide-ranging plan for reforming education. The plan
includes proposals for setting national standards in order to define what students should know; for
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The private sector has proven a valuable ally in the search for an
improved educational system. However, while welcoming continued
assistance from this quarter, it is also important to evaluate which sector
of society is optimally positioned to pull the nation out of its educational
crisis. The private sector understandably has its own institutional inter-
ests to protect and, like the states, may find it more difficult to attain the
national perspective that comes from governance of a country in its en-
tirety. Nor is the private sector organized or empowered to cajole indi-
vidual businesses into implementing a sustained and synchronized
national education strategy.77
By the very act of instigating and entering into the Jeffersonian
Compact, the White House gravitated, reflexively perhaps, toward recog-
nition of the strategic value of further pervasive involvement by the fed-
eral government in education reform. For, what is the creation of this
compact if not a tacit admission that there is a need for a national plan,
spearheaded by the federal government and developed in a new collabo-
ration with the states, to overcome the crisis and stabilize elementary and
secondary schools at an acceptable level of educational quality?
national student testing; for research and development by the private sector to invent new kinds of
schools; and for giving parents "choice" in selecting their children's schools. The latter proposal
envisions diverting governmental monies from the public schools to "follow" individual students
who wish to attend a private school. In addition to encouraging states to free school tax dollars in
this way, the Bush administration would like to see the federal laws amended so that Chapter I
funds, currently destined for public schools serving needy children, could be used to "follow" indi-
vidual disadvantaged students to the private schools of their choice. Susan Chira, Bush School Plan
Would Encourage Choice by Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1991, at Al [hereinafter Chira, Choice by
Parents]. Some criticize this portion of the plan for its tendency to undermine those public schools
which are already weak and for its abandonment of those troubled students who may be unequipped
to exercise the "choice" option or who will be rejected by their chosen school. School Choice, With-
out Harm, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1991, § 4, at 16; see also Chira, Choice by Parents, supra, passim
(setting forth Senator Edward M. Kennedy's negative reaction to the plan). Likewise, the Presi-
dent's charge to the business community to develop model schools has stirred considerable contro-
versy and opposition. Susan Chira, A Sea of Doubt Swells Around Bush's Education Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 1991, at A12 [hereinafter Chira, Sea of Doubt]; Karen DeWitt, Brought to You by
Exxon-School Reform, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1991, § 4, at 4 [hereinafter DeWitt, Exxon School
Reform].
77 Cf., e.g., Chira, Sea of Doubt, supra note 76, passim (reporting that some business leaders,
asked by President Bush to raise funds for the establishment of model schools, have criticized the
request due to the recession and because, the leaders predict, compliance will result in switching
funds from ongoing projects); DeWitt, Exxon School Reform, supra note 76, passim (noting that
many business leaders worry that the President's request for corporate involvement in the develop-
ment of new model schools will cause existing philanthropic programs for education to suffer); Wil-
liam Celis 3d, Business Tax Breaks are Hurting Schools, Educators Complain, N.Y. TIMEs, May 22,
1991, at Al (reporting that many of the companies which have aided deteriorating public schools
have also insisted on substantial tax breaks from their communities, thereby reducing funds available
to finance public education).
Indeed, education experts and business executives have said that, with respect to that element of
the President's plan favoring privatization of schooling, the "most fundamental problem.., is that
the President has not shown how his plan will lead to broad-based, systemic change." Chira, Sea of
Doubt, supra note 76, passim.
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If what is needed is a national approach entailing a more audacious
and far-ranging role for the federal government beyond supplementing
state education efforts, then the issue arises as to whether the legal sys-
tem can be understood to countenance such further developments. The
executive branch, with its various calls for national education goals, the
elements of a national core curriculum, national education standards,
and national student testing, among other proposals, 78 has begun to
sound as if the day is not far off before the question may be raised
whether a more national approach comports with constitutional
doctrines.
As discussed in Part IV of this Article, a positive right to education
under the Constitution would not only accommodate a new role for the
federal government in implementing a national approach, but would
mandate it by obligating the federal government ultimately to assure ful-
fillment of the right and, therefore, of a certain level of quality education.
The Supreme Court has seriously considered whether such a right exists.
And, while not yet recognizing the right, the Court has demonstrated a
marked reluctance to foreclose the possibility of its future recognition.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE RIGHT TO
EDUCATION UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The Supreme Court has primarily encountered the argument that
there is a federal constitutional right to education in the context of equal
protection cases decided over the course of the past two decades.79 How-
ever, well before the heyday of equal protection, in Meyer v. Nebraska,80
the Court advanced the notion that seeking knowledge has a constitu-
tional dimension under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause."' In Meyer, a parochial school teacher challenged the constitu-
tionality of a Nebraska statute under which he had been convicted for
violating its prohibition against teaching foreign languages to students
who had not yet passed the eighth grade.82 Relying upon the substantive
78 The National Commission on Excellence in Education described the elements of a core curric-
ulum which, in its view, were necessary nationwide. NAT'L COMM'N, NATION AT RISK, supra note
4, at 24-27. The Jeffersonian Compact enunciated the need for national education goals. Jefferso-
nian Compact, supra note 44, at 1487. Six national education goals were adopted by the nation's
governors in 1990. GovERNORs' ASS'N, EDUCATING AMERICA, supra note 4, at 36-38. The Bush
administration has also called for national education standards and national student testing. De-
Witt, Bush Pushes Education Goals, supra note 52, passim; Karen DeWitt, The Push to Consider a
Once Taboo Subject: National School Tests, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1991, § 4, at E5; Felicity Barringer,
Education Panel Sets Guidelines on Achievement, N.Y. TIMEs, May 13, 1990, § 1, at 18.
79 See infra notes 90-144 and accompanying text.
80 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
81 Id. at 399. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, "IN]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
82 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97.
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due process theory which held sway at the time,83 the Court found the
statute unconstitutional as applied because it contravened certain liber-
ties guaranteed by the clause.84 The Court included among the pertinent
liberties the right to acquire useful knowledge.8 5
The Meyer "education right" 86 has survived to this day,87 although
the particular brand of substantive due process upon which it is premised
has fallen by the wayside.88 It was conceived and is presently compre-
hended as a negative right in the sense that, rather than imposing any
affirmative obligation upon government to provide education, it simply
forbids government from impeding individuals in their quest for informa-
tion and enlightenment.8 9
After a long hiatus following the Meyer decision, the positive educa-
tion right also had its day in court, but as a function of equal protection
rather than due process analysis. The seminal case is San Antonio In-
dependent School District v. Rodriguez,90 a class action brought on behalf
of Mexican-American schoolchildren who challenged that component of
Texas' system of financing public education based on local property
taxes. The gravamen of the complaint was that Texas had violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause insofar as this aspect
of the financing scheme caused school districts with low property tax
bases to receive less funds than districts with higher property tax bases. 91
83 See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text. Although the substantive due process theory
which prevailed from 1897 to 1937 is discussed more fully in Part III of this Article, at this juncture
it may be helpful to point out that the Court typically used the theory to protect economic liberty
rights, such as the right to contract, which could not be curtailed by government unless pursuant to
the exercise of the state's police power in the interests of the general welfare. LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-2 to 8-4 (2d ed. 1988).
84 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401, 403.
85 Id. at 399.
86 In 1986, the Supreme Court described Meyer as having established childrearing and education
rights. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986); see Gard, supra note 67, at 13.
Some commentators have characterized the rights established in Meyer as privacy rights essen-
tially comprised of the individual's freedom to make decisions concerning his or her personal life.
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1589 (Johnny H. Killian ed., 1987) [here-
inafter CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS]; TRIBE, supra note 83, § 15-20.
This does not negate or run counter to conceptualizing Meyer as also recognizing a right to acquire
knowledge. See TRIBE, supra note 83, § 12-19, at 944 n.4, and § 15-6, at 1320; David Favre &
Matthew McKinnon, The New Prometheus: Will Scientific Inquiry Be Bound by the Chains of Gov-
ernment Regulations?, 19 DUQ. L. REv. 651, 707, 709-11 (1981).
87 TRIBE, supra note 83, § 15-6; Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 988-89 (1979). For other cases decided in the 1920s and adopting the
Meyer Court's reasoning, see Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
88 TRIBE, supra note 83, §§ 85 to 8-7.
89 Edelman, supra note 67, at 25 & n.99; see TRIBE, supra note 83, § 12-19, at 944 & n.4.
90 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
91 Id. at 4, 17-41, 47. The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Plaintiffs-appellees urged the Supreme Court to review the chal-
lenged legislation under the strict scrutiny standard, the most stringent
measure of a statute's constitutionality, and, therefore, the most
favorable standard of review available to them.92 However, in order to
invoke successfully strict scrutiny, plaintiffs were required by the Court
to meet one of two criteria: either the challenged law must infringe upon
a fundamental right under the Constitution, or the law must adversely
affect a suspect class.93 It is in considering the first criterion that the
Court confronted the question of whether a positive federal constitu-
tional right to education exists.94
While acknowledging the critical importance of education to the na-
tion,95 Justice Powell's majority opinion maintained that the importance
of a service performed by government is not germane to ascertaining
whether there is a fundamental constitutional right to that service.96
Rather, the sole test for discerning a fundamental right is that the right
must be "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. '97
Plaintiffs attempted to meet this test by arguing that education con-
stitutes an implicit right. Their theory was that education attains this
status because it is a virtual prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of free
speech under the First Amendment and of the right to vote.98 The Court
rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the Court recalled that
"we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to
guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed
electoral choice." 99 Second, the Court expressed a floodgates concern
that if education were a fundamental right under the Constitution, then
food and shelter could not logically be denied that status.100
These responses seem a most unsatisfying way of disposing of the
issue, for they are very like non sequiturs. With respect to the first re-
sponse, it should be noted that plaintiffs were not seeking the most effec-
tive speech or the most informed electoral choice. 1" 1 Nor would
92 411 U.S. at 17, 28-29. Under the strict scrutiny standard of review, the Texas statutes would
be upheld only if the state could show that the statutes furthered some compelling state interest. Id.
at 16-17.
93 Id. at 17.
94 Id. at 29.
95 Id. at 29-30.
96 Id. at 30-33.
97 Id. at 33-34.
98 Id. at 35-36.
99 Id. at 36.
100 Id. at 37.
101 Id. at 115-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Brief for Appellees at 25, 31-34, San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (No. 71-1332). During oral argument before the U.S.
Supreme Court, counsel for plaintiffs-appellees fleetingly mentioned that there should be a "maxi-
mum" educational program in Texas public schools. However, he did not explain what such a
program would entail and made no claim that it must endow the citizenry with the ability to articu-
late the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice. Oral Argument on Behalf of
86:550 (1992)
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recognition of a right to education necessarily require that the right must
yield the most effective speech or the most informed vote, a point which
the majority conceded elsewhere in the same opinion.102
The reasoning of the second response is similarly inapposite. If the
sole test for determining the existence of fundamental rights under the
Constitution is that they must be explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
that document, then the floodgates concern should not figure into the
calculus. Moreover, even if a floodgates effect were a legitimate analyti-
cal consideration, the majority opinion did not explore whether there are
grounds for distinguishing education from other basic needs. It is not as
if the search would be patently futile, since Justice Marshall did explore
precisely this question in his dissent and discovered a distinguishing
characteristic: education bears an immediate relationship to constitu-
tional concerns for free speech and democratic government while the re-
lationship of food, housing, and other basic needs is more attenuated.103
It is on the basis of such incongruous counter-arguments that the
Rodriguez majority concluded that education is not among the rights af-
forded implicit protection under the Constitution. t04 However, what is
perhaps most intriguing about Rodriguez is that the majority declined to
leave the matter in these unequivocal terms of repudiation. In dicta that
one commentator has dubbed the "unheld holding" of Rodriguez,105 the
Court indicated that, in an appropriate case, it might find that there is a
right to "some identifiable quantum of education" sufficient to provide
children with the "basic minimal skills" necessary for the enjoyment of
the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.' 0 6
Appellees, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (No. 71-1332), in 76
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 572, 590 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds., 1975).
102 The Court indirectly admits as much in hypothesizing a right to education which would be
violated if children were not to receive the basic minimal skills essential for the enjoyment of free
speech and voting rights. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37.
103 Id. at 115 n.74 (Marshall, J., dissenting). A few commentators have observed that state con-
stitutions often link education, but not housing or health, to the preservation of democratic values.
John E. Coons et al., Educational Opportunity: .4 Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial
Structures, 57 CAL. L. REV. 305, 387-89 (1969); Betsy Levin, Commentary: Education as a Constitu-
tional Entitlement: .4 Proposed Judicial Standard for Determining How Much Is Enough, 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 703, 712-13 [hereinafter Levin, Judicial Standard].
104 411 U.S. at 35. Because the Court determined that neither a fundamental right nor a suspect
class were involved in the Rodriguez litigation, the Court reviewed the Texas legislation under the
rational relationship standard of review which merely requires that state legislation be shown to bear
some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes in order for the legislation to be upheld. Id. at
40.
105 Preovolos, supra note 68, at 75, 78-83.
106 It is worth setting forth the Court's "unheld holding" in full:
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally pro-
tected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right [to free speech or to vote], we have
no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an education
that falls short. Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system
occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument
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The Court explained that it did not reach this issue in Rodriguez because
no allegation could fairly be made that Texas failed to provide its school-
children with such skills.10 7 The Court cited an absolute denial of educa-
tion to school-age children as an example of a case where the Justices
might someday reach the issue.10 8
This portion of Justice Powell's opinion reflects an unwillingness to
adopt a rigid and absolutist position against the right. Rather, the major-
ity opinion implicitly acknowledges the possibility that the Constitution
may be interpreted to support a positive right to education, i.e., a right to
have government provide education (in contrast to the negative Meyer
right to be free of governmental impediments to the acquisition of educa-
tion).10 9 The language signifies that the Rodriguez decision does not pre-
clude the Court from finding a positive constitutional right to education
on another occasion. Thus, the status of the right under the Federal
Constitution remains an open question. 110
The Supreme Court's next encounter with education as a positive
provides no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative differ-
ences in spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the present case-no charge fairly
could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the
basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation
in the political process.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37.
107 Id. Indeed, the Court ultimately held that Texas' legislation passed muster under the rational
relationship standard of review. Id. at 44-55.
108 Id. at 37. Because the Court described an appropriate case in which to recognize the right to
education as one in which a state's financing system causes a complete denial of educational opportu-
nities to its schoolchildren, some commentators have considered whether the Court only meant to
leave open the possibility that there is a right to have the states refrain from a total denial of the
opportunity to acquire minimal basic skills. See, eg., Levin, Judicial Standard, supra note 103, at
708. I tend toward the view that this is too restricted a reading of the Rodriguez language since the
Court also stated in the same paragraph that children might have a constitutional claim if the state
denied them the opportunity to acquire the basic skills necessary for enjoyment of free speech and
voting rights. Stuart Biegel, Reassessing the Applicability of Fundamental Rights Analysis The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Shaping of Educational Policy After Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public
Schools, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1078, 1084 (1989); Betsy Levin, The Courts, Congress, and Educa-
tional Adequacy: The Equal Protection Predicament, 39 MD. L. REv. 187, 260 (1979) [hereinafter
Levin, Educational Adequacy]; Preovolos, supra note 68, at 75, 78-83; Gershon M. Ratner, A New
Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEx. L. REv. 777, 831
& n.232, 850 (1985); Wright, supra note 68, at 56-57.
109 E.g., Biegel, supra note 108, at 1084; Edelman, supra note 67, at 33; James S. Liebman, Imple-
menting Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively En-
forced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REv. 349, 420 (1990); Lupu, supra note 87, at 1045; Preovolos,
supra note 68, at 75, 78-83; Ratner, supra note 108, at 850; Wright, supra note 68, at 56-57; see
Laurence H. Tribe, Commentary: The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirma-
tive Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330, 334 (1985) [hereinafter Tribe,
Inalienable Rights].
110 Julius Chambers, Adequate Education for All: A Right, an Achievable Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 55, 69-70 (1987); Paul R. Dimond, The Constitutional Right to Education: The Quiet
Revolution, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1087, 1102-03 (1973); Liebman, supra note 109, at 420; Preovolos,
supra note 68, at 83; Ratner, supra note 108, at 850; Wright, supra note 68, at 56-57; see Biegel, supra
note 108, at 1084; Edelman, supra note 67, at 33; Lupu, supra note 87, at 1045.
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fundamental right came nine years later in Plyler v. Doe.1 1 This case
was brought on behalf of undocumented school-age children assailing the
constitutionality, under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, of Texas statutes which authorized public school districts to deny
tuition-free enrollment to such children and which withheld from the
districts state funds for the education of illegal alien children. Plaintiffs-
appellees contended that this legislation violated the Equal Protection
Clause by denying undocumented children the free public education that
other children residing within Texas continued to enjoy. 112
Although, as in Rodriguez, the Court did not opt to review the legis-
lation under a strict scrutiny standard, the Court also did not choose the
least rigorous standard of review-the rational relationship test-which
had been employed in Rodriguez. Instead, the Plyler Court invoked the
intermediate or, as it is sometimes called, heightened scrutiny standard of
review1 13 based, in part, on the status of education under the Constitu-
tion. The Court took the position that while "[p]ublic education is not a
'right' granted to individuals by the Constitution ... neither is it merely
some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social
welfare legislation."'1 14 The Court explained that "[b]oth the importance
of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact
of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction."'1 15
But if education is not a constitutional right, and if it is also not just
another governmental benefit, then what is it? In his dissent, Chief Jus-
tice Burger-with some justification-found such reasoning to be tanta-
mount to a "quasi-fundamental-rights analysis." 116  Indeed, if the
Rodriguez Court opened the door to a positive right to education, the
Plyler majority may have momentarily straddled the threshold. 117 Yet,
111 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
112 Id. at 205.
113 As conceived in Plyer, under the intermediate or heightened scrutiny standard of review, state
legislation will be sustained in the face of an equal protection challenge if the legislation furthers
some substantial state goal. Id. at 217-18 & n.16, 223-24; see also TRIBE, supra note 83, § 16-32, at
1602-03 (discussing the various forms of intermediate scrutiny and referring to the variant of inter-
mediate scrutiny in Plyer as "a new form of heightened scrutiny.")
114 Id. at 221.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also TRIBE, supra note 83, § 16-23, at 1551 (referring
to the Plyler majority's "not-quite-fundamental right"). But see Wright, supra note 68, at 57 (read-
ing Plyler as temporarily discouraging fundamental right status for education).
117 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 83, § 16-23, at 1551; Ratner, supra note 108, at 840 n.287; Jim
Clark, Note, Plyler v. Doe: Broadening the Boundaries of Intermediate Scrutiny in Equal Protection
Cases, 36 ARK. L. REV. 383, 399 (1982); Ruth Jones, Note, Plyler v. Doe-Education and Illegal
Alien Children, 8 BLACK L.J. 132, 132 (1983); cf Biegel, supra note 108, at 1086 (noting that
although Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Plyler stated that education is not a constitutional
right, "his reasoning followed the usual pattern of fundamental rights analysis"). But see Deirdre
Dexter, Note, Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause: The Effect of Plyler v. Doe on
Intermediate Scrutiny, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 321, 337 (1983) (observing that Plyer treats education as a
"prized right of our society not deemed fundamental"). Interestingly, in a later case, the Court
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in the final analysis, this step was probably more conservative than dy-
namic. The Rodriguez majority had expressed a willingness to recognize
the right in the context of an absolute denial of public education-the
circumstance, in effect, presented in Plyler.118 The Plyler Court, while
not indicating any disagreement with that option in future cases, also
cautiously forebore to take full advantage of it at the first opportunity. 19
Given the ambivalence of Plyler, one might suppose that Papasan v.
Allain,120 the next case involving an asserted right to education, would
bring some further clarification of the issue. However, the factual pos-
ture of the latter case did not provide an opportunity for movement on
the question one way or the other. In Papasan, schoolchildren and local
public school officials in Mississippi's Chickasaw Cession brought an ac-
tion predicated, in part, on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The complaint charged that the state's distribution of
Sixteenth Section Land funds resulted in a funding disparity that favored
schools outside of the Cession. This disparity, it was alleged, denied peti-
tioners the minimally adequate education which children in other areas
of the state were assured. 121 Based on these allegations, petitioners ar-
gued that there was a federal constitutional right to minimally adequate
education, that Mississippi had infringed upon that right, and that, con-
sequently, the state's conduct should be reviewed under the strict scru-
tiny standard. 122
The Court declined this invitation, since the criteria for applying
strict scrutiny had not been fulfilled. 123 The Court observed, in dicta,
that under Rodriguez and Plyler the question of whether a fundamental
constitutional right to education exists "has not yet [been] definitively
described the Plyler majority opinion as not settling the question of whether a right to education
exists under the Constitution. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986); see also Patrick R. Hugg,
Federalism's Full Circle: Relieffor Education Discrimination, 35 Loy. L. REv. 13, 32 (1989) (em-
phasizing the Papasan Court's characterization of Plyler).
118 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
119 Michael A. Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, Toll v. Moreno, and Postsecondary Admissions: Undocu-
mentedAdults and "Enduring Disability," 15 LL. & EDUC. 19, 26 (1986); Joanne C. Slotnik, Plyler
v. Doe: Paving the Way for Heightened Judicial Scrutiny in ConstitutionalAdjudication of Denials of
Education, 9 J. CONTEMP. L. 235, 243-44 (1983); Carl D. Rosenblum, Comment, State Statute
Denying Undocumented Aliens Access to Free Public Education Unconstitutional, Plyler v. Doe, 6
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.. 367, 380 & n.83 (1982).
However, the Plyler Court, applying heightened rather than strict scrutiny to Texas' denial of a
free public education to illegal alien children, still found that the denial served no substantial state
interest and, therefore, that the state statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause. Plyler, 457 U.S.
at 230.
120 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
121 Id. at 274.
122 Id. at 285.
123 The Court ruled that the rational relationship test was the proper standard of review and
remanded for a determination of whether Mississippi had a rational reason for the funding disparity.
Id. at 286, 289-92.
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settled." 124 Nor did the Court see any reason to settle the question in
Papasan since the petitioners alleged no facts in support of the claim that
they were deprived of a minimally adequate education.1 25 Thus, Papasan
left matters where they were. Perhaps the main interest of the case, for
purposes of this discussion, lies in the fact that Justice White's opinion
for the Court confirmed what was not quite said outright before-it re-
mains an open question whether there can be a positive right to educa-
tion under the Constitution. 126
This is how things stood when the Supreme Court handed down
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools,12 7 the most recent and puzzling
case in the quadrumvirate of equal protection decisions addressing edu-
cation as a constitutional right. Plaintiffs-appellants were a schoolgirl,
Sarita Kadrmas, and her mother. They sued the Dickinson Public
School District because it charged the Kadrmas family, which lived on
an income at or near the poverty level, $97 per year to transport Sarita by
school bus over the sixteen mile distance between her home and
school. 128 The North Dakota statute which plaintiffs challenged permit-
ted nonreorganized school districts, on the latter's own authority, to
charge a fee for transporting students to and from school, but allowed
reorganized school districts this option only upon the direct approval of
voters. Plaintiffs, who resided in a nonreorganized school district, con-
tended that the fee and this difference between nonreorganized and reor-
ganized districts constituted a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. 129 A factual oddity of the case was that be-
cause the Kadrmases arranged for the private transportation of Sarita
between home and school, her parents' refusal to pay the bus fee never
prevented Sarita from attending school. 130
Plaintiffs-appellants pressed the Court to apply a heightened scru-
tiny standard of review; they made no attempt to persuade the Court to
use strict scrutiny.1 3 1 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court, how-
ever, characterized the Kadrmases as seeking strict scrutiny, or height-
ened scrutiny if strict scrutiny were refused. 132 She also represented their
brief as offering as a rationale for strict scrutiny that the bus fee unconsti-
124 Id. at 285.
125 Id. at 286.
126 Id. at 285. The Papasan Court's reaffirmation of the uncertain status of the right to education
has been highlighted by several commentators. E.g., Hugg, supra note 117, at 32; Liebman, supra
note 109, at 420; Wright, supra note 68, at 57.
127 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
128 Id. at 454-55.
129 Id. at 455.
130 Id. at 455-56, 458.
131 Brief for Appellants at 15-18, Kadrmas (No. 86-7113).
132 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court stated that plaintiffs-appellants sought to have the
Court "apply a form of strict or 'heightened' scrutiny to the North Dakota statute." Kadrmas, 487
U.S. at 458.
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tutionally deprived those who could not afford it of minimum access to
education. 133 The Kadrmases did, it is true, assert that they were uncon-
stitutionally deprived of such minimum access to education. But, the
right to education which they asserted was a state created right and did
not independently arise from the provisions of the Constitution. In es-
sence, plaintiffs-appellants' arguments revolved around the constitution-
ality of North Dakota's purported withdrawal of such an important
state-created benefit and the need for the Court's heightened scrutiny of
such state action.134
Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor addressed the applicability of strict
scrutiny and concluded that it was inappropriate on three grounds, two
of which are pertinent here. First, she dismissed the possibility that
Sarita had been denied a fundamental right of minimum access to educa-
tion, reasoning that inasmuch as Sarita had continued to attend public
school during the period of her exclusion from the bus, there could be no
denial of minimum access. 135
Justice O'Connor then surmised that plaintiffs-appellants must have
meant to argue that the Equal Protection Clause requires states to pro-
vide students like Sarita with free transportation to and from school, re-
gardless of whether such transportation is essential in providing access to
school, and that the fundamental right to such transportation would ne-
cessitate strict scrutiny. 136 The Court likewise struck down this alterna-
tive rationale for strict scrutiny by invoking the proposition that the
Court had not yet accepted "that education is a 'fundamental right,'...
which should trigger strict scrutiny" with citations to Rodriguez, Plyler,
and Papasan in support thereof.137
While it is true that these cases establish that the Court has not yet
accepted a positive constitutional right to education, the appearance of
this proposition in Kadrmas is baffling. The proposition is posed by Jus-
133 Id. at 458.
134 Brief for Appellants at 12, Kadrmas (No. 86-7113).
135 Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 458.
136 Id. at 458. Counsel for plaintiffs-appellants did have the following exchange with the Court in
which the right to transportation was mentioned:
QUESTION: That may be so, but if we rely on that, then we would have to be saying that
North Dakota is constitutionally required to furnish bus transportation to poor people, who
have no way for their children to get to school.
MR. HOUDEK: I think what it would-that's a fair characterization, Your Honor.
QUESTION: I think it is, too.
Record of Oral Argument on Behalf of Appellants at 15, Kadrmas (No. 86-7113).
However, the meaning of this cursory reference is unclear in view of the fact that appellants
stated in their reply brief: "[I]t should be noted that we are not discussing a claim that all children
in North Dakota have [a] constitutional right to be bused to school." Reply Brief of the Appellants
at 5, Kadrmas (No. 86-7113).
137 Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 458. Without discussion, Justice O'Connor also reiterated the proposi-
tion at the close of her opinion to the effect that the challenged North Dakota statute "interferes
with no fundamental right." Id. at 465.
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tice O'Connor as apparently countering a claim that Safita had a consti-
tutional right to free transportation between home and school. 138 But, if
that were the Kadrmas' claim, then plaintiffs-appellants were asserting a
right to free transportation, 139 not a right to education, and the Rodri-
guez-Plyler-Papasan proposition would not address the right asserted.
Consider, then, whether the proposition is pure dictum, as it is used
in Justice O'Connor's opinion, or whether it takes on some new signifi-
cance as an integrated part of the holding in Kadrmas. Even assuming
arguendo that the Kadrmases sought strict scrutiny, and assuming fur-
ther that the Kadrmases were really asserting a right to free transporta-
tion, then why should the Court even reach the issue of whether there is
a fundamental right to education under the Constitution? Indeed, the
Kadrmases made no other allegations before the Supreme Court regard-
ing the quality or quantity of education provided to Sarita once inside the
schoolhouse door. 140 Thus, the Kadrmas majority's reiteration of the
proposition that the Court has not yet accepted the right to education
seems totally gratuitous and quite out of place.14'
More curious still is the Kadrmas Court's failure even to mention
the "unheld holding" of Rodriguez and its continued vitality in Plyler
and Papasan. Did the Kadrmas Court mean in this way to answer the
open question as to whether there can be a positive right to education
under the Constitution? It does not seem plausible that the Court under-
took to resolve this issue, about which the Justices were in such a quan-
dry, with a single cryptic and conclusory statement. 142
138 I use the word "apparently" because Justice O'Connor did not clearly indicate that she meant
the proposition to answer a claim that there is a right to free transportation. However, the proposi-
tion appears to have no other discernible purpose in her analysis. See Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 458.
139 Justice Marshall aptly noted in a dissent joined by Justice Brennan that the Kadrmas majority
treated the case as turning on "the provision of transportation, rather than the provision of educa-
tional services." Id. at 466 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Hence, he concluded that the Kadrmas Court
"does not address the question of whether a State constitutionally could deny a child access to a
minimally adequate education." Id. at 466 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Jeffrey Jenkins, Note,
No Free Ride to the Schoolhouse Gate: Equal Protection Analysis in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public
Schools, 20 N.M. L. REv. 161, 175-77 (1990) [hereinafter Note, No Free Ride] (characterizing the
Kadrmas majority opinion as addressing a right to transportation rather than a right to education);
see also Michele Benson, Comment, Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools: A Search for a Consis-
tent Equal Protection Standard in Education, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 581, 593-94 (1989) [herein-
after Comment, Consistent Equal Protection] (contending that the majority opinion treated the
Kadrmas' claim as one to be free from a user fee rather than as a claim to a right to education); cf.
The Supreme Court 1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143, 208 (1988) ("The Court
failed to define 'fundamental right' " in Kadrmas.).
140 Brief for Appellants passim, Kadrmas (No. 86-7113); Reply Brief of the Appellants passim,
Kadrmas (No. 86-7113).
141 See Note, No Free Ride, supra note 139, at 175 & n.147.
142 Id.; see Comment, Consistent Equal Protection, supra note 139, at 594, 601. Moreover, some
commentators go so far as to suggest that Justice O'Connor's majority opinion, in dicta, expressly
left open the question of whether a constitutional right to minimal educational access exists. Biegel,
supra note 108, at 1085; Hugg, supra note 117, at 34.
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No doubt, the Kadrmas "statement" reflects an unfriendly attitude
on the part of at least five of the Justices toward a positive right to educa-
tion under the Constitution. As such, it probably dims any expectations
that the Court will soon recognize the right. On the other hand, the
Kadrmas decision's one-line statement that there is no constitutional
right to education can hardly be taken, as a matter of stare decisis, to
preclude the Court from finding the right at some future date. As used in
Kadrmas, the statement is dictum and without much logical relevance to
the matters litigated. Thus, although it is the Court's last word on the
subject, Kadrmas probably adds nothing and subtracts but little from the
analysis of the right to education developed in Rodriguez, Plyler, and
Papasan.1 43
In sum, the right to education is obviously no stranger to American
constitutional jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has long recognized
the existence of a negative right to education as one of the liberties guar-
anteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment such
that government is barred from obstructing the individual's acquisition
of knowledge. Through an equal protection analysis, the Court has also
considered whether the Constitution may embrace a positive right to ed-
ucation which would require government to provide public education to
school-age children. These equal protection cases, taken together, have
established two propositions: a positive right to education under the
Constitution has not yet been accepted; and, it is still an open question
whether children may someday have a positive constitutional right to
demand that government provide them with "some identifiable quan-
tum" of education so as to enable each child "to acquire the basic mini-
mal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process." 144
The open question has remained on the nation's agenda for close to
twenty years. Must it forever elude resolution? Does the Constitution
contain no answer to an issue of such import? As the analysis which
follows demonstrates, the Constitution does indeed contain an answer
and the question need not and should not, in good conscience, remain
open any longer.
143 Justice O'Connor also rejected the Kadrmas' plea for heightened scrutiny by distinguishing
Plyer from Kadrmas on factual grounds, i.e., that unlike the illegal alien children in Plyler, Sarita
had not been penalized for the illegal conduct of her parents; and that unlike the total denial of
public education to the undocumented children in Plyler, the bus fee would not create a subclass of
illiterates. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 450. In addition, Justice O'Connor construed the Plyler Court's
use of a heightened scrutiny standard as unique and inapplicable to factual situations other than
those presented by the Plyler litigation. Id. at 450.
Having rejected the heightened scrutiny standard of review, the Court then applied the rational
relationship test and held that North Dakota's school transportation practices did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Id at 465.
144 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973).
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III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A POSITIVE RIGHT TO
EDUCATION UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
A. Some Preliminary Matters
1. The Normalcy of Implied Constitutional Rights. -That the Con-
stitution does not expressly posit a right to education by no means ends
the controversy over whether the right exists. This, of course, is the
teaching of Rodriguez: rights may arise by implication from the Consti-
tution's provisions as well as by explicit reference.1 45 Nor are implied
constitutional rights aberrational. Over the years, the Supreme Court
has recognized an extensive array of diverse implied rights which have
become part of the lexicon of modem constitutional jurisprudence.1 46
The Constitution contains a number of provisions any one of which
arguably forms the analytical basis for an implied positive right to educa-
tion. However, because not all of these bases are necessarily of equal
interest, I have chosen to focus mainly on those constitutional provisions
and doctrines which make the strongest and most influential case for the
right. 147 Of these provisions, modem substantive due process theory
145 Id. at 17, 33 & n.78; see infra notes 407-28 and accompanying text (setting forth a full discus-
sion of the Ninth Amendment's role as authority for recognizing implied rights under the
Constitution).
146 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (right to an open criminal
trial); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (rights to a presumption of innocence and to demand
proof beyond a reasonable doubt before being convicted of a crime); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978) (the right to marry or not to marry); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(right to make one's own choice about having children); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(right to travel interstate); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (right to receive
information); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (right to retain American citizenship, in spite of
commission of criminal activities, until expressly and voluntarily renouncing it); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (right
to vote); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (right to use the federal courts and to advise others
to use them); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (right to hold one's
own beliefs); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1928) (right of association); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to rear children in accordance with parental values and
beliefs).
147 No effort is made in this Article to locate a positive right to education in the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The omission is, in a sense, ironic. Rodriguez, Plyler,
Papasan, and Kadrmas, the cases which have thus far broached the question of whether there is a
positive federal right to education, are, in fact, all equal protection decisions. Nonetheless, in Rodri-
guez, the case which sets forth the most substantive discussion of the matter, the Court considered
the envisioned right as flowing, not from the language of the Equal Protection Clause, but, rather,
from the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause and from constitutional provisions evincing solici-
tude for individual political participation. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-36; see Gard, supra note 67, at
26-29. Plyler is the only other of the four equal protection cases to give more than glancing attention
to the viability of a positive right to education under the Constitution. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
221-24 (1982). The Plyler Court, with its fear that Texas' education policies might create a "subclass
of illiterates" and a "permanent caste... of cheap labor," may have brought the idea of a constitu-
tionally protected interest in education somewhat nearer to the classic equal protection concerns of
ameliorating invidious discrimination and majoritarian domination. Id. at 230, 218-19; TRIBE, supra
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would presently seem to hold the most promise and is thus given particu-
lar attention.
2. Overcoming the Prejudice Against Positive Constitutional
Rights.-Mainstream legal thought has it that the Constitution is a char-
ter of negative rights protecting Americans against governmental intru-
sions.148 The Rodriguez majority opinion, however, posed the possibility
note 83, § 16-12, at 1463-64, 1465 & n.ll. Yet the Court seemed to rely for its quasi-fundamental
rights analysis not upon equal protection language, but upon such factors as the needs of the nation
and of the nation's children. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
In any event, some commentators have proposed finding a positive right to education in the
Equal Protection Clause. Eg. Levin, Educational Adequacy, supra note 108, at 254-63; Preovolos,
supra note 68, at 120; cf. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Four-
teenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 57-58 (1969) (arguing that theoretically there is a need for
an entitlement under the U.S. Constitution to a minimum level of education, but that the fulfillment
of such need can only be achieved through equal protection claims). One writer suggests the Thir-
teenth Amendment as a foundation for the right as well. Rodic B. Schoen, Nationalization of Public
Education: The Constitutional Question, 4 TEx. TECH L. Ruv. 63, 115, 119-25 (1972). Although
their reasons for invoking the Equal Protection Clause differ on some points, a uniting concern is for
the promotion of equal educational opportunity as well as for the guarantee of some quantum of
adequate education. The linchpin of their analyses is that the rights to equal educational opportu-
nity and to a quantum of adequate education both fit comfortably in the Equal Protection Clause
because the pursuit of equality and the pursuit of adequacy ultimately converge.
I do not quarrel with the desirability of attaining equal educational opportunity or of continuing
to use the Equal Protection Clause for that purpose. I also concur with the notion that educational
equality and educational adequacy or quality are not mutually exclusive concepts. Indeed, these are
values which complement each other and which can and should operate in tandem for the improve-
ment of American education. SALOMONE, supra note 39, at 198-203.
Where I do part company with these writers is in relation to their underlying theorematic con-
struct that because the two concepts are not mutually exclusive, the Equal Protection Clause suffices
as the foundation for a positive right to education just as it suffices as the foundation for a right to
equal educational opportunity. See Levin, Educational Adequacy, supra note 108, at 254-63; Pre-
ovolos, supra note 68, at 120; cf Michelman, supra, at 57-58 (arguing that fulfilling a right to mini-
mum protection of education will require that claims be predicated on notions of inequality or
discrimination). The illogic of this progression becomes readily apparent when one considers that
the Equal Protection Clause could theoretically be satisfied by denying education to all children or
by allocating to each student equal shares of substandard schooling. See Philip B. Kurland, The
Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last?," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405, 419
(1972); cf. Edelman, supra note 67, at 34-35 (under the Equal Protection Clause, "[t]he obvious
question is, if poor or vulnerable children cannot be absolutely deprived of education when it is
provided to others, why can they be absolutely deprived when it is not?"); Michael J. Perry, Equal
Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual Agenda of Constitutional Theory: Reflections on,
and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 329, 336 (1983) ("Abridgement of a fundamental
interest is not an equal protection problem."). But see Levin, EducationalAdequacy, supra note 108,
at 259-63 (arguing that since state governments already provide education, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Federal Constitution requires that states must provide to all children that level of
education which the state considers basic or adequate). Clearly, such a universal denial of education
or severe denigration of its quality across the board would violate a positive right to a quantum of
adequate or quality education even as it might pass muster under equal protection principles.
148 Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271, 2272-78
(1990); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864, 864-67,
878, 889-90 (1986); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a
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that the Constitution is susceptible of giving rise to a positive right to
education.149 While this break with tradition might be discounted as
dicta gone fanciful, it turns out that the concept of such a right has re-
ceived the approbation of a number of legal scholars.' 50 Moreover, the
Supreme Court reiterated the heresy in Papasan.'5'
The Rodriguez dicta, although departing from mainstream thinking,
may actually be quite in harmony with the original intent of the Consti-
tution's framers and the spirit of the final document which they pro-
duced. Evidence of such original intent in relation to governmental
responsibility for education is taken up in Part III.C.3 of this Article.
However, it may assist the reader in considering the arguments which
follow if I digress at this juncture to illustrate, albeit in abbreviated fash-
ion, that the language and spirit of the Constitution accord quite
naturally with the general proposition that there may be positive consti-
tutional rights.
Most rights arising under the Constitution are phrased as prohibi-
tions on government and, therefore, are considered negative rights.152
Yet a mere abundance of negative rights does not mean that the Consti-
tution is thereby rendered devoid of positive rights. This may be readily
ascertained from a perusal of Constitutional provisions which, in fact,
expressly set forth positive rights. 153 The Sixth Amendment nicely illus-
trates the point, 154 as it grants "the accused" a veritable panoply of posi-
tive rights: the right to "enjoy ...a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury," the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation," the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him,
the right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and the right to have assistance of counsel.' 55 Similarly positive in con-
tent is the right described in Article IV of the Constitution that "[t]he
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 410 (1990); see also Charles L.
Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103,
1107 (1986) [hereinafter Black, Jr., Further Reflections] (noting that the "constitutional law of
human rights is traditionally conceived as being a set of prohibitions only, rather than as containing
... affirmative duties"); Tribe, Inalienable Rights, supra note 109, at 330 (remarking that under the
Constitution, "rights tend to be individual, alienable, and negative").
149 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37; see supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
150 See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
151 See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284-85 (1986) (noting that whether a positive right to
education may be recognized in the Constitution remains an unsettled question).
152 Currie, supra note 148, at 864-66; Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv.
873, 888 (1987); Tribe, Inalienable Rights, supra note 109, at 330; see Gerhardt, supra note 148, at
410.
153 Bandes, supra note 148, at 2276; Gerhardt, supra note 148, at 437 & n.117; Tribe, Inalienable
Rights, supra note 109, at 331-32.
154 Bandes, supra note 148, at 2276; Tribe, Inalienable Rights, supra note 109, at 331-32.
155 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Citizens in the several States," 156 and the right to American citizenship
conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment upon "[a]ll persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof."157
While there are only a few isolated instances of express positive
rights in the Constitution, they signify much in a milieu indisposed to the
recognition of such rights. Their presence demonstrates that ours is a
Constitution compatible with the inclusion of positive rights. Or, to put
the matter in tautological but unambiguous terms, the Constitution's ex-
press positive rights show that the Constitution can and does have posi-
tive rights.15 8
This conclusion is further buttressed by the existence of implied pos-
itive constitutional rights as well as express ones. Some scholars have
descried implied positive rights in the many affirmative duties which the
Constitution imposes on government.159 The genesis of this theory lies in
156 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The purpose of this provision is to assure that when the
citizens of State A travel to State B, they will be entitled to partake of the same fundamental rights
enjoyed by the citizens of State B. TRIBE, supra note 83, § 6-34.
157 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262 (1967); Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165, 169 (1964); TRIBE, supra note 83, § 5-16, at 356 (construing this provision
as conferring a right to citizenship on persons born or naturalized in the United States).
158 Tribe, Inalienable Rights, supra note 109, at 331-32.
159 For commentaries which enumerate some of the affirmative duties imposed by the Constitu-
tion on government, see Black, Jr., Further Reflections, supra note 148, at 1111-14; Currie, supra
note 148, at 872-86; and Tribe, Inalienable Rights, supra note 109, at 332.
It is interesting to note that some of the federal government's greatest affirmative duties are set
forth with sweeping eloquence in the Preamble to the Constitution. U.S. CONST. pmbl. Unlike
other provisions of the Constitution, though, the Preamble is treated more as a statement of aspira-
tion than as a source of law. Black, Jr., Further Reflections, supra note 148, at 1107-08. Yet, Profes-
sor Charles Black's query in relation to the Declaration of Independence pertains equally to the
Preamble of the Constitution: "Can we... dare to treat these words as semantically blank?" Id. at
1105. The ramifications of such an inquiry are intriguing. Conceived of as a source of duties and
correlative rights, the elements of the Preamble seem to presuppose an educated citizenry and, there-
fore, an implied positive right to education. For example, if a purpose of the Constitution is to
"provide for the common defence," then the populace has a concomitant right to that defense. This
conclusion is lent added support by the delegation of power to Congress in Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 1 of the Constitution to lay and collect taxes to provide for the nation's defense. Id. at 1113-
14. However, one might also argue that if the right to common defense is to be made capable of
realization, it must include the positive right to education. This relationship between education and
defense has lately come into sharper focus as the juxtaposition of increasingly sophisticated weap-
onry with undereducated troops has drawn national attention. See supra notes 55-58 and accompa-
nying text; Robert J. Goodwin, The Crisis in Public Education and a Constitutional Rationale for
Federal Intervention, 4 DET. C.L. REV. 937, 957 n.100 (1988). Similar reasoning supports recogni-
tion of an implied right to education in the Preamble's assurances that the Constitution was formed
to "promote the general Welfare" and "insure domestic Tranquility." U.S. CONST. pmbl. The rela-
tionship between education and the nation's economic welfare is now all too evident, as is the rela-
tionship between education and the welfare of society's individual members. See supra notes 51-54,
59-69 and accompanying text. The correlation between education and domestic tranquility (mani-
fested as an absence or reduction of crime) is well known, too. See supra notes 59-62 and accompa-
nying text. Finally, liberty is secured to "ourselves and our Posterity" by the Preamble, and,
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the insight that a duty simultaneously creates a right to have the duty
performed, just as the converse holds true-a right implicates a duty to
effectuate the fulfillment of the right. It may be deduced from this
symbiotic relationship between rights and duties that, among the affirma-
tive duties expressly imposed on government by the Constitution, there
are some which contemporaneously create implied, correlative positive
rights. 160 This symbiotic process is manifested in such constitutionally
mandated affirmative duties as the requirements that "a regular State-
ment and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money
shall be published from time to time" by Congress; 161 that the members
of the House of Representatives must be chosen by the people;162 and
that the United States must guarantee to every state a republican form of
government and protection against invasion. 163
Additionally, there are many rights generally thought to be phrased
in the negative, but which may legitimately be read to entail positive
rights and burdens. 164 An example is the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause that no state shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."165 The
clause has been understood to confer upon its beneficiaries the authority
to demand government's affitrmative exertions as well as governmental
restraint in order that equal protection be given its full effect. 166 This
reasoning applies with equal force to the First Amendment's Free Speech
Clause. While the clause states what Congress may not do-abridge free
speech 167-the language has been interpreted to oblige government,
under certain circumstances, to provide resources enabling public access
to fora and information. 168 The Fourth Amendment is another provision
therefore, "[p]osterity has its claims under the Constitution." Arthur S. Miller, Nuclear Weapons
and Constitutional Law, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW 235, 242 (Arthur S. Miller & Martin
Feinrider eds., 1984). This is especially true of the claims of children to the education which will
enable their ultimate liberty and independence. While an argument for a right to education based on
the introductory words of the Constitution is not the most palatable argument available, perhaps
with the continuing deterioration of education and the damage such deterioration is working on
defense, general welfare, tranquility, and liberty, "[tihe time has come to think seriously about giving
substantive content to the preamble." Miller, supra, at 241.
160 Tribe, Inalienable Rights, supra note 109, at 332; cf. Black, Jr., Further Reflections, supra note
148, at 1111-14 (generally inferring from the existence of express affirmative duties the existence of
implied positive constitutional rights).
161 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; see Tribe, Inalienable Rights, supra note 109, at 332.
162 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; see Tribe, Inalienable Rights, supra note 109, at 332 & n.10.
163 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4; see Tribe, Inalienable Rights, supra note 109, at 332.
164 Bandes, supra note 148, at 2282; Currie, supra note 148, at 874-75; Edelman, supra note 67, at
25; Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1326 (1984); Sunstein, supra note 152, at 889.
165 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
166 Bandes, supra note 148, at 2276-77; Michelman, supra note 147, at 16-17; Tribe, Inalienable
Rights, supra note 109, at 332.
167 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
168 Bandes, supra note 148, at 2282 & n.51 (citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)).
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articulated as a prohibition-protecting the sanctity of the home and in-
dividual personal affairs against governmental intrusions.1 69 But, en-
forcement of this prohibition is also contingent upon government
fulfilling the affirmative duty, owed to the citizenry, to obtain a warrant
based on probable cause.17 0 Thus, those constitutional provisions cast in
negative terminology may exist in dialectic union with complementary
positive rights and burdens.171
The orthodox view rejecting the possibility of positive constitutional
rights is, by its very prevalence and longevity, due considerable defer-
ence. Yet, dogmatism and immovability on the subject are also clearly
inappropriate. The plain words of the Constitution as well as the inter-
pretation of those words by legal scholars seem to warrant the unortho-
dox but supportable conclusion that positive rights are neither alien nor
antithetical to American constitutional law.
B. The Substantive Theoretical Foundations for the Right to
Education
1. The Due Process Clause.-The Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits the states from depriving any person of
"life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 1' 72 In attempting
to give content to this sweeping injunction, the Supreme Court has un-
derstood due process as giving rise to conceptually distinct doctrines of
procedural due process and substantive due process.173 The latter has
been further subdivided into two separate modes of analysis for finding
substantive constitutional rights. 174 One mode is that of incorporation,
169 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
170 Bandes, supra note 148, at 2282.
171 See id. at 2282-83.
172 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth Amendment places the same prohibition on the
federal government. Id. at amend. V.
173 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 14.6 (1986) [hereinafter 2 ROTUNDA, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE]; see JOHN H.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14-21 (1980).
174 Some commentators argue that a substantive property right to education arises by operation
of procedural due process pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See, eg., Allen W. Hubsch,
Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. &
EDUC. 93, 109-12 (1989); Liebman, supra note 109, at 406-13. Professor Liebman poses it this way:
Can it be argued, then, that students have a property interest, say, in receiving a diploma and
that among the procedures that are due before the state may withdraw that benefit are instruc-
tion and remedial services sufficient to enable students applying reasonable effort to pass the
tests on which diplomas are in part predicated?
Liebman, supra note 109, at 406; see Hubsch, supra, at 110.
Reduced to its underlying logic, Professor Liebman's premise is that a substantive state-pro-
vided right to education may give rise to federal procedural due process protections against the
abrogation of the state-provided right; the purported result is that the state-provided right is thereby
metamorphosed into a positive federal constitutional right to education. However, that procedural
due process may be required before a state can curtail or terminate a state-created right does not
86:550 (1992)
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meaning that most of the Bill of Rights are applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 175 My focus
here is on the other mode of substantive due process analysis, which lo-
cates fundamental constitutional rights in the promise of "liberty" in the
Due Process Clause taken by itself.176 It is substantive due process in
this latter sense which legal scholars repeatedly raise as a possible home
for a positive right to public elementary and secondary education.1 77
Substantive due process as an independent source of constitutional
rights has a long and tumultuous history. In its first incarnation, during
the so-called Lochner era spanning 1897 to 1937,178 substantive due pro-
cess theory focused primarily on protecting the liberty to contract. As
such, the theory did duty as a justification for striking down state and
federal legislation thought to intrude upon a laissez-faire paradigm of
economic relations.179
In keeping with this solicitude for the private sector, the Court also
decided two cases during the Lochner era which articulated a substantive
due process liberty right to be free of governmental impediments in the
acquisition of education from private providers. In Meyer v. Nebraska, it
will be recalled, the Court found unconstitutional, as applied in a private
tutoring arrangement, a Nebraska statute that forbade the teaching of
foreign languages to children who had not completed the eighth grade.180
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court invalidated an Oregon statute
that required school-age children to attend public rather than private
schools.181 Although, in 1937, the Court disavowed substantive due pro-
cess in relation to economic rights, 182 Meyer and Pierce have survived
alter the fact that the right is state-created and state-defined. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976);
2 ROTUNDA, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 173, § 17.5; Hubsch, supra, at 109. Were
Professor Liebman's thesis accepted, a procedural due process right to education under the Constitu-
tion would seem to take on the character of a second-class right which, because of its state-defined
content, would lose much of its ameliorative pedagogic effect. See infra notes 478-85 and accompa-
nying text.
175 2 ROTUNDA, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 173, § 15.6.
176 Id. § 15.7; Daniel D. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215,
218 n.22 (1987); Richard S. Myers, The End of Substantive Due Process?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
557, 557 n.1 (1988).
177 Edelman, supra note 67, at 33-35; Gard, supra note 67, at 13-14, 21; Philip B. Kurland, Equal
Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Defined, 35 U. CHI. L. REV.
583, 591 (1968); Lupu, supra note 87, at 1000-01, 1045; see also Tribe, Inalienable Rights, supra note
109, at 334.
178 TRIBE, supra note 83, § 8-2.
179 Id. §§ 8-2 to 8-4. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1904), for which the era was named,
typifies the Court's substantive due process theory at the time. In Lochner, the Court struck down a
state statute which prohibited bakers from working more than sixty hours per week. The Court's
rationale was that the law interfered with the liberty of bakers and their employers to contract under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
180 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text (discussing the Meyer case).
181 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
182 TRIBE, supra note 83, § 8-2.
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intact as has idea of a negative liberty right to acquire knowledge, free of
governmental obstruction. 18 3
The Court's moratorium on substantive due process continued for
almost thirty years following the close of the Lochner era. 184 Then, in
1965, the Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut,185 holding constitution-
ally impermissible a state prohibition on the use or abetment of the use of
contraceptives by married couples.186 Taking Justice Douglas' opinion
for the Court at face value, the marital privacy right announced in Gris-
wold was located in "penumbras" emanating from various constitutional
amendments. 187 However, Justices White and Harlan, in concurring
183 Id. § 15-6.
184 Conkle, supra note 176, at 215.
185 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
186 Id.
187 Id. at 481-86.
A central thesis undergirding Part III of this article is that in order to give real meaning to
certain express provisions of the Constitution (as well as to the unenumerated right to vote), these
provisions must be understood as giving rise to an implied right to education. Another possible basis
for this thesis is Justice Douglas' penumbras approach articulated in Griswold. In his opinion for the
Court, Justice Douglas found a right to marital privacy in the zone of privacy located in penumbras
created by emanations from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Id. at 481-86.
Likewise, it is also plausible to argue that a right to education may be drawn from a zone protective
of an educated and knowledgeable citizenry, which zone is created by penumbras emanating from
the constitutional sources described in Part III. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Government
Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917,
972 (1988).
However, the penumbral approach is problematic for two reasons which, taken together, coun-
sel against its use in support of a right to education. First, penumbras, as conceived in Griswold,
have been in disfavor with the Supreme Court for some time now-the Justices preferring to locate
personal privacy rights elsewhere in the Constitution. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977)
(privacy rights arise more properly from the due process concept of liberty); see Hodgson v. Minne-
sota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2936-37 (1990) (pregnant minor has a protected liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause in deciding whether or not to bear a child); Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetrics & Gynecology, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
Second, the penumbral approach is commonly thought of in relation to privacy rights exclusively.
See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Property Rights in the Balance-The Burger Court and Constitutional
Property, 43 MD. L. REv. 518, 535-39 (1984); Wendy M. Watts, The Parent-Child Privileges: Hardly
a New or Revolutionary Concept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 583, 602 (1987); James B. Stoneking,
Note, Penumbras and Privacy: A Study of the Uses of Fictions in Constitutional Decision-Making, 87
W. VA. L. REv. 859, 870-72 (1985). But see Gottlieb, supra, at 972 (invoking penumbras in support
of a right to education). For the time being, then, these drawbacks curb the temptation to employ
Griswold-type penumbras in support of a constitutional right to education.
It may be objected that insofar as Part III of this Article proposes a right to education because
of a nexus between education and an express or already acknowledged constitutional right, the pro-
posal comes perilously close to Justice Douglas' penumbral reasoning. However, it bears emphasiz-
ing that a nexus relationship has been used repeatedly by the Supreme Court to give rise to various
unenumerated constitutional rights without invoking the Griswold jargon of penumbras, emanations,
and zones. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (under the First
Amendment there is a right to have criminal trials open to the public); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S.
478 (1978) (a criminal defendant has the right to a presumption of innocence under the Sixth
Amendment); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (the Constitution generally supports the
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opinions, lodged the right in the Due Process Clause,"8 and it is their
analysis which, with the benefit of hindsight, has become the "prevailing
doctrine of Griswol."189 Subsequently, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,190 the
Court, this time ostensibly relying on equal protection principles, invali-
dated a statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
persons and freed the privacy right from notions of marriage and fam-
ily.191 Finally, in 1973, the Court frankly reconstructed substantive due
process in Roe v. Wade' 92 as the analytical basis for another privacy
right, the right to an abortion. 193
Conservatively viewed, Griswold and its progeny go no further than
to establish a constitutional right to privacy which, with Roe, became
engrafted onto the Due Process Clause. However, Professor Laurence
Tribe proposes that the very logic of privacy implicates the broader con-
cept of personhood. Professor Tribe reasons that human existence neces-
sarily has a social dimension as well as an inward-turning one. The right
to privacy, considered in relation to this social aspect of the human expe-
rience, thus may be understood to be subsumed within the more compre-
hensive right of personhood "to project one identity rather than another
upon the public world."' 94 Building upon this premise, Professor Tribe
advances the thesis that the freedom or privacy of the entire self, both
inward- and outward-turning, cannot be ensured exclusively by negative
constitutional rights. "Ultimately, the affirmative duties of government
right to travel interstate); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that a "one person, one vote" rule must govern elections for state
legislators); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (there is a First Amendment right of associa-
tion); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (there is a First Amendment
right of belief); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause gives rise to parents' right to send their children to private school). As Chief Justice
Burger approvingly described the approach, "fundamental rights, even though not expressly guaran-
teed, have been recognized by the Court as indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly de-
fined." Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580.
188 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring); id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
Goldberg's concurrence, which was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, also con-
ceived the marital privacy right as flowing from the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 486.
189 Lupu, supra note 87, at 994; see also TRIBE, supra note 83, § 11-3 (noting that by 1973, most
of the Justices had accepted Griswold as a substantive due process decision); Conkle, supra note 176,
at 220-21 (interpreting the Griswold decision as reaffirming the validity of the substantive due pro-
cess rights announced in Meyer and Pierce).
190 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
191 Id.
192 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
193 Id. The right to an abortion elucidated in Roe v. Wade is not unqualified; restrictions on the
exercise of the iight increase with each succeeding trimester of pregnancy. But cf. Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (a majority of the Court upholding Missouri's ban on the
use of public resources for the performance of an abortion not essential to save the mother's life, and
upholding the requirement that before a physician conducts an abortion on a fetus believed to be at
least twenty weeks old, he must determine whether the fetus is viable).
194 TRIBE, supra note 83, § 15, at 1303.
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cannot be severed from its obligations to refrain from certain forms of
control; both must respond to a substantive vision of the needs of human
personality." 195
In contemplating Professor Tribe's exposition of the psychological
and sociological attributes of self, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion
that intellectual development is a major component of human identity.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has alluded in more than one opinion to the
value of education in forming the civilized individual. 196 But, if this is so,
then cannot Meyer and Pierce, read in light of cases such as Roe v. Wade,
be understood as only a partial and insufficient step with respect to the
status of education as an element of the personhood right? Education,
after all, does not drop from heaven and not everyone can afford the cost
of private schooling. Thus, if Meyer and Pierce say that government can-
not thwart the acquisition of knowledge and if public schools are the
main avenue by which the populace acquires knowledge, 197 then does it
not follow that a right to personhood should also require government to
provide those schools? Otherwise, a good share of the populace will most
certainly be thwarted in its pursuit of knowledge.' 98
It is not necessary, however, to agree with the transmutation of the
right to privacy into a right to personhood in order to find a positive
right to education in the Due Process Clause. There are several analyti-
cal constructs for finding fundamental liberty rights in the clause which
are not necessarily tied to the privacy right. Constitutional theorists
cluster into several different camps, each espousing a different approach
195 Id. § 15-2.
196 The Court has observed that an essential purpose of the public schools is to educate youth to
"the shared values of a civilized social order." Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683
(1986). "By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the
structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in
even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).
"[E]ducation prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society." Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972). Education "is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
197 Out of a total of 45,433,000 children enrolled in elementary and secondary schools in the fall
of 1988, there were 5,241,000 students in private schools and 40,192,000 students in public schools.
It is estimated that of the 45,963,000 children enrolled in elementary and secondary schools in the
fall of 1989, there were 5,355,000 students in private schools and 40,608,000 in public schools. It is
also estimated that of the 46,192,000 children enrolled in elementary and secondary schools in the
fall of 1990, there were 5,391,000 students in private schools and 40,801,000 students in public
schools. Telephone interview with Fred Beamer, Statistician with U.S. Dep't of Education, Office of
Education, Research, and Improvement (July 11, 1991).
198 See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text (discussing more fully the dialectical relation-
ship between negative and positive rights); see also Tribe, Inalienable Rights, supra note 109, at 333-
34 (contending that government-provided education may be an entitlement under the Constitution
because without that education many people will be rendered unable to exercise other constitutional
rights).
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to such fundamental rights determinations. 199 The Justices of the
Supreme Court are no less badly divided, as evidenced by the divergent
opinions in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 200 and the obtuse sidestepping (ex-
cept for Justice Scalia's concurring opinion) of the issue in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health.20 1 While an exegesis of the
views of constitutional theorists might well yield analytical constructs
conducive to finding an affirmative right to education in the Due Process
Clause,202 it would perhaps be more useful to look to the theories put
forward by the Justices in Michael H., because the opinions by Justices
Scalia, O'Connor, and Brennan contain the most recent and self-con-
sciously comprehensive judicial exposition of the criteria for finding due
process liberty rights in general. Although the Justices' methodological
models of substantive due process rights selection are at variance with
each other, each model can be legitimately construed to support recogni-
tion of an affirmative due process right to public elementary and secon-
dary education. 203  From a practical standpoint, this means that if a
majority of the Court does ultimately settle upon one of the Michael H.
199 The interpretivist school of thought refuses to acknowledge the discovery of any rights not
literally set forth in the text of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. E.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143-60, 251-59 (1990). Value-
oriented theorists support judicial recognition of unenumerated constitutional rights insofar as nec-
essary to further social good that comports with the history and principles of the Constitution and
with a broader social consensus. E.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY
THE JUDICIARY 91-145 (1982); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 227-62 (Jack N.
Rakove ed.,1990). A third group of scholars, those using "process oriented" interpretation, focus on
the Constitution as a device for protecting the openness of the political processes. E.g., Paul Brest,
The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-12 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in EQUALITY
AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 85, 130 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1977).
200 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
201 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). Cruzan considered whether a person in an irreversible vegetative state
has a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause to obtain termination of life-sustaining, artifi-
cial hydration and nutrition. The majority assumed, without deciding, that a competent person
would have this right based on prior case law involving the right to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment. Id. at 2852. Without any meaningful exploration of the fundamental rights analysis upon
which it was relying, the majority then concluded that the incompetent's liberty interest in dying
could not attain the same status and was properly subject to the state's countervailing interest in
preserving life, as manifested in the state's requirement that the incompetent's desire to die must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence before life-sustaining treatment will be terminated. Id.
Only Justice Scalia offered a forthright analysis, drawing upon his plurality opinion in Michael H., as
to why he would find the incompetent without a right to die under the Due Process Clause. Id. at
2859-63.
202 For example, Professor Tribe suggests that an affirmative right to basic education should be
found in the Constitution because it is one of those systematic relational rights concerned with ca-
pacities that persons are unable to exercise without governmental assistance. Tribe, Inalienable
Rights, supra note 109, at 333-34.
203 The concurring opinion of Justice Stevens and the dissenting opinion of Justice White will not
be examined since neither focused on the methodology to be used in determining substantive due
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constructs, there will be in place an analytical basis for also finding a
positive liberty right to education.
The plurality opinion in Michael H. was written by Justice Scalia
and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and, in all but footnote six, by
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy as well. As framed by Justice Scalia,
the issue was whether the unwed father, Michael H., had a constitution-
ally protected fundamental liberty interest in parental rights with respect
to Victoria, where blood tests showed a 98.07 percent probability that she
was his natural daughter; where the mother was married to another man
and was cohabiting with the latter at the time of Victoria's conception
and birth; and where the married couple wished to embrace the child as
their own.2 04 Justice Scalia refused to find such a fundamental due pro-
cess right in the apparent biological father. Justice Scalia relied upon an
analysis, set forth in the now famous footnote six, which makes decisive
whether the liberty interest at stake is "rooted in history and tradition"
of this society,205 with tradition to be determined by "the most specific
level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to,
the asserted right can be identified. 20 6
Justice Scalia stressed that in order for an interest to be recognized
as a substantive due process right, the traditional protection accorded it
"need not take the form of an explicit constitutional provision or statu-
tory guarantee, ' 20 7 i.e., the interest need not previously have existed as a
formal right. Rather, there must be some evidence that the interest has
been an "important traditional value."20 8 It is instructive to attend to
those repositories of law and legal thought that Justice Scalia selected as
appropriate sources for locating the most specific level of tradition pro-
tecting or denying protection to Michael H.'s asserted right: longstand-
ing American common law developed by state courts and early English
common law, as well as the writings of prominent figures in the history of
legal scholarship, such as Blackstone, were thought to be dispositive.20 9
However, in an evident effort to fortify his analysis, Justice Scalia also
canvassed more modem state statutes and state and federal judicial deci-
sions directly addressing the most specific level of tradition protecting or
repudiating the particular right in question.210 These, then, are exem-
plary of the evidences to which, in Justice Scalia's view, the judiciary
should turn in the search for traditional values.
Justice Scalia's reasoning, particularly insofar as it requires reliance
process rights generally. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2347-49 (Stevens, J., concurring); Id. at 2360-63
(W hite, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 2342 & n.4, 2343-44.
205 Id. at 2342, 2344 n.6.
206 Id. at 2344 n.6.
207 Id. at 2341 n.2.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 2342-43.
210 Id. at 2343.
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on "the most specific level" of relevant tradition, has been subject to
scathing criticism. How, the critics ask, can the most specific levels of
relevant tradition be defined?21 1 And, isn't this formulation really an in-
vitation to judges to use their own subjective value systems, cloaked in a
seeming mantle of objectivity, in determining substantive due process
rights? 212 The difficulties in defining the most specific levels of relevant
tradition are formidable. Nevertheless, this author will resist the tempta-
tion to join in the assault on footnote six and assume, for purposes of
argument, that the footnote six approach is a workable and defensible
one.
Justice Scalia's methodology can be usefully employed here because
there is overwhelming evidence of American history and traditions
which are specifically protective of children's interest in education.
Michael H., according to Justice Scalia, was unable to point to history
and traditions specifically protecting the interest of an unwed father so
circumstanced as Michael H. in a paternal relationship with a natural
daughter like Victoria.213 In contrast, school-age children in the United
States can point to an enduring and pervasive historical tradition of re-
ceiving state-provided elementary and secondary education. 214 Indeed,
those children for whom private schooling is not an option are compelled
to attend public school.215 These historical traditions "specifically relate
to the right" 216 to education of persons in the particular circumstance of
being school-age children.
The historical tradition of children receiving, and of government
providing, public elementary and secondary education has roots in the
roles played by both the state and federal governments. State govern-
ments began to provide free public education long before other major
Western societies. 217 Public primary schools run by the states were in
place before the turn of the century.218 Public high schools came into
their own in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and from 1890 to
1930, enrollments in public high schools doubled each decade.219 All
states currently provide free public elementary and secondary schools. 220
By 1918, every state had enacted compulsory schooling laws, and most
211 E.g., Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1090-98 (1990); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 103 HARv. L. REV.
137, 183-87 (1989) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
212 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 44, 94-95 (1989); Tribe
& Dorf, supra note 211, at 1059, 1086-87, 1089; Leading Cases, supra note 211, at 183, 185.
213 Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2344 n.6.
214 See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see infra notes 217-39 and accompanying text.
215 See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see infra note 221 and accompanying text.
216 Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2344 n.6.
217 KATZNELSON & WEIR, supra note 5, at 28.
218 Id.; see also CREMIN, supra note 5, at 544.
219 CREMIN, supra note 5, at 546; see also KATZNELSON & WEIR, supra note 5, at 225 n.1.
220 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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states began to seriously enforce such laws during the 1920s and
1930s. 2 2 1 The constitutions of all states contain provisions supportive of
state-provided education.222 At least thirty-eight states had constitutions
containing such provisions during the nineteenth century.223 Most of the
current state constitutions go much further and affirmatively obligate
state governments to provide public education, while no less than twenty-
nine state constitutions boasted such affirmative obligations before
1900.224 The history and tradition resulting from the practices and laws
221 CREMIN, supra note 5, at 644. However, during the early twentieth century "universal" pub-
lic education frequently excluded children from minority groups. KATZNELsON & WEIR, supra note
5, at 28, 73-74; KOTIN & AIKMAN, supra note 6, at 34. Moreover, in reaction to Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), several southern states repealed their compulsory attendance or compul-
sory education statutes in order to avoid the effect of the Brown Court's ruling requiring racially
integrated public schools. Within the ensuing decade after Brown, every southern state except Mis-
sissippi re-enacted compulsory attendance statutes, albeit some in a watered down form. KOTIN &
AiKMAN, supra note 6, at 34. Mississippi reenacted a compulsory school attendance law in 1987.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91 (1990).
222 ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256, amended by ALA. CONsr. amend, no. 111; ALASKA CONST.
art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5;
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art.
IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; HAW. CoNsT. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL.
CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1;
KY. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; MD. CONsT. art.
VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1;
Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; Mo. CONST. art. 9, § l(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST.
art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4;
N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1-2; N.D. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7, art. VI, §§ 2-3; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art.
VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONsT. art. X, § 1; VT.
CONST. ch. II, § 68; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; W. VA. CONsT. art. XII,
§ 1; Wis. CONST. art. X, § 3; Wyo. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
223 DAVID TYACK ET AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785-1954, at 55-59
(1987) [hereinafter TYACK, SHAPING EDUCATION].
224 For state constitutions affirmatively obligating state governments to provide public education
at present, see, for example: ALASKA CONsT. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARK. CONST.
art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;
DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X,
§ 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1; KAN. CONST.
art. VI, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; MD.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; MIss. CONST. art.
VIII, § 201; Mo. CONST. art. 9, § l(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; NEV.
CONs?. art. XI, §§ 1-2; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONS?. art. XI,
§ 1; N.C. CONS?. art. IX, §§ 1-2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7, art. VI, §§ 2-
3; OKLA CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; S.C. CONST.
art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONS?. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONS?. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1;
UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; W. VA. CONST.
art. XII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3; Wyo. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
For state constitutions affirmatively obligating state governments to provide public education
before 1900, see, for example: ARK. CONS?. art. XIV, § 1 (1874); CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (1879);
CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (1849); COLO. CONS?. art. IX, § 2 (1876); DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1897);
FLA. CONS?. art. XII, § 1 (1885); FLA. CONS?. art. IX, § 2 (1868); GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
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of the states for over a century have established that the "principle of
free, mass public schooling... [has been] accepted as a given by virtually
all of the social classes and groups in the United States. ' 225
But the states' role is only half the story. The federal government
and its founders have contributed significantly to the tradition of public
education from the beginning of the nation until the present. As dis-
cussed in Part III.C.3 of this Article, George Washington, Thomas Jef-
ferson, and other political leaders of the early republic highly valued
mass education. Jefferson, in particular, favored a central role for the
federal government in ensuring that free education would be made avail-
able to the nation's children. 226 Indeed, the federal government has,
since its earliest years, followed a policy of allocating to the states land
grants for the express purpose of establishing public schooling.227 After
the Civil War, Congress also conditioned re-entry of the Confederate
states into the Union upon their willingness to guarantee public educa-
tion to all of the children within their respective borders. 228
In more modern times, the federal government's continued involve-
ment is manifested in an extensive matrix of legislation governing and
aiding various aspects of public elementary and secondary education.229
The Supreme Court, too, has often extolled the virtues of public educa-
tion,230 recognizing "the public schools as a most vital civic institution
(1877); IDAHO CONsT. art. IX, § 1 (1889); ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1870); IND. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1 (1851); KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1859); Ky. CONST. § 183 (1891); LA. CONST. art. 248 (1898);
LA. CONsT. art. 224 (1879); LA. CONST. art. 135 (1868); LA. CONST. tit. XI, art. 141 (1864); LA.
CONST. tit. VIII, art. 136 (1852); LA. CONST. tit. VII, art. 134 (1845); ME. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(1819); MD. CONSi. art. VIII, § 1 (1867); Mo. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1875); Mo. CONST. art. 9, § 1
(1865); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1889); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. IV, § 7, para. 6 (amended 1875);
N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 1 (1897); N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (1868); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 147
(1889); OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1851); OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (1857); PA. CONS. art. X, § 1
(1873); S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1889); TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1876); WAsH. CONsT. art. IX,
§ 2 (1889); W. VA. CONS-T. art. XII, § 1 (1872); Wis. CONST. art. X, § 3 (1848); WYo. CONsT. art.
VII, § 1 (1889).
225 KATZNELSON & WEIR, supra note 5, at 29. "Access to a common school system,... became
part of what Americans expected as a minimum right of citizenship." Id. at 75; see also Preovolos,
supra note 68, at 111 (arguing that there is a common understanding that education is a national
entitlement).
226 See infra notes 443-50 and accompanying text.
227 See infra notes 448-50 and accompanying text.
228 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 220 & n.9 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
229 See, eg., Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1990); Ele-
mentary and Secondary School Improvement Hawkins-Stafford Amendments of 1988, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2731 (1990); Women's Educational Equity Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3041-3047 (1990); School
Dropout Demonstration Assistance Act of 1988, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3241-3247 (1990); Bilingual Educa-
tion Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3281-3341 (1990).
230 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 n.20 (1982) ("Moreover, the significance of educa-
tion to our society is not limited to its political and cultural fruits. The public schools are an impor-
tant socializing institution, imparting those shared values through which social order and stability
are maintained."); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (Education is the primary vehicle for
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for the preservation of a democratic system of government 231 that is
intrinsic to American national identity and culture. Nor has the Court
limited itself to the role of a sidelines cheerleader. It has frequently and
profoundly intervened to implement such far-reaching reforms as racial
desegregation of the public schools,232 the delineation of the extent of
students' free speech rights233 and freedom of belief while in the school-
house, 234 protection of public schools' discretion to include evolution in
the science curriculum,2 35 and protection of the right of school-age illegal
alien children to free public schooling.236
Finally, the executive branch of the federal government has periodi-
cally exerted itself on behalf of the nation's schoolchildren as well. Presi-
dents Lyndon Johnson and Dwight Eisenhower took the initiative in
prompting Congress to provide extensive financial assistance to educa-
tion.237 President Ronald Reagan's Secretary of Education appointed a
transmitting "the values on which our society rests."); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954) ('Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demon-
strate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship."); Illinois ex rel. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 231 (public schools are "the
most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people ... [They
are] at once the symbol of our democracy and the most persuasive means for promoting our com-
mon destiny.").
231 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
232 See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457 (1982); Columbus Bd. of Educ.
v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton II);
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (Dayton 1); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267 (1977) (Milliken II); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Wright v. Council of
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971);
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin V. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964);
Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1); but
see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Dowell, Ill S. Ct. 630 (1991) (holding that desegregation decrees are not
intended to operate in perpetuity and that determinative factors in deciding the legality of dissolving
such a decree are whether there has been good faith compliance and whether vestiges of past de jure
segregation have been eliminated to the extent practicable); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler,
427 U.S. 424 (1976) (holding that the school board need not continue to reassign students on the
basis of race to compensate for demographic changes); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)
(Milliken 1) (holding that a federal court may not impose a multidistrict, area-wide remedy for
single-district de jure segregation violations where there is no evidence that the other included school
districts have failed to operate unitary school systems or effected segregation within other districts,
and where there is no evidence that school district boundaries were created to foster racial
segregation).
233 See, eg., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
234 Eg., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
235 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
236 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
237 As John Brademas notes, Congress, at the behest of the President, also has pushed education
aid to center stage to meet periods of national urgency. Thus, President Lyndon Johnson made
federal assistance to elementary and secondary schools a weapon in his War on Poverty, just as
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National Commission on Excellence in Education and charged it with
studying and reporting on the condition of the public schools. The re-
sulting report catapulted the education crisis into popular consciousness
and inspired reform efforts in several states.238 President Bush also has
assumed a leadership role by convening an education "summit" meeting
with the nation's governors to set national goals for improving the public
schools. 23
9
It is improbable that in expounding the footnote six methodology
for finding substantive due process liberty rights, Justice Scalia or Chief
Justice Rehnquist ever contemplated it as a basis for finding an affirma-
tive right to public elementary and secondary education.240 Yet, unlike
the hapless unwed father in Michael H, school-age children are blessed
with a rich legacy of historical tradition, continued to this day, specifi-
cally protective of an entitlement to government-provided public elemen-
tary and secondary education. This is true whether the source of such
historical tradition is sought in state laws and practices of a bygone era,
such as were thought decisive in the Michael H. plurality opinion, or in
modern state law and practice, in the views of the Founding Fathers, or
in federal law and practice.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Michael H., with which
Justice Kennedy joined, did not dispute the proposition that relevant his-
torical traditions protecting or denying protection to a claimed right are
valid criteria for determining whether to recognize a right as fundamen-
tal under substantive due process doctrine.241 Rather, Justice O'Connor
took issue with the footnote six methodology insofar as it makes determi-
native the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting or
repudiating the asserted right can be identified. She reasoned that
neither precedent nor the "unanticipated" future warrants the unyielding
narrowness of the footnote six approach. 242  Although Justice
O'Connor's opinion is vague as to the manner in which relevant histori-
President Dwight Eisenhower had before him made federal assistance to education a key component
of the American response to the Soviet Union's launching of Sputnik in 1957. BRADEMAS, supra
note 30, at 27, 61, 76.
238 See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.
239 See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
240 In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989), Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion held that under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause a
state has no affirmative duty to protect an individual against violence at the hands of another private
actor. According to the Court, the Due Process Clause protects the individual only from abusive or
oppressive conduct by government. Of course, the right asserted in DeShaney is distinguishable
from a positive right to have government provide education; the latter does not require state protec-
tion against the aggression of a private actor. In dicta, however, the Court more broadly observed
that "our cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests
of which the government itself may not deprive the individual." Id. at 1003.
241 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2346-47 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
242 Id. at 2346-47.
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cal traditions are to be utilized, plainly she intended a more flexible stan-
dard than is set forth in footnote six. 243 But, surely, if the claimed right
of school-age children to public elementary and secondary education can
meet Justice Scalia's more exacting "specific level" test, then the right
can also meet Justice O'Connor's more liberal conception.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Mar-
shall and Blackmun, also spurned footnote six.244 Like Justices Scalia
and O'Connor, Justice Brennan did not dispute that history and tradition
should play a role in the ascertainment of fundamental substantive due
process rights.245 He parted company with footnote six, however, in re-
lation to Justice Scalia's definition of tradition and in relation to the lat-
ter's insistence that only historical tradition is pertinent to the inquiry.
In essence, Justice Brennan's conception of tradition differed from
that of Justice Scalia in four ways. First, Justice Brennan posited that
the tradition which matters for substantive due process purposes is not
the tradition protecting a claimed right, but, instead, the tradition mani-
festing the importance which society attaches to the claimed right.246
Second, Justice Brennan asserted that the relevant tradition need not be
the most specific level of tradition protecting the claimed right. Rather,
liberty rights may consist of "more generalized interests" that have re-
ceived protection, such as parenthood or marriage. 247 Third, Justice
Brennan would restrict the use of tradition in locating substantive due
process rights to those situations where the rationale for a traditional rule
has not changed so as to make the rule "out of place." 248 Fourth, insofar
as the Supreme Court has already considered related liberty interests,
Justice Brennan would also look for relevant tradition in the Court's
precedents. 249 -Beyond these four modifications in the definition and ap-
243 Justice O'Connor stated that no "single mode of historical analysis" is proper. Id. at 2347.
She reasoned that a "single mode of historical analysis"--and especially that set forth in footnote
six-would be so constraining as to preclude future recognition of "unanticipated" rights which are
as worthy of fundamental status as those constitutional rights which came into being before Michael
H. and which might well not pass muster under footnote six. Id. at 2346-47.
244 Id. at 2349-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
245 Justice Brennan stated that with respect to the recognition of substantive due process rights,
"[it is not that tradition has been irrelevant to our prior decisions." Indeed, such recognition has
been "partly the result of the historical and traditional importance of these interests in our society."
Id. at 2350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
246 Justice Brennan wrote:
Moreover, by describing the decisive question as whether Michael and Victoria's interest is one
that has been "traditionally protected by our society," ante, at 2341, (emphasis added), rather
than one that society traditionally has thought important (with or without protecting it), and by
suggesting that our sole function is to "discern the society's views," ante, at 2345, n.6, (emphasis
added), the plurality acts as if the only purpose of the Due Process Clause is to confirm the
importance of interests already protected by a majority of the States.
Id. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
247 Id. at 2350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
248 Id. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
249 Id. at 2350-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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plication of tradition as an analytical tool in finding substantive due pro-
cess rights, Justice Brennan would have the Court take into account the
nature of the Constitution as a "living charter"250; in particular, the
"broad and majestic terms" of the due process guaranty should be im-
bued with meaning garnered from experience so that it is not rendered
"an empty promise. '251
The whole thrust of Justice Brennan's analysis is to avoid the per-
ceived straightjacket into which Justice Scalia's footnote six would fit the
Due Process Clause. His more fluid and general conception of historical
tradition, as well as his exalted expectations for the promises of the Due
Process Clause, bespeak a deeply held concern that substantive due pro-
cess remain responsive, in a principled way, to the evolving conditions
and values of American society. It is thus in the context of Justice Bren-
nan's overall purpose in finding an alternative to footnote six, as well as
in the analytical elements of that alternative, that the possibility of a sub-
stantive due process right to public education must be considered.
Justice Brennan's four-part definition of tradition lends itself to rec-
ognition of a positive due process right to public education, although not
without some complications. As discussed earlier, there is a long and
pervasive tradition in the United States of protecting children's access to
public elementary and secondary education, a tradition which, therefore,
necessarily manifests the exceptional importance which this society at-
taches to children's education. 252 Whether this tradition is understood as
operating at the most specific level of protection afforded the claimed
right to education or as serving a generalized interest in protecting chil-
dren's education, the claimed right to education must meet Justice Bren-
nan's more general standard because, as has been shown, it satisfies
Justice Scalia's more specific one. Nor has the rationale for the historical
tradition of providing school-age children with public education changed
so as to make the tradition obsolete and "out of place." To the contrary,
the unrelenting national crisis in public education has generated urgent
calls for greater governmental commitment to improving elementary and
secondary school systems.25 3 Indeed, government has attempted to re-
spond, within the limitations imposed by the current legal structure. 254
It is the fourth part of Justice Brennan's definition of historical tra-
dition, suggesting reliance on pertinent Supreme Court precedents, which
may prove somewhat troublesome in relation to establishing an affirma-
250 Id. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
251 Id. at 2350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
252 See supra notes 5-7, 217-39 and accompanying text; see infra notes 436-55 and accompanying
text.
253 E.g., GOVERNORS' ASS'N, EDUCATING AMERICA, supra note 4,passim; NAT'L COMM'N, NA-
TION AT RISK, supra note 4, at 32-33; Jeffersonian Compact, supra note 44, at 1487-90.
254 See supra notes 31, 36- 40, 44- 47, 50, 75-76 and accompanying text. For a detailed description
of state government efforts to respond to the crisis, see NAT'L GOVERNORS' ASS'N, THE GOVaR-
NORS' 1991 REPORT ON EDUCATION: RESULTS IN EDUCATION: 1990, at 6-46 (1990).
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tive right to education under substantive due process. Justice Brennan
implied that reliance on Supreme Court precedent is appropriate where
the claimed right is not "'new,'" i.e., where the claimed right is "close
enough" to interests already accorded constitutional protection by the
Court.255 However, deciding whether a substantive due process right to
government-provided education is "new" is not as easy as it may sound.
On the one hand, cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska 256 and Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters25 7 have posited a negative substantive due process right to
acquire useful knowledge. On the other hand, in the equal protection
context, the Court has essentially either skirted or confounded the issue
of whether there can be an affirmative constitutional right to public ele-
mentary and secondary education. 258
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,259 the
Court left open the question of whether there might be a fundamental
constitutional right to "some identifiable quantum of education" neces-
sary for meaningful exercise of the rights of free speech and of political
participation. 260 The Court did not see any need to reach that question
because no claim was made in the Rodriguez litigation that Texas' school
financing scheme fell short of providing this baseline quantum of educa-
tion.261 That the constitutional status of an affirmative right to education
remained unresolved was highlighted a decade later by the ensuing cases
of Plyler v. Doe262 and Papasan v. Allain.263 In Plyler, the Court opined
that public education is not a right under the Constitution. In the next
breath, however, the Court remarked that "neither is it merely some gov-
ernmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare
255 Justice Brennan explained the idea this way in the context of Michael H.:
This is not a case in which we face a "new" kind of interest, one that requires us to consider for
the first time whether the Constitution protects it. On the contrary, we confront an interest-
that of a parent and child in their relationship with each other-that was among the first that
this Court acknowledged in its cases defining the "liberty" protected by the Constitution ....
Thus, to describe the issue in this case as whether the relationship existing between
Michael and Victoria "has been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of
our society" ... is to reinvent the wheel. The better approach-indeed, the one commanded by
our prior cases and by common sense-is to ask whether the specific parent-child relationship
under consideration is close enough to the interests that we already have protected to be deemed
an aspect of "liberty" as well.
Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2351-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
256 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
257 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
258 See supra notes 90-144 and accompanying text (discussing the case law on this point). Liberty
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause may also be fundamental constitu-
tional rights for purposes of equal protection analysis. 2 ROTUNDA, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE,
supra note 173, § 18.39, at 695-96.
259 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
260 Id. at 36-37.
261 Id. at 36-38.
262 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
263 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
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legislation. ' 264 In Papasan, Justice White's opinion expressly stated that
the question of whether there is an affirmative right to public education
under the Constitution had not been answered by Rodriguez or Plyler
and would not be definitively settled in Papasan either since the latter
case did not require resolution of the issue.265 Although Justice
O'Connor joined in Justice White's Papasan opinion without reserva-
tion, 266 just two years later, in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 267
she curtly stated, without discussion, "[n]or have we accepted the propo-
sition that education is a 'fundamental right.' "268 This was stated in a
case which the Court treated as turning more on the right to transporta-
tion than on the right to education. 269 Justice Marshall's dissenting opin-
ion in Kadrmas cautioned that the constitutional status of public
education "remains open today. '270
With Meyer and Pierce and the four equal protection decisions in
mind, it can be concluded that an affirmative substantive due process
right to education is both not new and new. It is not new in the sense
that the Court has definitively recognized a related due process right-
the negative right to acquire knowledge free of governmental impedi-
ments. It is also not new in the sense that in the equal protection cases
the Court considered but failed to decide whether there can be an affirm-
ative fundamental right to public elementary and secondary education.
But, the possibility of an affirmative fundamental right to public educa-
tion is also, at the same time, still quite new and unexplored insofar as it
has been left by the Court for another day.
The result is that Supreme Court precedent simply may not be help-
ful in ascertaining whether Justice Brennan's methodology, as described
in his Michael H. dissent, will give rise to an affirmative substantive due
process liberty right to public education. The negative right established
in Meyer and Pierce may be too attenuated and dissimilar from an affirm-
ative right to education, and the precedent of Rodriguez and its progeny
may be too unsettled to offer any guidance.
Professor Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf have suggested that in
using Supreme Court precedent as part of the tradition which defines
substantive due process rights, what matters is not so much the precise
holdings of those precedents, but rather their underlying rationales-
"the essential reasons for those holdings."'271 Professor Tribe and Mr.
Doff are of the opinion that with respect to the use of such precedent,
264 457 U.S. at 221.
265 478 U.S. at 285-86.
266 Id. at 267.
267 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
268 Id. at 458.
269 See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
270 487 U.S. at 466 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
271 Tribe & Dorf, supra note 211, at 1103.
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"Justice Brennan's dissent in Michael H. proceeds much along these
lines." 27
2
Certainly, one of the rationales behind Meyer and Pierce is to ensure
that Americans have the opportunity to acquire useful knowledge with-
out hindrance from government. If this rationale is applied in American
society of the late twentieth century-in the "information age" of in-
creasingly sophisticated and novel moral, scientific, and political is-
sueS273-does not government impede the acquisition of useful
knowledge if it fails to provide the means to acquire such knowledge?274
Indeed, the Rodriguez Court's "unheld holding"-hypothesizing a posi-
tive right to some quantum of education-comes close to acknowledging
that such means must be provided as a constitutional matter. 275
Furthermore, what of the rationale behind the decision in Plyler v.
Doe? If it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to deprive school-
age undocumented children of a free public education, then can any one
group of school-age children be so deprived? And, if no one group can
be deprived, can it seriously be argued that all children may be deprived
without violating the Due Process Clause?276 The rationale of Plyler
surely militates against such a result. In short, relevant Supreme Court
precedent, viewed through the lens of the Court's underlying rationales,
can be construed as yet another indication that Justice Brennan's concept
of tradition supports an affirmative liberty right to public elementary and
secondary education.
However, even if the rationales behind these precedents are not gen-
eralized enough to support such a right, this does not, by itself, require
rejection of an affirmative right to education under Justice Brennan's the-
ory. Nowhere in'his dissent does Justice Brennan even hint that a pau-
city of dispositive Supreme Court precedent is fatal to an asserted
substantive due process right. Indeed, such a result would run counter to
the very notion of the living Constitution that Justice Brennan so warmly
embraced. Under these circumstances, the other parts of Justice Bren-
272 Id. at 1103 n.172.
273 The National Commission on Excellence in Education reported:
Knowledge, learning, information, and skilled intelligence are the new raw materials of interna-
tional commerce .... Learning is the indispensable investment required for success in the
"information age" we are entering....
A high level of shared education is essential to a free, democratic society ....
For our country to function, citizens must be able to reach some common understandings
on complex issues, often on short notice and on the basis of conflicting or incomplete evidence.
NAT'L COMM'N, NATION AT RISK, supra note 4, at 7. See supra text accompanying note 66.
274 See supra notes 164-71, 197-98 and accompanying text. It is not meant to suggest that Meyer
and Pierce stand for the proposition that there is a positive right to education under the Due Process
Clause. Rather, these cases are cited for the import of their underlying rationales.
275 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24, 36-37 (1973); Gard, supra note
67, at 27; Preovolos, supra note 68, at 75, 78-83.
276 Edelman, supra note 67, at 34-36.
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nan's definition of applicable tradition would appear to take on greater
weight and still make a persuasive case for the right.
The disagreement among the Justices in Michael H. over the correct
analytical construct for determining substantive due process rights essen-
tially turns upon the Justices' divergent understandings of the concept of
tradition. It is a significant disagreement. By the same token, it should
not be overlooked that the Justices have continued to agree that tradition
is a crucial component of the rights discovery process under the Due
Process Clause. No matter which of the three conceptions of tradition
put forward in Michael H. may command a majority of the Court, the
evidence of tradition supporting recognition of a positive substantive due
process right to education is enormous. 277
2. The Free Speech Clause.-The Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech. ' 278 The obvious import of these words is, gener-
ally speaking, legislation that abridges freedom of speech is prohibited.279
The corollary is that legislation which enriches freedom of speech by
making manifest the full extent of its meaning is permitted and, indeed,
desirable.280
While the reach of the Free Speech Clause has been the subject of
lively debate, much of the discussion has occurred within the parameters
elucidated by Professor Thomas Emerson who has posited that free
speech in a democratic society embodies four main purposes: to assure
277 Some commentators have made an additional argument in support of a positive right to public
education which, although based on substantive due process, involves an analysis markedly different
from that discussed in the text above. E.g., Ratner, supra note 108, at 823-28; see Patricia W. Morri-
son, Note, The Right to Education: A Constitutional Analysis, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 796, 807-09
(1975). The argument proceeds by analogy from the holding in Jackson v. Indiana that a criminal
defendant involuntarily committed to a state mental institution for an indefinite period of time is
entitled, by virtue of substantive due process, to have "the nature and duration of commitment bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed." 406 U.S. 715, 738
(1972); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 n.27 (1982) (reaching the same conclusion
where the claimant is a mentally retarded person who is involuntarily institutionalized and seeks
treatment and training). The commentators theorize that because every state compels children to
attend school, under the reasoning of Jackson and Romeo "the nature of the education that students
are provided must be rationally related to the purpose for which they are compelled to attend
school," i.e., the purpose of acquiring academic knowledge. Ratner, supra note 108, at 827-28.
Thus, substantive due process requires that the "incarcerated" child receive at least an adequate
education in the basics of academic knowledge. Id.; cf. Gard, supra note 67, at 20-22 (developing a
similar argument that failure to provide an adequate education to children forced into school attend-
ance violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
278 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
279 Although the literal language of the Free Speech Clause prohibits abridgement of speech in
seemingly absolute terms, the Supreme Court has allowed restrictions upon speech under certain
limited circumstances where there are competing considerations. TRIBE, supra note 83, § 12-2.
280 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 19-20 (1979).
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individual self-fulfillment; to advance knowledge and discover truth; to
provide for participation in decision making by all members of society;
and to achieve an adaptable, more stable community.281 At various
times, the Justices of the Supreme Court have looked to one or another of
these purposes to explain the meaning of the clause.282
It is the thesis of this Article that the full extent of the Free Speech
Clause, understood under any one of Professor Emerson's premises, nec-
essarily encompasses an implied positive right to elementary and secon-
dary education. Otherwise, without an education, the American people
will inevitably be alienated from free speech objectives and the clause will
be enervated into mere words of aspiration.
One of the most durable free speech purposes advanced by Professor
Emerson is the clause's "structural" role in promoting democratic gov-
ernment. Justice Brennan described the basic idea that "the First
Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expression and
communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to
play in securing and fostering our republican system of self govern-
ment. '28 3 If the United States is truly a government based on the demo-
281 THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970). But see Ron-
ald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First Amend-
ment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1405 passim (1987) (arguing that the First Amendment should not
be viewed as promoting a well-defined conception of positive values, but rather as a negative-reactive
attempt to limit wrongful government interference with free speech).
282 Justice Brennan, in his opinion for the Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), adopted the notion that the main function of the Free Speech Clause is to further the
democratic processes inherent in self-government. Lee C. Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual
Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438, 438-39 (1983); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on
"The Central Meaning of the First Amendment, " 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 208-10, 221. This notion
also was favored by Justice Stewart in relation to the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment.
Peter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975). In contrast, Justices Holmes
and Brandeis suggested that a primary purpose of the Free Speech Clause is to promote individual
self-realization or autonomy. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring) (Justice Holmes joined in Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion); see also Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (Harlan, J., writing for the Court and expressing the same view). Justice
Holmes also embraced the concept that the Free Speech Clause is designed to lead to the discovery
of truth through robust intellectual exchange in the marketplace of ideas. Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Later, the Court brought within the ambit of the
marketplace-of-ideas concept the goal of furthering democratic participation in government. New
York Times, 376 U.S. at 269-72; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
283 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan's understanding of the structural role of the Free Speech Clause is supported by
leading First Amendment scholars coming from a broad spectrum of philosophical and political
orientations. See, eg., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 62 (1975); ELY,
supra note 173, at 93-94; EMERSON, supra note 281, at 7; MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 280, at 27;
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 23 (1971);
Kalven, Jr., supra note 282, at 208-10, 221.
Some commentators also have critiqued this view without entirely rejecting it. See, e.g., C.
Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 1039-40
(1978) (the Free Speech Clause implicates more than mere "individual participation in public deci-
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cratically elicited consent of the governed, then free expression is
essential to the formulation and articulation of what that consent shall
be.284
While many a truth may come from the mouths of babes, it is clear
that participation in self-government requires considerably more. In-
deed, why else would the Constitution set a minimum voting age of
eighteen?285 But, age alone does not suffice either. Justice Brennan ob-
served that "[i]mplicit in this structural role is ... the antecedent as-
sumption that valuable public debate-as well as other civic behavior-
must be informed. ' 286 In short, the participation of the populace in self-
sion making," i.e., "it requires protecting self-chosen, nonverbal conduct from certain forms of gov-
ernment abridgement."); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM.
B. FOUND. REs. J. 523, 527-28 (the structural role of the First Amendment should be supplemented
by a "checking value" which aims at curbing abuse of official power); Martin H. Redish, Self-Reali-
zation, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression: A Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678,
680 (1982) (the reach of the First Amendment must go beyond the structural role model to serve the
goal of self-realization as well).
284 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 280, at 27.
285 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
286 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring); accord Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-63 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized in the Free Speech Clause a right to receive informa-
tion. E.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (holding that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibited Georgia from making mere private possession of obscene material a crime);
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) (holding that
it is a violation of the First Amendment for Congress to enact a statute requiring the addressee to
request in writing that his mall be delivered in order to receive mail classified by the statute as
communist political propoganda). Some commentators have extrapolated from the right to receive
information a positive right to education. Gard, supra note 67, at 18-19; Preovolos, supra note 68, at
91-94. This analogy between the right to receive information and the right to education is weakened,
though, by the fact that the former is usually thought of as the proscription of governmental interfer-
ence with access to information while the latter would require the government's fulfillment of an
affirmative obligation. Preovolos, supra note 68, at 92-93. Ms. Preovolos overcomes this difficulty
by relying on CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), in which the Court held that the
First Amendment does not compel broadcasters to sell time for editorial advertisements. Ms. Pre-
ovolos finds the case supportive because the holding is premised upon the Court's determination that
FCC practices already provided adequate access to the information in issue. Preovolos, supra note
68, at 93. Her argument is an intriguing one, but, in relying so heavily on the CBS case, it seems to
hang by a very slender thread.
However, the decision in Richmond Newspapers may give the argument added force. In a plu-
rality opinion, the Richmond Newspapers Court ruled that there is a First Amendment right of
access to criminal trials-even though in that case neither defense counsel, the prosecution, nor the
trial judge wanted an open trial. TRIBE, supra note 83, § 12-20, at 959 & n.35. The decision raises
the question of "why the public has a right to receive information in spite of its supplier's desire that
it not be disclosed." Id. § 12-20, at 959. Taking this logic one step further, if government can be
compelled to provide access to a trial, why cannot it be compelled to provide access to education?
The theory admittedly becomes strained in light of the differences between the provision of an
open criminal trial and the provision of education. The criminal trial must be conducted in any
event and government's provision of access to it involves not much more than the opening of doors;
the provision of education obviously entails a great deal more than opening doors. Moreover, the
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution "implies that government cannot claim unfettered discretion
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government requires the education of that populace.
Luminaries among the Founding Fathers such as Thomas Jefferson
and George Washington had no hesitation in acknowledging the critical
relationship between education and self-government. 28 7 Over two hun-
dred years later, this relationship has become still more profoundly syn-
ergistic in a society faced with making decisions about such complex and
fateful issues as environmental conservation, the national budget deficit,
disarmament, abortion, and the right to die.288 Yet, in this same society,
massive numbers of Americans begin their adult lives unable to interpret
a newspaper article,289 if they can read at all,290 and unable to write well
enough to communicate persuasively. 291 Nor do they bring to the deci-
sion-making process that store of general foundational knowledge from
which an informed and reasoned consent may be conceptualized. 292 No
doubt, this is why government officials and education experts alike have
expressed the fear that present deficiencies in American public elemen-
tary and secondary education will, somewhere along the line, jeopardize
the functioning of democratic government.293
The link between public education and the preservation of demo-
cratic government has become almost proverbial in Supreme Court opin-
ions. The Court's decisions repeatedly and reverentially refer to the
nation's public schools as both the symbol and engine of American-style
democracy. 294 But, if there is this link-if democracy cannot survive
to treat criminal trials as though they involved wholly internal or confidential matters." Id. § 12-20,
at 959. There is no such Sixth Amendment underpinning for a positive right to education. Nonethe-
less, the idea of using Richmond Newspapers to build upon Ms. Preovolos's theory for a First
Amendment right to education is provocative. Cf TRIBE, supra note 83, § 12-20, at 965 (opining
that perhaps the most far-reaching aspect of Richmond Newspapers is that it reflects a "growing
realization that the Constitution is no longer simply a source of fences around private spheres, but is
increasingly drawn into question when the state is asked to take affirmative steps to make liberty or
equality meaningful").
287 See infra notes 443-44 and accompanying text; see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 66, 273 and accompanying text; see also Edelman, supra note 67, at 33-34
("How can anyone participate effectively in America's democratic processes... without some mini-
mum amount of education? Whatever the situation was in 1787, in 1987 education is essential for
everyone.").
289 DeWitt, First Report Card, supra note 48, passim. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
290 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
291 See NAT'L COMM'N, NATION AT RISK, supra note 4, at 9 (four-fifths of the seventeen-year-
olds tested could not write a persuasive essay); see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
293 NAT'L COMM'N, NATION AT RISK, supra note 4, at 7; KEARNS & DOYLE, supra note 29, at 2,
85-86; see RAvrrCH & FINN, JR., supra note 29, at 252.
294 E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (accepting the proposition that "education
is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political sys-
tem"); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247 (1968) (stating that education is "an indispensable
ingredient for achieving the kind of nation, and the kind of citizenry" essential to a free society);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 628 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that the
"public educational system is the genius of our democracy"); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic
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without education-then necessarily the structural role of the Free
Speech Clause can only be realized if education is provided. In other
words, the structural role of the Free Speech Clause ineluctably presup-
poses and entails an implied affirmative right to education.295 It should
be noted that the idea of a nexus between education and free speech, such
that the former enables the actualization of the latter, is not unfamiliar to
the Justices. Plaintiffs-appellees in the Rodriguez case raised the nexus
argument, and it was given some credence by the Court as a possible
reason for recognizing a positive right to education sometime in the
future.296
This causal relationship also exists between education and the other
three purposes of the Free Speech Clause. If the purpose of the clause is
individual self-fulfillment, as Professor Emerson and others hold it to
be, 297 then it requires no inferential leap to conclude that education is the
necessary prerequisite to that maturation of character and intellect which
is within contemplation of the clause. Those who receive substandard
education tend to be alienated from their own potentiality. For many of
them, self-fulfillment, whether in the form of earning power, political
input, or intellectual accomplishment, becomes unknowable and
unreachable. 298
Likewise, if the purpose of the clause is the advancement of knowl-
edge and the discovery of truth,299 then, once again, education is neces-
institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government."); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.) (maintaining that public schools are
"the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people" and
that public schools are "at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for
promoting our common destiny").
295 Compare Gard, supra note 67, at 18 (making a nexus argument that there should be a right to
education because education enables the meaningful exercise of free speech) with Preovolos, supra
note 68, at 87-88, 91-96 (accepting the nexus argument, but also contending that there should be a
right to education because it would be analogous to the right to free speech); cf. Dimond, supra note
110, at 1104 (noting that "[e]ducation always has been an aspect of, and in tension with, the First
Amendment freedoms").
296 See supra notes 98, 102, 106 and accompanying text.
297 EMERSON, supra note 281, at 6; TRIBE, supra note 83, § 12-1, at 787-89; Baker, supra note
283, at 991-92; Redish, supra note 283, at 679. But see Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in
First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L. REV. 761, 772-74 (1986).
298 See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text (documenting the harm that substandard educa-
tion works upon individual development).
299 The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the relationship between free speech and
the discovery of truth. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982); Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5
(1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). This purpose of the Free Speech Clause also has
been recognized by First Amendment theorists. EMERSON, supra note 281, at 6-7; Christopher T.
Wonnell, Truth and the Marketplace of Ideas, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 669, 670 (1986); see also
Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleologi-
cal Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 203-08 (1972) (pur-
pose of Free Speech Clause is to promote the correction of erroneous beliefs). But see Baker, supra
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sarily implicated as a free speech right. The marketplace of ideas, which
Justice Holmes saw as central to promoting the discovery of knowledge
and truth, is utterly meaningless without an education. The formulation
and the articulation of ideas which excite intellectual ferment and which
foster enlightenment are obviously contingent upon the receipt of infor-
mation and the development of sophisticated thought processes.300
The fourth purpose of the Free Speech Clause, the achievement of a
more adaptable and stable community, is predicated on the assumption
that open discussion, involving the opportunity for disagreement and
conffict, enhances the individual's tolerance of government decisions
which counter his beliefs.301 Like the purposes of promoting democratic
self-government and acquiring knowledge and truth, this purpose would
seem wholly dependent on education. For how can a society conduct
open and intelligent discussions in relation to controversial issues with-
out informed conversationalists?
Some will no doubt object that the idea of an implied affirmative
right to education in the Free Speech Clause runs counter to the en-
trenched view that this clause is the very archetype of the negative right
and should primarily be construed to do no more than bar government
from interfering with expression.302 Nevertheless, the fact remains that
none of the purposes of the clause can be effectuated without educating
the populace. When traditional analysis clashes so seriously with the
purposes of the Free Speech Clause, it is time to consider embracing al-
ternative approaches that have a more realistic chance of effectuating the
central goals of the clause. The alternative that seems naturally to un-
note 283, at 974-81; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 1, 1-48.
300 The relationship between education and the discovery of knowledge and truth is highlighted
by the effects of the education crisis on the young adults emerging from the nation's schools during
the 1980s. These young people have been rendered ignorant of history, literature, science, and other
fields, necessarily causing a drastic contraction of their knowledge and ability to discern truth. See
supra notes 32-34, 41-43 and accompanying text.
301 EMERSON, supra note 281, at 7; Jeffrey M. Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical
Functionalist Approach to Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1273, 1324-25, 1349-50 (1983).
302 "Traditionally, the first amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, has operated
primarily as a negative force in maintaining the system of freedom of expression. It has served to
prevent the government from prohibiting, harassing, or interfering with speech or other forms of
communication." Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L.
REv. 795, 795 (1981).
Nevertheless, Professor Emerson also suggests that the structural role of the Free Speech Clause
does imply certain positive unenumerated rights. He bases this suggestion upon the assumption that
government has become "a more pervasive participant in the system of freedom of expression." Id.
As such, he argues that the First Amendment imposes the obligation on government to "expand the
system of freedom of expression" while, at the same time, adhering to rules setting outer limits of
that expansion. Id. at 796. Inasmuch as government may aptly be characterized as a pervasive
participant in that marketplace of ideas called school, Professor Emerson's argument may have some
application as support for a positive right to education arising from the First Amendment.
86:550 (1992)
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dergird the clause and that goes to the very essence of free speech is an
implied positive right to education.
3. The Right to Vote. -Closely related to the Free Speech Clause's
structural role is the right to vote, for both serve the end of enabling
individual participation in democratic self-government.30 3 Although
there is no one clause of the Constitution expressly announcing a right to
vote per se, the Constitution is filled with references to voting304 and
mandatory federal elections 30 5 that appear to presuppose the existence of
a right to vote in federal elections. In addition, Article IV, Section 4
provides that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government. ' 30 6
However, there is continuing disagreement over whether the Consti-
tution does, in fact, guarantee the right to vote in either federal or state
elections. The controversy persists in spite of the Supreme Court's ex-
plicit acknowledgment in Reynolds v. Sims 30 7 that the Constitution em-
braces the right: "Undeniably the Constitution of the United States
protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in
federal elections. ' 30 8 Some commentators, taking a dismissive attitude
303 ELY, supra note 173, at 116; Preovolos, supra note 68, at 88.
304 The provisions of the Constitution which mention voting typically do so in the context of
prohibiting restraints upon exercise of the franchise. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right
of citizens... to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."); id. at amend. XIX, § 1 ("The right of citizens
... to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment states:
The right of citizens.., to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President,
for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll
tax or other tax.
Id. at amend. XXIV, § 1; id. at amend. XXVI, § 1 ("The right of citizens.., who are eighteen years
of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of age.").
305 The Constitution repeatedly refers to mandatory federal elections, sometimes with the quali-
fier that the elections are to be carried out by "the people," i.e., presumably through the vote. Eg.,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen
every second Year by the People of the several States ...."); id. at art. I, § 2, cI. 2 ("No Person shall
be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State
in which he shall be chosen."); id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 3 ("No Person shall be a Senator who shall not
have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen."); id. at art. II,
§ 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He
shall ... be elected .... ); id. at amend. XVII, § 1 ("The Senate ... shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof .. "); id. at amend. XXII, § I ("No person
shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice ... .
306 Id. at art. IV, § 4.
307 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
308 Id. at 554. The Court also stated, "[a] consistent line of decisions by this Court in cases
involving attempts to deny or restrict the right of suffrage has made this [the right to vote] indelibly
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toward this pronouncement, or ignoring it altogether, contend that be-
cause the Constitution does not expressly grant a right to vote, there
must be none.30 9 Others are equally convinced that the Constitution em-
braces an implied right to vote. 310
Analysis would seem to dictate that the better argument rests with
those who contend that there is a federal constitutional right to vote. In
Reynolds, the Court's pronouncement that there is such a right is not
dicta, but appears to be integral to the holding in that case. The Reyn-
olds Court considered whether Alabama's legislative apportionment
scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. By the
Court's own admission, the existence of an implied personal right to vote
was a "predominant consideration" in determining the scheme's
constitutionality. 311
Allowing, then, that a constitutional right to vote is not without its
respectable detractors, there is authority in the textual references of the
Constitution, in the Reynolds decision, and in scholarly writings to sup-
port the proposition that such a right exists. This being so, the next logi-
cal question is whether this right is merely the mechanical act of pulling
a lever or whether it entails something more.
A monkey probably can be trained to pull a lever in a voting booth.
But it would be reducing voting to an absurdity to include within its
clear. It has been repeatedly recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected
right to vote." Id. (citing Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884)); see also United States v. Clas-
sic, 313 U.S. 299, 314-15, 318 (1941) (voting in congressional elections is a constitutional right). But
see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973) (asserting in dictum that
"the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right"); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217
n.15 (1982) (reiterating the above quoted language from Rodriguez); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S.
(21 Wall.) 162, 171, 173-78 (1874) (there is no constitutional right to vote upon which women's
assertion of a right of suffrage may be predicated). The ruling in Minor on women's right to vote was
later reversed by the Nineteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
309 Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 585, 595-96 (1975); Gerald P. Goulder, The Reconstructed Right to Vote: Neutral Principles
and Minority Representation, 9 CAP. U. L. REv. 31, 34 (1979); see also Emily M. Calhoun, The First
Amendment and Distributional Voting Rights Controversies, 52 TENN. L. REv. 549, 550-51, 555
(1985) (noting that the Court's pronouncements on whether there is a right to vote have been incon-
sistent and that the status of the right under the Constitution is unclear).
310 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 474 (14th ed.
1978); ELY, supra note 173, at 117, 122-23, 234 n.30; Mary J. Morrison, Constitutional Reasoning for
Rights, 54 Mo. L. REV. 29, 50 & n.55 (1989); Sandra Guerra, Note, Voting Rights and the Constitu-
tion: The Disenfranchisement of Non-English Speaking Citizens, 97 YALE L.J. 1419, 1426 (1988);
Nancy Manougian, Note, Plyler v. Doe: Equal Protection for Illegal Aliens, 12 CAP. U. L. REv. 143,
156 (1982); Robert F. Wall, Comment, Equal Protection: Analyzing the Dimensions of a Fundamen-
tal Right-The Right to Vote, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 163, 175 (1977); see Preovolos, supra note
68, at 88-91; cf Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1079 (1979) (there is a "quasi-constitutional right" to vote in state elections).
311 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561. The Court's statements in later cases to the effect that there is no
constitutional right to vote are dicta. See, eg., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15 (1982); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973); see CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 86, at 1780 n.7.
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compass a choice that has nothing to do with political issues or candi-
dates for political office. Voting in American society is understood to be
essential to the promotion of democratic self-government and a republi-
can form of government. 312 Hence, voting is preconditioned on the abil-
ity to engage in politically purposive conduct. Politically purposive
conduct, in turn, is preconditioned on an educated citizenry. This does
not mean that the voter must be guaranteed "the most informed electoral
choice, ' 313 but it does require that the voter at least be provided the
wherewithal to make a "meaningful" electoral choice.314 That is why the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that "education is necessary to pre-
pare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open polit-
ical system."'315
The relationship between education and voting is particularly com-
pelling considering that American voters decide the external policies and
internal stability of a superpower in a rapidly changing world. While the
uneducated may still be able to meaningfully elect the local dogcatcher,
they are simply unequipped to vote in a politically purposive way in rela-
tion to such monumental and intricate issues as structuring post-Cold
War international relations, dealing with smoldering tensions in the Mid-
dle East, or reducing the runaway budget deficit. In relation to national
security policy, one education expert points out that "issues of war and
peace are vastly more complicated than ever before. To comprehend
them, we must know more facts, take into account more variables, and,
in developing national policy, far more skillfully balance means and
goals." 316
Unless the right to vote is recognized to give rise to an implied right
to education, the vote will inevitably be debased by its lack of political
meaning. As the issues to which candidates must respond become thorn-
ier and as the education crisis continues, this degenerative process can
only accelerate until the vote is completely undermined by its meaning-
lessness. Indeed, symptoms that this process has been underway for
some time may be reflected in statistics showing that large percentages of
Americans do not bother to vote and that there is a correlation between
312 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 ("The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the
essence of a democratic society .... ); id. at 562 ("The right to elect legislators... is a bedrock of
our political system."); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (voting is
"the foundation of our representative society"); ELY, supra note 173, at 116 ("TIThe right to vote
seems ... central to a right of participation in the democratic process .... ); Perry, supra note 310,
at 1079 ("The franchise is a fundamental-perhaps the fundamental-characteristic of American
government and politics.").
313 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973).
314 Preovolos, supra note 68, at 90.
315 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 63 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "there can be no doubt that education is inextricably linked to the right to
participate in the electoral process").
316 BRADEMAS, supra note 30, at 113.
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lack of education and the propensity to forego voting.317
Yet, if anything, the development of constitutional law in relation to
the right to vote manifests the Supreme Court's long-standing concern
that the vote not be debased or distorted. This concern has been most
prominently manifested in apportionment cases involving challenges
under Article I, Section 2 or the Equal Protection Clause, to districting
schemes that caused some individuals' votes to be given less weight than
others. The Supreme Court responded by propounding the concept of
"one man, one vote," with the avowed purpose of ensuring that, insofar
as practicable, each person's vote must be given approximately equal
weight.318 While the holdings in these cases are clearly confined to the
problem of unequal weighting of votes, 319 the Court's reasoning is in-
structive. The Court repeatedly and emphatically has referred to its un-
derlying disquiet over any subversion of the vote. "The consistent theme
of those [apportionment] decisions is that the right to vote in an election
is protected by the United States Constitution against dilution or debase-
ment. '320 Or, restated, "each and every citizen has an inalienable right
to full and effective participation in the political processes. '321
Of course, there is no precise measurement of what level of educa-
tional deprivation will effectively silence a would-be voter's political
voice. However, as detailed earlier, education experts are finding that the
education crisis is leaving people shockingly unaware of the most basic
317 In 1988, 57.4% of the electorate voted in the presidential elections, while in the 1986 congres-
sional elections, 46% of the voting-age population went to the polls. Of those persons voting for
President, 36.7% had only completed eight years of school or less; 41.3% had completed one to
three years of high school; 54.7% had completed four years of high school; 64.5% had completed
one to three years of college; and 77.6% had completed four years or more of college. Of those
persons voting in congressional elections, 32.7% had completed eight years of school or less; 33.8%
had completed one to three years of high school; 44.1% had completed four years of high school;
49.9% had completed one to three years of college; and 62.5% had completed four years or more of
college. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
U.S. 262 (110th ed. 1990).
318 With respect to congressional elections, the Court has looked to Article I, Section 2's edict
that representatives shall be chosen "by the People" as the constitutional underpinning for the "one
man, one vote" principle. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964). With respect to state legisla-
tive elections, the Court has relied upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
as support for applying the principle. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964). The Court has
also invoked the Equal Protection Clause to apply the "one man, one vote" principle to certain local
governmental bodies as well. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 53-54 (1970). But cf.
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 726-28 (1973) (principle is
inapplicable to election of members of a water district where main purpose was to provide for reten-
tion and distribution of water for farming).
319 See, eg., Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8, 18; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568. But see White v. Register,
412 U.S. 755, 767-69 (1973) (concluding that it was proper to assess the constitutionality of a Texas
legislative reapportionment plan by factoring in cultural and language barriers that effectively alien-
ated Mexican-Americans from political participation).
320 Hadley, 397 U.S. at 54.
321 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565; accord White, 412 U.S. at 767-69.
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information. 322 It should be recalled that many Americans have trouble
even interpreting the newspaper and are ignorant of major events in
American history.323 In the political sphere, a 1982 study revealed
"grave shortcomings in 17-year-olds' understanding of our system of
government," while a 1986 assessment showed "little improvement in
knowledge of American political philosophy, the Constitution, and basic
civil rights. '324 To put it bluntly, the intellect of the poorly educated has
been infantilized, both in terms of its store of information and its capac-
ity for political acumen. As the wherewithal for reasoned political judg-
ment has disappeared, so too has the possibility of a politically purposive
vote necessarily become more remote for such people. The interrelation-
ship between the vote and education has thus been brought into high
relief by the ongoing education crisis.
Insofar as it may be assumed that a constitutional right to vote ex-
ists (and there is a solid basis for so assuming), then there must also be a
correlative, implied positive right to education. The correlative right fol-
lows because it is education which makes the vote meaningful as politi-
cally purposive conduct and because it is the meaningful vote, not a
nonsensical one, that is guaranteed by the Constitution. Otherwise, the
Supreme Court's overriding concern in the apportionment cases that a
person's vote must not be diluted or debased in relation to other votes
will be betrayed, as will the nation's commitment to ensuring the popu-
lace's full and effective participation in the electoral processes.
4. The Privileges or Immunities Clause.-The Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States."' 325 The Clause is considered
something of an enigma. There is little in the way of dispositive legisla-
tive history to illuminate what rights might be subsumed under its apho-
ristic phraseology. 326 Case law interpreting the Clause is also sparse.327
322 See supra notes 31-36, 41-43, 50-53, 57-58, 60, 69-71 and accompanying text.
323 See supra notes 42, 289 and accompanying text.
324 BENNETr, MAKING IT WORK, supra note 29, at 13-14.
325 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
326 There are differing opinions as to what the debates of the 39th Congress reveal about the
intent behind the privileges or immunities clause. See ELY, supra note 173, at 27; Aviam Soifer,
Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651, 655, 681-86
(1979). In this regard, it has been remarked:
[E]xactly what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended in their Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause has been a puzzling subject. And as Professor Gunther has noted, "[iun no part of
the congressional debates on the Amendment is there greater evidence of vagueness and incon-
sistencies than in the discussions of 'privileges and immunities'."
J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause, 12 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 43, 44 (1989) (quoting GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 417 (1lth
ed. 1985)).
327 2 ROTUNDA, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 173, § 14.3.
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In fact, within five years after enactment of the Amendment, the
Supreme Court essentially torpedoed the Privileges or Immunities Clause
in the Slaughter-House Cases.328 In Slaughter-House, the Court upheld
Louisiana legislation establishing a slaughterhouse monopoly against
plaintiffs' claim that the monopoly interfered with, among other things,
the right to carry on a lawful trade protected by the Clause.329 Because
the Court believed that fundamental rights, for the most part, belong
within "the class of rights which the State governments were created to
establish and secure, '330 the majority opinion interpreted the Privileges
or Immunities Clause narrowly so as to protect only those rights which
are uniquely derivative of national citizenship, i.e., rights that "owe their
existence to the Federal Government, its National character, its Consti-
tution, or its laws. ' 331 The right to pursue a lawful trade, the Court said,
belongs to the rights of state, not national, citizenship. 332
In Slaughter-House and subsequent cases, the Court attempted to
give this concept of the Clause more definition by enumerating some of
the specific rights peculiar to national citizenship. Standing in stark con-
trast to the broad language of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the
list which emerged has turned out to be an eclectic mix of rights unified
only by the fact that they are all already guaranteed by federal law other
than the Clause.333 The Slaughter-House decision thus effectively ren-
dered the privileges or immunities language a redundancy.3 34
Slaughter-House has cast a long shadow, for the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause is still "largely ignored" by the courts as a source of
328 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
329 Id. at 60, 77, 80, 83.
330 Id. at 76.
331 Id. at 79.
332 Id. at 60, 78-79.
333 The list of rights set forth in the Slaughter-House decision include the rights to free access to
the nation's seaports; to use the nation's navigable waters; to seek a writ of habeas corpus; to become
a citizen of any state by bona fide residence in that state; to demand the federal government's protec-
tion over life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or in a foreign country; and to visit the seat
of the national government to make claims against or do business with that government. Id. at 79-
80. In Twining v. New Jersey, the Court added to this list the rights to pass freely from state to state;
to petition Congress for redress of grievances; to vote for national officers; to enter public lands; to be
protected against violence while in lawful custody of a U.S. Marshal; and to inform United States
authorities regarding violations of federal law. 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908). Later, in Oyama v. Califor-
nia, the Court recognized the statutory right to take and hold real property as falling within the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as well. 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948).
334 The received reading of Justice Miller's Slaughter-House majority opinion is that it turned the
Privileges or Immunities Clause into surplusage by assigning to the clause rights already protected
elsewhere in the Constitution. ELY, supra note 173, at 22-23; TRIBE, supra note 83, § 7-4, at 556,
558; Normand G. Benoit, The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Can
There Be Life After Death?, XI SuFFoLK U. L. Rlv. 61, 63-64 (1976); Lino A. Graglia, Do We Have
an Unwritten Constitution?-The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 83 (1989).
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rights. 335 However, this very quiescence has periodically provoked spec-
ulation in the academic community on the true meaning and potential of
the Clause. Indeed, it is troubling to live with the notion that any provi-
sion of the Constitution is pointless verbiage--especially where it is capa-
ble of defensible interpretation. 336
From among those scholars who share this unease, a school of
thought has evolved which contends that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause should be understood to implicitly give rise to certain unenumer-
ated substantive rights.337 A prominent representative of this viewpoint,
Professor Philip Kurland, has suggested that one of the rights protected
by the Privileges or Immunities Clause is a positive right to education:
With all due respect to those who have labored so hard in the vineyard,
equal educational opportunity is not the essence of the claim. It is not
equality but quality with which we are concerned. For equality can be se-
cured on a low level no less than a high one. The claim that will have to be
developed will be a claim to adequate and appropriate educational opportu-
nity. And this, I submit, derives more cogently from concepts of privileges
and immunities rather than equality of treatment. 338
Professor Kurland's thesis is that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is best suited to making the Constitution responsive to the "exis-
tent and potential needs" of a modem society dominated by big govern-
335 Wilkinson III, supra note 326, at 43; Timothy S. Bishop, Comment, The Privileges orlmmuni-
ties Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 142, 143 (1984);
Ivery Foreman, Comment, Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 6 BLACK L.J. 211, 228-29
(1980).
336 "It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect;
and therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it." Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). As Professor Charles Black has commented, it is
presumptuous to disregard the meaning of even so nebulous a provision as the Preamble to the
Constitution. Black, Jr., Further Reflections, supra note 148, at 1105, 1107. With respect to the
Privileges or Immunities Clause in particular, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment "certainly
must have felt that the words that they labored over would convey more than the present nullity."
Benoit, supra note 334, at 107-08; see Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on the Rehabilitation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71, 82
(1989). Contra Wilkinson, III, supra note 326, at 52.
337 For a sampling of the literature espousing the thesis that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
should be interpreted to support unenumerated or implied rights generally, see ELY, supra note 173,
at 24, 28-30; TRIBE, supra note 83, § 7-4, at 558-59, and § 11-2, at 773-74; Michael K. Curtis,
Privileges or Immunities, Individual Rights, and Federalism, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 53, 58-60
(1989); Kurland, supra note 147, at 419; Levinson, supra note 336, at 74-75; Lupu, supra note 87, at
1035; Laurence H. Tribe, Contrasting Constitutional Visions: Of Real and Unreal Differences, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 102 (1987) [hereinafter Tribe, Contrasting Visions]; see also Benoit,
supra note 334, at 101-02, 112. Contra Graglia, supra note 334, at 88-89.
Some of these commentators also make the point that the unenumerated rights protected by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause include substantive ones. ELY, supra note 173, at 24; TRIBE, supra
note 83, § 7-4, at 558-59, and § 11-2, at 773-74; Kurland, supra note 147, at 419; Lupu, supra note
87, at 1035; Tribe, Contrasting Visions, supra, at 102; see Benoit, supra note 334, at 101.
338 Kurland, supra note 147, at 419.
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ment and by the massive inundation of new technologies. 339 According
to Professor Kurland, governmental power over the creation and distri-
bution of goods and services in the United States has assumed such pro-
portions that individual choice is substantially constricted;340 this threat
to individual freedom is further compounded by the advent of new tech-
nologies that have the potential to invade and overwhelm Americans'
personal lives.341 Professor Kurland would ward off such oppression by
finding certain implied substantive rights, and especially a positive right
to education, in the Privileges or Immunities Clause.342 Because its lan-
guage "speaks to matters of substance," it is this Clause which most nat-
urally lends itself to serve as the source of the right.343
Although Professor Kurland wrote his article on the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in 1972, the omnipresence of government and the
proliferation of new technologies has not appreciably abated. Depen-
dence on government continues to erode the integrity of individual free-
dom. The very desire for personal self-preservation, for example, is
contingent upon governmental decisions with respect to nuclear weapons
plants,344 nuclear weapons policy,345 governmental allocations of medical
and other essential benefits to the poor or elderly,346 governmental in-
volvement in the decision to have an abortion, 347 governmental involve-
ment in combating illicit drug trafficking, 348 etc. Likewise, there is the
potential for abuse of evolving technologies, such as gene therapy,349
robotics, 350 and the computer,35' so as to intrude upon personal privacy
339 Id. at 418-19. For a similar perception of late twentieth century American society, see TRIBE,
supra note 83, § 7-4, at 558-59; Foreman, supra note 335, at 229-31.
340 Kurland, supra note 147, at 418-19; accord Kreimer, supra note 164, at 1295-96.
341 Kurland, supra note 147 at 419; cf Emerson, supra note 302, at 795-96, 848 (commenting on
the dangers to freedom of expression posed by new communications technology).
342 Kurland, supra note 147, at 418-20; see also JOHN DEwEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 9
(1944) (noting the need for formal education to prepare the individual to deal with complex, over-
bearing societies).
343 Kurland, supra note 147, at 406, 419.
344 Keith Schneider, Nuclear Weapons Plants Face Law Suits Around the US., N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
8, 1990, at A15; Matthew Wald, Secrecy Tied to Hanford Tanks' Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1990,
at A12.
345 ELLIOTT MEYROWITZ, PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE RELEVANCE OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 29-39 (1990).
346 Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2032 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 301-1397e (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
347 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding regulations prohibiting certain
federally funded programs from providing abortion counseling, referral, and activities involving the
recommendation of abortion as a family planning method).
348 David G. Evans, In the Name of Policing the Drug War... How Many Liberties Are We
Losing?, 17 HUM. RTs. 14 (1990); Katherine Bishop, Military Takes Part in Drug Sweep and Reaps
Criticism and a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1990, at A12.
349 Robert M. Henig, Dr. Anderson's Gene Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1991, § 6, at 31; Gene
Treatments for Human Illness May Be Tried Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1990, at Al.
350 See A Robot with the Brains, Build and Gait for Mars, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1990, § 3, at 9.
351 Edward Rothstein, In the Mind of the High-Tech Child, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1990, at Cl;
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and individuality.
In view of the continuity and intensity of these political and scien-
tific developments, Professor Kurland's argument for finding a positive
right to education in the Privileges or Immunities Clause has become
increasingly convincing with the passage of time. Indeed, his foresight
has been confirmed by the symptomology of the education crisis. As pre-
viously discussed, poor education is jeopardizing democratic govern-
ment 352 and disqualifying large numbers of people from either working in
or coping with an increasingly "high-tech" environment.353 The result,
just as Professor Kurland predicted, is an incremental encroachment on
the capacity of the individual to meaningfully exercise constitutional
freedoms, such as free speech and political participation, and a concomi-
tant contraction of individual identity in the face of seemingly monolithic
political and technological forces. 354
As relevant as Professor Kurland's ideas are to the 1990s, it should
be acknowledged that this theory is not without its weaknesses. First, on
its face, the Privileges or Immunities Clause appears to limit cognizable
claims to those made only against state governments. Anticipating this
objection, Professor Kurland disposes of it by looking to Supreme Court
decisions which demonstrate "how the national government may be
called on to respond to claims which the fourteenth amendment in terms
makes only against state action. ' 355 Second, the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause, read literally, appears to bestow its protections only upon
"citizens of the United States." 356 Professor Kurland meets this diffi-
culty with the observation that any difference in treatment as between
aliens and citizens already must be "particularly justified" under the
Equal Protection Clause.357 Thus, whatever rights may, in the future, be
Peter H. Lewis, The Executive Computer: Modem Makers Are Picking up the Pace, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 1990, § 3, at 8.
352 See supra notes 68, 288-95, 301, 312-17, 323-24 and accompanying text.
353 See supra notes 34, 42, 51-57, 67, 288-92, 297-300 and accompanying text. For a full analysis
of the technological demands which will be made on the American work force and the latter's
preparedness to meet those demands over the next decade, see HUDSON INSTITUTE, supra note 66,
passim.
354 See Kreimer, supra note 164, at 1295-96, 1395-96; see also Emerson, supra note 302, at 795
(noting that government has become "a more pervasive participant in the system of freedom of
expression" and has assumed a greatly enhanced affirmative role in the system).
355 Kurland, supra note 147, at 419 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); and Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)). The dynamic
of the Court calling upon the federal government to respond to claims which the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment makes actionable only against state conduct is well illustrated in Boiling.
There, the Court incorporated into the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause principles of equal-
ity that are virtually identical to those arising from the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. The effect is to forbid the federal government from allowing racial segregation of public
schools in the District of Columbia, just as Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), prohibits
state governments from doing the same under the Equal Protection Clause.
356 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
357 Kurland, supra note 147, at 419; see also ELY, supra note 173, at 24-25 (contending that the
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accorded citizens under the Privileges or Immunities Clause will also be
accorded to resident noncitizens by operation of the equal protection
principle.
The third and perhaps most troubling weakness in the Kurland pro-
posal is that its practical application is still barred by the Court's 1873
Slaughter-House decision. Yet, as long as people change their minds and
judges overrule their decisions, this obstacle is not insurmountable either.
As one commentator stated, "[t]he overruling of Slaughter-House's read-
ing of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is a consummation devoutly to
be wished. ' 358 In fact, whatever validity Slaughter-House had when it
was decided, it is clear that the considerations underlying the decision no
longer exist.
The seeds of the Slaughter-House case were sown in the uncertainty
and confusion over the concept of citizenship which prevailed before the
Civil War.359 The view which had particular currency in the Supreme
Court during that period was that national citizenship was actually sec-
ondary to and derivative of state citizenship.36° Even though the Union
victory subsequently marked the ascendancy and primacy of national
government, the early post-Civil War era retained a pronounced anti-
federal mood in many quarters.36' Thus, although Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment was added to the Constitution shortly after the war
in order to invest the national government with "a portion of each state's
control over civil and political rights" and to make state citizenship de-
rivative of federal citizenship, 362 a majority of the Supreme Court Jus-
tices remained mired in pre-war conceptualizations. 363
"The nineteenth century legal mind grasped the concept of federal-
ism by visualizing two coextensive spheres, one defining the power of the
federal government, the other that of the states."' 364 To the Slaughter-
Privileges or Immunities Clause could mean that "there is a set of entitlements, 'the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States,' which states are not to deny to anyone. In other words,
the reference to citizens may define the class of rights rather than limit the class of beneficiaries.").
358 Levinson, supra note 336, at 73-74. The Supreme Court is no stranger to such about-faces.
Consider that in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court rejected its earlier legiti-
mation, in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), of separate but equal facilities for blacks and
whites under the Equal Protection Clause. Or consider another famous turn around when the Court
invalidated the substantive due process doctrine which had predominated from 1897 to 1937. West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see TRIBE, supra note 83, § 4-4, at 219-20. Indeed, the
overthrow of precedent has recently come into vogue among many Supreme Court Justices.
Supreme-But Also Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1991, § 4, at 14.
359 TRIBE, supra note 83, § 7-3, at 549.
360 See, eg., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
361 TRIBE, supra note 83, § 7-3, at 549-51.
362 Id. at 549.
363 "The majority of the Slaughter-House Court thought Congress intended no sweeping recon-
struction of the spheres of state and federal power." Wilkinson, III, supra note 326, at 46; see
Levinson, supra note 336, at 73.
364 TRIBE, supra note 83, § 7-3, at 552.
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House Justices, it was impossible for the federal government, under au-
thority of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, to sit in judgment upon
state legislation for the purpose of protecting the peoples' civil rights
from infringement by state governments. Attributing such power to the
federal government meant to these Justices nothing less than the destruc-
tion of state sovereignty and federalism. 365 Thus, the Slaughter-House
decision froze for posterity pre-Civil War thinking on federalism and
civil rights; the casualty, of course, was the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.
While the nation obviously still wrestles periodically with various
facets of state-federal relations, 366 it is equally true that the particular
concerns of the Slaughter-House majority have long been put to rest.
What Slaughter-House stanched under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause was merely rerouted through the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses. Throughout the twentieth century, the Court has fre-
quently relied on one or the other of these two clauses to strike down
state laws as violative of federally enforceable rights under the Constitu-
tion.367 Certainly the evolution of the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses are reassurance that the elicitation of fundamental rights from
the federal Constitution does not signify the demise of the states or feder-
alism. The reality is that the rationale for Slaughter-House's decimation
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is irrelevant to late twentieth cen-
tury legal analysis and presents a totally unnecessary obstacle to judicial
development of the clause.
The error of the Slaughter-House majority's ways is further exempli-
fied by the fact that even in 1873, the year of the Slaughter-House deci-
sion, there already existed precedent warranting a different result. The
1823 case of Corfield v. Coryel1368 indicates that Slaughter-House may
not have been correctly decided in the first place and that Professor Kur-
land's reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause comports more
faithfully with the purpose and spirit of the clause. Corfield was de-
cided under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section
2 of the Constitution,369 a clause which, in spite of similarities in verbiage
and cadence, has a meaning different from the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges or Immunities Clause. While the latter seems to be worded so
as to guaranty substantive rights, the former is cast in terms of equal
access to state-created rights. That is, the Privileges and Immunities
365 Id. at 551-55; see Benoit, supra note 334, at 99.
366 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). Garcia significantly diminished state immu-
nity from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
367 TRIBE, supra note 83, § 7-3, at 553-55; Benoit, supra note 334, at 99-100.
368 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
369 The clause provides that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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Clause is generally understood to require that each state must accord to
visiting citizens of other states the same fundamental rights as the host
state accords to its own citizens. 370
However, in Corfield, Judge Bushrod Washington was not content
to let each state be the arbiter of what rights it, as the host state, would
grant to out-of-staters. Judge Washington took the tack that there are
certain rights which are so fundamental that they belong to the citizens
of all free governments:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those
privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which
belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at
all times, been enjoyed by citizens of the several states which compose this
Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.
What these fundamental privileges are, it would perhaps be more tedious
than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended
under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoy-
ment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every
kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to
such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good
of the whole.371
Judge Washington followed this statement of principle with a list of spe-
cific rights intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.372 The
strong implication is that he understood Article IV, Section 2 to embrace
unenumerated and, as of yet, unidentified federally protected rights
under the Constitution.373
There has been much vacillation and controversy over the validity
of the Corfield fundamental-rights analysis as it relates to Article IV,
Section 2.374 But, doubts on this score do not change the fact that two
370 ELY, supra note 173, at 29; 2 ROTUNDA, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 173,
§ 14.3; TRIBE, supra note 83, § 6-34, at 528.
371 6 F. Cas. at 551-52 (emphasis added).
372 Judge Washington wrote:
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of
trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and
dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions
than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular
privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of
privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated
and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised....
Id. at 552 (emphasis added).
373 Judge Washington's intention in this regard may be gleaned from his statement that in listing
rights arising from Article IV, Section 2, he was only mentioning "some" of the particular privileges
and immunities of citizens and that there are "many others, which might be mentioned." Id. at 552;
see ELY, supra note 173, at 28-30.
374 Judge Washington's analysis has been viewed by some as an attempt to introduce natural-
rights theory into the Privileges and Immunities Clause. TRIBE, supra note 83, § 6-34, at 529; David
S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 794, 842
86:550 (1992)
HeinOnline -- 86 Nw. U. L. Rev.  613 1991-1992
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
circumstances continue to make the Corfield analysis highly pertinent to
determining what rights are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges or Immunities Clause. First, during the thirty-ninth Congress,
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment repeatedly referred to
Corfield as explanatory of the sorts of rights guaranteed by the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. 375 Second, Justice Field's dissenting opinion in
the Slaughter-House Cases, in which he was joined by Chief Justice
Chase and Justices Swayne and Bradley, borrowed from the Corfield
analysis in order to define the dissenters' view of the federal rights pro-
tected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.376
If the Corfield analysis does inform the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, then the case becomes even more
persuasive for adopting Professor Kurland's thesis regarding the right to
education. Certainly there is a plausible argument that the general
rights, listed in Corfield, to happiness, safety, liberty, life, and property
are all contingent, to one degree or another, upon fulfillment of a more
specific right to education. Indeed, this relationship has been under-
scored by contemporary data on the ramifications of the public education
crisis, showing that substandard education endangers national security,
aggravates crime, interferes with individual self-fulfillment, and depresses
the economy's capacity for innovation and international competition.377
In sum, Professor Kurland's formulation of a substantive right to
education in the Privileges or Immunities Clause has only become more
compelling as the evidence mounts that, without successful school sys-
tems, individual rights and freedoms will be endangered by the invasive
(1987). Before the nineteenth century ended, the Supreme Court ostensibly rejected Judge Washing-
ton's injection of natural rights into the clause. See Downham v. Alexandria, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 173
(1870); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869) (The Paul case was later overturned in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), reh'g denied, 323 U.S. 811 (1944)).
Nevertheless, natural-rights doctrine returned to haunt Article IV, Section 2. Whether among the
Justices there numbered some closet natural-rights theorists or whether sheer inadvertence has been
the cause, the parlance of natural-rights thinking found its way into some twentieth-century opinions
interpreting the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game
Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978) (Privileges and Immunities Clause protects only "basic and es-
sential activities"); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975) (Privileges and Immunities
Clause includes for nonresidents of a state a "fundamental" right to "exemption from higher taxes or
impositions than are paid by" residents of the state). But, Professor Laurence Tribe calls these
modern incantations of natural-rights ideology "echos, rather than true incarnations, of the 19th-
century natural rights notions that animated Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield." TRIBE,
supra note 83, § 6-35, at 534.
375 ELY, supra note 173, at 29. "Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan, a member of the Committee
on Reconstruction, quoted extensively from the opinion of Circuit Judge Washington in Corfield v.
Coryell while defining the intended scope of the fourteenth amendment in the Senate." Foreman,
supra note 335, at 213; see also Russel W. Galloway, Slaughtering Slaughter-House: The Privileges or
Immunities Clause Should Be Restored to Its Original Meaning, 7 CAL. LAW. 16, 16-18 (1987).
376 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83-111 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting); see Kurland, supra note 147, at
412-13.
377 See supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
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attributes of modem society. Corfield lends added support to this formu-
lation. When these factors are considered in conjunction with the anach-
ronistic posture of the Slaughter-House Cases, the time seems long
overdue for bringing the Privileges or Immunities Clause out of idle ob-
scurity and into the fray as the legitimate source of a positive right to
education.
C. Principles of Constitutional Construction Also Support Recognition
of the Right
In the preceding sections, the case is made for finding an implied
right to education in various express provisions of the Constitution as
well as in another implied right, the right to vote. The analysis of each
such constitutional basis for the right to education has been developed, it
is trusted, to stand independently and on its own, without further elabo-
ration or reference to additional doctrinal justifications. However, it
would be a distortion to leave things at that. The case for finding a posi-
tive right to education is actually considerably stronger than the sum of
its analytical bases. There are principles of constitutional construction
which make recognition of the right even more compatible with the sense
and purpose of the Constitution. These principles derive from interna-
tional law's informing role, the Ninth Amendment, and evidence of origi-
nal intent.378
378 The Supreme Court also has had occasion to rely upon a rule of construction for locating
fundamental rights which consists of looking to the Constitution as a whole, rather than to any
specific constitutional provision. This approach is perhaps most notably exemplified in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968), where the Court held that there is a constitutional right to travel
interstate. In describing its rationale, the Court stated that, "[w]e have no occasion to ascribe the
source of this right... to a particular constitutional provision," although during the years preceding
Shapiro, the Court had invoked several provisions as possible bases for the right. Id. at 630. Ac-
cording to the Court, the right is to be found, instead, in the "nature of our Federal Union" and "our
constitutional concepts of personal liberty." Id. at 629. The Court could go this route, it was ex-
plained, because the right to travel interstate is a" 'right so elementary [that it] was conceived from
the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created.'" Id. at
631 (quoting Justice Stewart's majority opinion in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966)).
Former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger recently stated that he believes there is a right to educa-
tion suffusing the Constitution as a whole. Interview with former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, in
Dearborn, Mich. (Nov. 15, 1991) (clarifying his remark, that there is a right to education, made in
Address Marking the Bicentennial of the Bill of Rights in Honor of the Centennial of the Detroit
College of Law, in 1991 DET. C. L. Rnv. (forthcoming Jan. 1992)). Certainly it is conceivable that
the education crisis may become devastating enough to imperil "'the stronger Union the Constitu-
tion created,' " as in Shapiro. Id. Indeed, it is arguable that things already have reached such a pass.
Cf. Wright, supra note 68, at 53-54, 60, 69 (suggesting that because the Constitution is a charter of
self-government by enfranchised citizens, the time is ripe for the Court to look for a right to educa-
tion in the Constitution as a whole). While the theory has considerable appeal, its prospects for
success at present do not appear especially bright. Aside from the difference between the political
proclivities of the Warren Court, which decided Shapiro, and the Rehnquist Court, there is the fact
that prior to Shapiro, the Court had already recognized a constitutional right to travel in specific
provisions of the Constitution. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (First
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1. International Law in the Role of Informing the Constitution.-
There are at least six international instruments which posit a positive
right to education. One, the Protocol of Buenos Aires, is a treaty to
which the United States is a party. 379 The others either are treaties to
which the United States is not yet a party or are nontreaty instruments.
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child380 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights38' are
and Fifth Amendments); California v. Edwards, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (Commerce Clause); Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (Fourteenth Amendment). The right to education can boast no
such pedigree.
379 Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States (Protocol of
Buenos Aires), Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, OAS Treaty Series No. 1-A OASOR, OEA/Ser. A/Z,
Add. 2 (1967) [hereinafter Buenos Aires Protocol]. The right to education is set forth as follows:
The Member States will exert the greatest efforts, in accordance with their constitutional
processes, to ensure the effective exercise of the right to education, on the following bases:
a. Elementary education, compulsory for children of school age, shall also be offered to
all others who can benefit from it. When provided by the State it shall be without charge;
b. Middle-level education shall be extended progressively to as much of the population as
possible, with a view to social improvement. It shall be diversified in such a way that it meets
the development needs of each country without prejudice to providing a general education; and
c. Higher education shall be available to all, provided that, in order to maintain its high
level, the corresponding regulatory or academic standards are met.
Id. at art. 47.
380 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, 44 U.N. GAOR.
Supp. No. 49 at 165, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989) [hereinafter Convention of the Child]. The right
to education is set forth, in pertinent part, as follows:
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this
right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular:
(a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all;
(b) Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including general
and vocational education, make them available and accessible to every child, and take appropri-
ate measures such as the introduction of free education and offering financial assistance in case
of need;
(c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate
means;
(d) Make educational and vocational information and guidance available and accessible to all
children;
(e) Take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out
rates.
Id. at art. 28.
381 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Economic, Etc. Rights Covenant]. The right to education is
set forth, in pertinent part, as follows:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to educa-
tion....
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the
full realization of this right:
(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all;
(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secon-
dary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate
means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;
(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by
every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;
(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those
persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education;
(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an
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two such treaties; another, the Convention Against Discrimination in
Education, 382 imposes a duty to educate upon those nations that become
parties to that Convention. The category of nontreaty instruments in-
cludes the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 38 3 the American Dec-
laration of the Rights and Duties of Man,384 and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.3 85
Although the right to education is variously described in these docu-
ments, generally speaking, the standard formulation establishes a right to
education which is then qualified with the acknowledgment that the right
may be achieved progressively, in stages. Article 26 of the Universal
adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching staff
shall be continuously improved.
Id. at art. 13, 1-2.
382 Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Dec. 14, 1960,429 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter
Anti-Discrimination Convention]. The duty to provide education is described as follows:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake furthermore to formulate, develop and
apply a national policy which, by methods appropriate to the circumstances and to national
usage, will tend to promote equality of opportunity and of treatment in the matter of education
and in particular:
a. To make primary education free and compulsory; make secondary education in its
different forms generally available and accessible to all; make higher education equally accessi-
ble to all on the basis of individual capacity; assure compliance by all with the obligation to
attend school prescribed by law;
b. To ensure that the standards of education are equivalent in all public education institu-
tions of the same level, and that the conditions relating to the quality of the education provided
are also equivalent;
c. To encourage and intensify by appropriate methods the education of persons who have
not received any primary education or who have not completed the entire primary education
course and the continuation of their education on the basis of individual capacity;
d. To provide training for the teaching profession without discrimination.
Id. at art. 4. Although this provision does not literally enunciate a right to education, the imposition
of the duty to provide education may be read to give rise to an accompanying right to demand
fulfillment of the duty. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
383 United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386, 14 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 16 at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959). The right to education is set forth, in pertinent part,
as follows:
The child is entitled to receive education, which shall be free and compulsory, at least in
the elementary stages. He shall be given an education which will promote his general culture,
and enable him, on a basis of equal opportunity, to develop his abilities, his individual judgment
and his sense of moral and social responsibility, and to become a useful member of society.
Id. at principle 7.
384 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/
Ser. L/V/II. 23, Doc. 21, Rev. 6 [hereinafter American Declaration]. The right to education is
stated as follows:
Every person has the right to an education, which should be based on the principles of
liberty, morality and human solidarity.
Likewise, every person has the right to an education that will prepare him to attain a
decent life, to raise his standard of living, and to be a useful member of society.
The right to an education includes the right to equality of opportunity in every case, in
accordance with natural talents, merit and the desire to utilize the resources that the state or the
community is in a position to provide.
Every person has the right to receive, free, at least a primary education.
Id. at art. 12.
385 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A, 3(1) GAOR Res. 71, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
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Declaration of Human Rights typifies the pattern: "Everyone has the
right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and
fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Techni-
cal and professional education shall be made generally available and
higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of
merit." 386
It is tempting to become sidetracked into a discussion over the appli-
cability of the instruments' education provisions as the law of decision,
binding on domestic courts. In fact, some authorities have made pre-
cisely this argument, with respect to five of the instruments-the Proto-
col of Buenos Aires, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the Conven-
tion Against Discrimination in Education-in order to establish the right
to education as a binding rule of customary international law.387 In addi-
tion, some have argued that the right to education provision of the Proto-
col of Buenos Aires is binding, self-executing treaty law.388 However, the
limited scope of this Article's thesis obviates any need to consider the
instruments as providing the rule of decision. For even if the instruments
were binding on domestic courts, that would not give them constitutional
stature. Rather, by virtue of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, 389
386 Id. at art. 26.
387 Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN.
L. REV. 367, 406-08 (1985); Charles Christopher, Comment, Plyler v. Doe and the Right of Undocu-
mented Alien Children to a Free Public Education, 2 B.U. INT'L L.J. 513, 523-32 (1984). Contra In
re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd unreported mem. (5th Cir.
1981), aff'd sub nom. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The district court inIn reAlien Children
Education Litigation rejected plaintiffs' arguments that the right to education provisions of the Bue-
nos Aires Protocol, the Universal Declaration, the Economic, Etc. Rights Covenant, the American
Declaration, and the Anti-Discrimination Convention, are binding as customary international law.
Neither the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court mentioned these international
law arguments in their affirming opinions. Professor Lillich has criticized the district court's deci-
sion as improperly concluding that the education provisions are aspirational and as demonstrating a
"misunderstanding of the role of domestic courts in the enforcement, much less the development, of
customary international law." Lillich, supra, at 407 nn.189-90 & 192.
As a general matter, non treaty instruments and even treaties to which this country is not a
party may, under certain circumstances, constitute customary international law. L. CHEN ET AL.,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 266-71 (1980). Customary international law is con-
sidered part of the federal common law. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
388 See Brief of the International Human Rights Group as Amicus Curiae Urging Affirmance at
3-23, Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980) (No. 78-3311); accord Robert F. Kane & Felix
Velarde-Munoz, Undocumented Aliens and the Constitution: Limitations on State Action Denying
Children Access to Public Education, 5 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 461, 504 & 505 n.367 (1978).
A treaty which is not self-executing requires a congressional enactment in order to have binding
effect within the United States. A self-executing treaty does not require this additional step. For a
discussion of the distinctions between self-executing and non self-executing treaties, see Louis HEN-
KIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 156-61 (1972).
389 The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof,
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they would merely become federal law which could be superseded by
subsequent contradictory federal legislation or treaty law.390
For purposes of this discussion, the real relevance of these interna-
tional instruments lies in their value as a means of informing open-ended
or cryptic clauses of the Constitution. The general. informing role of in-
ternational human rights instruments vis-a-vis the Constitution has been
embraced by a significant number of international law scholars391 and at
least one United States Court of Appeals. 392 It also received an approv-
ing nod from the four concurring Supreme Court Justices in Oyama v.
California,393 when they looked to the United Nations Charter to define
constitutional norms under the Fourteenth Amendment. 394
While the use of international human rights instruments to inform
constitutional language has gained a great deal of credence in recent
years, there is lack of agreement as to whether such instruments must
rise to the level either of binding customary international law or of self-
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
390 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); HENKIN, supra note 388, at 163-64; Lillich,
supra note 387, at 369.
391 Richard B. Bilder, Integrating International Human Rights Law into Domestic Law-U.S.
Experience, 4 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 1, 2,7 (1981); Gorden A. Christenson, UsingHuman Rights Law to
Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 3,4, 15-18, 36 (1983) [herein-
after Christenson, Inform Due Process and Equal Protection]; Gorden A. Christenson, The Uses of
Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 4 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 39, 52-55 (1981)
[hereinafter Christenson, Inform Constitutional Interpretation]; Lillich, supra note 387, at 408-12;
Hans A. Linde, Comments, 18 INT'L LAW. 77-78, 80-81 (1984); Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United
Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IoWA L. REv. 901, 902,
916, 932, 936, 948-49 (1984); Robert J. Martineau, Interpreting the Constitution: The Use of Inter-
national Human Rights Norms, 5 HuM. RTs. Q. 87, 103, 105-07 (1983); Jordan J. Paust, Human
Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27
How. L.J. 145, 210-11, 218-20 (1984).
Incidentally, this role of international law in relation to the Constitution has been given a
number of interchangeable names. See, eg., Christenson, Inform Due Process and Equal Protection,
supra, at 3, 36 (informing or illuminating role); Lillich, supra note 387, at 408-12 (infusing role);
Lockwood, supra, at 902, 916, 948 (finding or redefining role); Martineau, supra, at 103, 107 (defin-
ing or incorporating role). It is perhaps worth mentioning that there is some inconsistency among
the commentators with respect to the meaning of the term "incorporating" as it is used in this
context. At least one commentator uses the term in the same sense that others use the terms "in-
forming," "infusing," etc. See Martineau, supra, at 103, 107. In contrast, some writers use the word
"incorporating" to convey the process by which a non-self-executing treaty or customary interna-
tional law may become part of the federal common law. See Christenson, Inform Due Process and
Equal Protection, supra, at 20. As indicated in the text above, this latter sort of incorporation is not
in issue here. In the interest of avoiding any unnecessary confusion, the term "incorporating" sim-
ply will not be used.
392 Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981) (referring to inter-
national law as an aide in defining due process).
393 332 U.S. 650 (1948).
394 Id. at 673 (1948) (Black, J., Douglas, J., Murphy, J., & Rutledge, J., concurring).
HeinOnline -- 86 Nw. U. L. Rev.  619 1991-1992
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
executing treaties in order to fulfill the informing function. Professor
Richard Lillich takes the position that international human rights instru-
ments may infuse the Constitution whether or not they also constitute
binding customary international law or self-executing treaties.3 95 Profes-
sor Gordon Christenson, on the other hand, intimates that in order for
international human rights norms to be of value in informing the Consti-
tution, they should derive from customary international law.396
Professor Christenson is undoubtedly correct when he suggests that
customary international law is more persuasive than international human
rights norms which do not yet attain to that status. But, in this writer's
judgment, Professor Lillich takes the sounder view. Unlike the situation
where an international instrument is to serve as the rule of decision, use
of the instrument as an interpretative device merely to inform the Consti-
tution does not logically require treating the instrument as dispositive
law.
As mentioned previously, some commentators have proposed that
the education provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
Protocol of Buenos Aires, the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, and the Convention Against Discrimination in Educa-
tion, do, in fact, give rise to a positive right to education as binding cus-
tomary international law.397 Arguably, then, these instruments meet
even Professor Christenson's more demanding standard for informing
the Constitution. In any event, surely these five instruments meet Profes-
sor Lillich's more liberal prerequisites, representing the reiteration of a
world consensus on the right to education in major international docu-
ments over the course of several decades.398
395 Professor Lillich states that "international human rights law, at least until the United States
ratifies more self-executing human rights treaties or more norms in the Universal Declaration ripen
into customary international law, may serve an important function shaping the content and reach of
constitutional... standards." Lillich, supra note 387, at 411-12; see also Martineau, supra note 391,
at 105, 107 (maintaining that "[t]he [informing] approach is free from the concerns... of determin-
ing whether international norms are so widely accepted as to be deemed binding on the court"); cf.
Bilder, supra note 391, at 7 (asserting that the judiciary will use international standards to inform the
Constitution even though they are not regarded "as customary law to be considered as 'the law of
the land' ").
396 Professor Christenson remarks that "[tihese [international human rights] norms supply a con-
text, guide interpretation and fill gaps in the positive law, but their use requires convincing technical
presentation of the positive sources of customary international law before they are contextually per-
suasive." Christenson, Inform Due Process and Equal Protection, supra note 391, at 17.
397 See supra note 387 and accompanying text; see also CHEN ET AL., supra note 387, at 273-74
(pronouncing the entire Universal Declaration to be customary international law).
398 Lillich, supra note 387, at 406-08; cf Paust, supra note 391, at 191 (implying that "human
rights to education," drawn from the Universal Declaration, should at least have informed the
Supreme Court's analysis in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)); Chris-
tenson, Inform Due Process and Equal Protection, supra note 391, at 18-20 (suggesting that the
education rights provisions of the Universal Declaration, the Economic, Etc. Rights Covenant, and
the Child Rights Declaration, may inform the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
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It still may be objected, though, that nothing much is accomplished
by this informing role because, by the instruments' terms, the right may
be achieved progressively and, typically, only elementary education is
guaranteed. Yet the fact remains that these documents posit a right to
education which is clearly meant to be mandatory, not precatory. 399
That provision is made for the right to be achieved in stages probably
reflects the drafters' recognition that not all nations have the resources or
level of development necessary to achieve the full-blown right immedi-
ately.4 ° It is stating the obvious to add that the United States does not
fall within the classification of poor or underdeveloped nations of likely
concern to the drafters.40 1
Granting that at least five of the seven international instruments dis-
cussed above are of a status qualifying them to inform the Constitution,
the question still remains as to whether the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution need informing. An affirmative answer seems in order when
the substantive analytical bases for a constitutional right to education are
considered, e.g., the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Privi-
leges or Immunities Clauses, the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause,
and sundry references to the right to vote. These clauses and phrases are
the very prototype of that comprehensive yet compressed constitutional
language which lends itself to, and, indeed, begs for infusion by interna-
tional human rights norms because so few words are used to say so
much.402 What, after all, could be at one and the same time both so terse
and so expansive as the Constitution's directives that the states must not
"abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens"; 40 3 that "Congress shall
primarily by justifying application of a stricter standard of scrutiny to discriminatory classifications
burdening education):
399 Lillich, supra note 387, at 407; see also Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79
CoLum. L. REv. 405, 418 (1979) (the right to education provision in the Economic, Etc. Rights
Covenant is not merely aspirational).
400 Henkin, supra note 399, at 418-19; see Frank C. Newman, Editoria" Interpreting the Human
Rights Clauses of the U.N. Charter, 1972 REVUE DEs DRorrs DE L'HOMME 283, 287-288.
401 Even if the education provisions of these instruments were construed to make the secondary
level of education aspirational rather than mandatory, the fact that the language posits a right to
education at the elementary school level would still be supportive of a right to education under the
Constitution. The infusing role would simply be somewhat less persuasive and encompassing.
402 The Privileges or Immunities Clause has remained "an empty and unused vessel which affords
the Court full opportunity to determine its contents ...." Kurland, supra note 147, at 420. The
vast number of decisions by the Supreme Court fleshing out the Free Speech and Due Process
Clauses stand as a testament to the need for and propriety of normative infusion from international
law. See, eg., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (qualified right
to die located in Due Process Clause); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(right to receive information guaranteed by Free Speech Clause); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (right to hold one's own beliefs recognized in Free Speech Clause);
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (right of association guaranteed by Free
Speech Clause); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to raise children in accordance with
parental values and beliefs protected by Due Process Clause).
403 U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
86:550 (1992)
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make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech"; 40 4 that no state shall
deprive any person "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law";40 5 and passing references to the right to vote?406 The positive right
to education as an international human rights norm has the potential to
breathe a more complete and rational meaning into the language of these
constitutional provisions.
2. The Ninth Amendment. -The Ninth Amendment to the Consti-
tution states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
ple. '' 40 7 Like the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause, the Ninth Amendment has been assiduously ignored for decades
on end.40 8 However, the silence has been punctuated sporadically by in-
tense and disputatious bursts of scholarly interest.40 9 The reason under-
404 Id. at amend. I.
405 Id. at amend. XlV, § 1.
406 See supra notes 304-06 and accompanying text.
407 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
408 From its adoption in 1791 until the Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), the Ninth Amendment was never used as the basis for a decision by the United
States Supreme Court, even though parties periodically raised the issue. Eugene M. Van Loan, III,
Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U. L. REv. 1, 1 (1968). For a discussion of the few
pre-1965 Supreme Court opinions containing anything more than a fleeting reference to the Ninth
Amendment, see Van Loan, III, supra, at 1 n.3. Likewise, little scholarly attention was devoted to
the Ninth Amendment before the Griswold decision. Van Loan, III, supra, at 1 n.4; see also Randy
E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 n.9 (1988) [hereinafter
Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth]. Even after Griswold, the Supreme Court only predicated its deci-
sions on the Ninth Amendment in two cases, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Naturally, Griswold engendered a great deal of
commentary. See Van Loan, III, supra, at 2 n. II (listing twenty-three articles and student com-
ments and case notes on the Ninth Amendment).
409 A recent spurt of scholarly activity in relation to the Ninth Amendment commenced in the
late 1980s. See generally Morriss Arnold, Doing More Than Remembering the Ninth Amendment,
64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265 (1988); Sotirios A. Barber, The Ninth Amendment: Inkblot or Another
Hard Nut to Crack?, 64 CHL-KENT L. REV. 67 (1988); Randy E. Barnett, Two Conceptions of the
Ninth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 29 (1989) [hereinafter Barnett, Two Conceptions];
Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: The Ninth Amendment and Constitutional Legitimacy, 64 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 37 (1988) [hereinafter Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy]; Donald L. Beschle, Uniformity in
Constitutional Interpretation and the Background Right to Effective Democratic Governance, 63 IND.
L.J. 539, 560-61 (1988); Charles L. Black, Jr., On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in THE
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
337 (Randy E. Barnett ed. 1989) [hereinafter Black, Jr., Reading the Ninth]; Chambers, supra note
110, at 69; Charles J. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty: The Ninth Amendment's
Forgotten Lessons, IV J.L. & POLITICS 63 (1987); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the
Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131 (1988); Stephen Macedo, Reasons, Rhetoric, and the
Ninth Amendment: A Comment on Sanford Levinson, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163 (1988); Calvin R.
Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, in THE RIGHTS RETAINED
BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT, supra, at 291; Si-
meon C.R. McIntosh, On Reading the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Raoul Berger, in THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT, supra, at
219; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Ninth Amendment and the "Jurisprudence of Original Intention," 74
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lying both the long stretches of inattention and shorter bouts of charged
controversy may well be the same: this is the "scary amendment," 410 at
least for those who harbor a strong resistance to unenumerated or im-
plied constitutional rights.
The "scariness" of the Ninth Amendment is that, if read in a
straightforward way, it means that the express enumeration of the rights
of the people in the Constitution must not be taken to preclude future
recognition of other unenumerated rights in the Constitution. While this
view has considerable currency among constitutional theorists,411 it is by
no means the only view. For instance, some see the Ninth Amendment
merely as a constraint on the federal government's usurpation of
power.412 Others theorize that the Ninth Amendment refers to common
law or other rights that fall short of constitutional stature.413 Yet, the
straightforward reading of the Ninth Amendment continues to hold an
inherent appeal for this author. This interpretation, unique among
others, has the distinct virtue of taking the amendment's words for just
what they seem to say. It is an interpretation buttressed by evidence that
the framers meant what they wrote,414 as well as by modem precedent
GEO. L.J. 1719 (1986); Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Constitu-
tion: The Problems of Constitutional Interpretation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 177 (1988); Norman
Redlich, The Ninth Amendment as a Constitutional Prism, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1989)
[hereinafter Redlich, Ninth Amendment Prism]; Lawrence G. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide
Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth. But What on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amend-
ment?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. Rlv. 239 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, The Founder's Unwritten Constitution,
54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127 (1987).
410 ELY, supra note 173, at 34.
411 Id. at 34-41; 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 624-25 (4th ed. 1873); Barnett, Two Conceptions, supra note 409, at 37; Black, Jr., Further
Reflections, supra note 148, at 1104; Chambers, supra note 110, at 69; Edward S. Corwin, The
"Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REv. 149, 152-53 (1928)
(pt. 1); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 709
(1975); Knowton H. Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, in THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT, Supra
note 409, at 93; Massey, supra note 409, at 325; McIntosh, supra note 409, at 233, 241; Mitchell,
supra note 409, at 1731-33, 1742; Bennet B. Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth Amendment, in THE
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT,
supra note 409, at 107; Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of
Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 231, 234, 237, 245-46 (1975); Redlich, Ninth Amendment Prism,
supra note 409, at 26; Sherry, supra note 409, at 1164-66; Tribe, Contrasting Visions, supra note 337,
at 107-08; Van Loan, III, supra note 408, at 35, 38, 41-45.
412 EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 63 (1957); Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amend-
ment, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1980); Cooper, supra note 409, at 64, 66.
413 Russell L. Caplan, History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, in THE RIGHTS RETAINED
BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT, supra note 409, at
243, 247-48.
414 ELY supra note 173, at 34-41; Barnett, Two Conceptions, supra note 409, at 34, 36, 37; Kelsey,
supra note 411, at 102; Levinson, supra note 409, at 141; Massey, supra note 409, at 295-98; Paust,
supra note 411, at 234-35; Norman Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights... Retained by the People?,"
in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT, supra note 409, at 127, 138-39; Sherry, supra note 409, at 1164-66; but see Cooper,
86:550 (1992)
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issuing from the Supreme Court.
That modem precedent originated in 1965 with Griswold v. Connect-
icut.4 1  The significance of the opinion, for purposes of this discussion, is
that it recognized a marital privacy right as emanating from the penum-
bras of the Ninth Amendment, as well as from other amendments to the
Constitution.4 16 However, Justice Douglas' opinion is disappointing in
that it contains no explanation of the role that the Ninth Amendment
plays in giving rise to such a penumbral right. It was Justice Goldberg
who leaped into the breach with a concurring opinion devoted to the
significance of the Ninth Amendment as it relates to unenumerated
rights generally and the marital privacy right in particular. According to
Justice Goldberg, while the Ninth Amendment does not serve as an in-
dependent source of rights in and of itself, the amendment does mean
that there are other unenumerated constitutional rights beyond those
specifically listed in the Bill of Rights.417
Since Griswold, the Supreme Court has expressly relied upon the
Ninth Amendment in two additional cases: Roe v. Wade4 18 and Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.419 In Roe, the Court mentioned the
Ninth Amendment as one of a number of constitutional bases for pro-
tecting, as a "liberty" under the Due Process Clause, a woman's
unenumerated right to have an abortion under certain circumstances. 420
In Richmond Newspapers, Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion in-
voked the Ninth Amendment as support for finding, implicit in the guar-
antees of the First Amendment, an unenumerated right to attend
criminal trials.4 21 In keeping with Justice Goldberg's conception, the
Court looked to the Ninth Amendment, not as creating Ninth Amend-
ment rights, but, as a rule of construction authorizing the judiciary to
find unenumerated rights elsewhere in the Constitution. This is an ap-
proach that also has attracted substantial support in the scholarly
literature.422
supra note 409, at 64 (the framers intended the Ninth Amendment "to protect 'residual' rights that
exist by virtue of the fact that the federal government has only limited powers"); Mitchell, supra note
409, at 1719-25 (it is impossible to know the framers' intent in relation to the Ninth Amendment).
415 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court is described more fully in part
III.B. 1 of this Article.
416 Id. at 484-86.
417 Id. at 486-93, 496 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
418 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
419 448 U.S. 555, 579 & n. 15 (1980) (plurality opinion).
420 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
421 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 579 & n.15.
422 ELY, supra note 173, at 37-38; Arnold, supra note 409, at 268; Black, Jr., Reading the Ninth,
supra note 409, at 346-47; Black, Jr., Further Reflections, supra note 148, at 1104; Rapaczynski,
supra note 409, at 188-90; Tribe, Contrasting Visions, supra note 337, at 102; see Thomas C. Grey,
The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 211, 221 (1988); Patterson, supra note
411, at 125; Redlich, Ninth Amendment Prism, supra note 409, at 26-28; Sherry, supra note 409, at
1166. Some commentators suggest that the Ninth Amendment is undersold as a pure rule of con-
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Having settled upon the Ninth Amendment as a rule of construc-
tion, it should be pointed out that the critical question yet remains as to
what sources may be used to find unenumerated constitutional rights.
Some commentators claim that these rights must be ascertained by distil-
ling a sense of the Constitution as a whole;423 others opine that such
rights may be drawn from extra-constitutional sources; 424 and still
others, echoing the analysis in Griswold, Roe, and Richmond Newspapers,
propose that such rights must be already implicit within specific provi-
sions of the Constitution (other than the Ninth Amendment).42 5
It is the latter source of rights which is favored here upon the prem-
ise that it is the least unprecedented and, therefore, probably the most
readily acceptable. The Supreme Court has long engaged in the practice
of recognizing unenumerated rights as implicitly arising from constitu-
tional provisions, resulting in numerous entitlements that are nowhere
mentioned or even alluded to in the Constitution.426 This practice would
seem to corroborate, de facto, that the unenumerated rights referred to in
the Ninth Amendment may properly be sought in the implications of the
express words of the Constitution.
This Article has urged that an unenumerated positive right to edu-
cation arises from the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, the
Due Process Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and, indirectly, from the Constitution's references to
elections and voting. The Ninth Amendment, as a rule of construction,
thus makes clear that finding the education right in these provisions is an
exercise which, far from offending constitutional precepts, comports with
an accepted paradigm of constitutional interpretation. 427
struction and that the amendment should also serve as an independent source of unenumerated
constitutional rights. Levin, Judicial Standard, supra note 103, at 707; Massey, supra note 409, at
311-320, 336; McIntosh, supra note 409, at 235, 240-41; Mitchell, supra note 409, at 1731-34; Paust,
supra note 411, at 234-35, 253-59; Van Loan, III, supra note 408, at 42 & n.246, 45. Some commen-
tators have even recognized a right to education as located within the Ninth Amendment itself.
Levin, Judicial Standard, supra note 103, at 707; Terrence J. Moore, The Ninth Amendment-Its
Origins and Meaning, 7 NEw ENG. L. REv. 215, 308-09 (1972).
423 ELY, supra note 173, at 12; McIntosh, supra note 409, at 235-36; Tribe, Contrasting Visions,
supra note 337, at 107; see Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, supra note 409, at 56.
424 Barnett, Two Conceptions, supra note 409, at 38-39; Black, Jr., Reading the Ninth, supra note
409, at 344-49; Black, Jr., Further Reflections, supra note 148, at 1105; Grey, supra note 422, at 211,
214, 221-22, 233-34, 237; Sherry, supra note 409, at 1164-66, 1177.
425 Arnold, supra note 409, at 268; Black, Jr., Further Reflections, supra note 148, at 1104; Red-
lich, Ninth Amendment Prism, supra note 409, at 27; Tribe, Contrasting Visions, supra note 337, at
107; see Black, Jr., Reading the Ninth, supra note 409, at 347.
426 See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
427 At least one commentator has advocated using the Ninth Amendment as a rule of construc-
tion so as to facilitate judicial recognition of an unenumerated right to education under the Constitu-
tion. Chambers, supra note 110, at 69 & n.63, 70-72. Such an argument, no doubt, will meet with
objection from those who believe that the Ninth Amendment should be limited to supporting nega-
tive constitutional rights exclusively. Barnett, Two Conceptions, supra note 409, at 40. But see supra
notes 148-71 and accompanying text.
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The right to education, although nowhere specifically enumerated in
the Constitution, is "retained by the people" by implication in that docu-
ment's express provisions. Indeed, Justice Douglas foresaw just this pos-
sibility when he stated that "the right of the people to education.., like
the right to pure air and pure water, may well be rights 'retained by the
people' under the Ninth Amendment. '428
3. Original Intent to Delegate Power over Education to the Federal
Government.-The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution states: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." 429 The conventional wisdom is that the power to provide educa-
tion belongs primarily to the states because the Constitution does not
delegate that power to the federal government nor forbid the states from
exercising such power.430 Thus, conventional theory teaches that the
federal government is restricted to supplementing state-provided educa-
tional systems insofar as the Constitution otherwise permits.431 The axis
upon which this construct turns is the presumption that the power over
education is not delegated to the United States.
Yet, if the Supreme Court were to recognize an implied positive
right to education under the Constitution, then an implied duty and the
power to carry out that duty would thereby be delegated to the federal
government to ensure fulfillment of the right.432 Once the federal gov-
ernment's power was recognized, the Tenth Amendment would recede
into inconsequence. It has become a "truism" that the Tenth Amend-
ment imposes no affirmative limitation on any authority delegated to the
federal government by the Constitution.433 In short order, the conven-
428 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233-34 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
429 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
430 KERN ALEXANDER ET AL., THE ECONOMICS AND FINANCING OF EDUCATION 323 (4th ed.
1983); ARVAL A. MORRIS, THE CoNsTrrTION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 61 (2d ed. 1980); 1
JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 3.02[2], at 3-11 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1991); Project, Education
and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1373, 1375 & n.4 (1976)
[hereinafter Project, Education and Law].
431 1 RAPP, supra note 430, § 3.0113], at 3-5. The federal government has considerable influence
over education through provisions of the Constitution other than the Tenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
id. § 3.01[3] (discussing federal control over education pursuant to the spending power).
432 The point is made earlier in this article that a constitutional right creates a correlative govern-
mental duty to assure fulfillment of the right and vice versa. See supra notes 159-71 and accompany-
ing text. Indeed, many of the articles sympathetic to recognition of a positive right to education
under the Constitution are predicated on the underlying assumption that the right would empower
the federal government to fulfill the duty of ensuring provision of at least an adequate quantum of
education. See, eg., Edelman, supra note 67, at 33-34; Gard, supra note 67, at 29-34; Kurland, supra
note 147, at 419; Levin, Educational Adequacy, supra note 108, at 261-63; Preovolos, supra note 68,
at 76, 112-17; Tribe, Inalienable Rights, supra note 109, at 330-35; Wright, supra note 68, at 72-80.
433 The Supreme Court has stated:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. ...
From the beginning and for many years the amendment has been construed as not depriving the
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tional wisdom would be delegitimated and overthrown by recognition of
the right.
A likely objection to this debunking may be that the Constitution
was never written with such a right and power in mind and, therefore,
that the Tenth Amendment remains a bar to direct and expanded federal
involvement in guaranteeing the provision of education. To meet this
concern, and ease the inevitable discomfort that such a thorough deposal
must occasion, it is informative to examine available evidence of original
intent with respect to the national government's power over education.
Although there is a division of opinion as to what degree, if any,
original intent should be used to construe the Constitution,4 34 surely it is
appropriate to consult this source where the validity of longstanding as-
sumptions about a constitutional provision are called into question. In-
deed, should there be purblind acceptance of the conventional wisdom
when original intent may disclose a different understanding? It is my
contention that the evidences of original intent reveal that the Tenth
Amendment has been materially misunderstood in relation to the provi-
sion of education. The framers' own words and conduct as well as the
attitude of other eminent public figures of the day reveal that the Consti-
tution was drafted upon the assumption that the national government
would shoulder a direct and pivotal responsibility for providing educa-
tion, well beyond supplementation. 435
Even before the adoption of the Constitution, the Confederate Con-
gress exercised the power to subsidize local public education, the effect of
which was the proliferation of schools. 436 For example, the Confederate
Congress enacted the Land Ordinance of 1785 by virtue of which the
sixteenth lot of every township was reserved for the establishment and
maintenance of schools. 437 Subsequently, in its Northwest Ordinance of
national government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power
which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); accord Martha A. Field, Comment, Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV.
84, 90-91, 95-96 (1985); Kevin P. Holewinski, Comment, Garcia: The Preservation of Federalism
Values Is Best Left to the Political Process Rather than the Courts, 15 CAP. U. L. REv. 515, 537
(1986). Contra Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 568, 570-73 (1985) (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting); see also Stephen L. Smith, Comment, State Autonomy After Garcia: Will the
Political Process Protect States' Interests?, 71 IowA L. REV. 1527, 1541 (1986) (pointing out that
some legal scholars have disagreed with the Supreme Court's characterization of the Tenth Amend-
ment as a "truism").
434 Compare BORK, supra note 199, at 143-60 (asserting that the only legitimate method of inter-
preting the Constitution is reliance upon original intent) with TRIBE, supra note 83, § 1-7, at 10 &
n.2 (observing that what the framers intended or assumed in drafting the Constitution is not neces-
sarily determinative of what the Constitution means).
435 See FRANK BOURGIN, THE GREAT CHALLENGE: THE MYTH OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC 45, 131-37 (1989); Gard, supra note 67, at 10-12; Preovolos, supra note 68, at 108-
09.
436 TYACK ET AL., supra note 223, at 31-33.
437 An Ordinance for ascertaining the mode of disposing Lands in the Western Territory, May
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1787, the Confederate Congress articulated the national government's
policy of encouraging education in the affected territory: "Religion, mo-
rality and knowledge, being necessary to good government and happiness
of mankind, schools and means of education shall forever be en-
couraged.'438 In fact, in negotiating the sale of Northwest Territory
lands to the Ohio Company in 1787, the Congress again reserved the
sixteenth section of every township for schools.4 39
It is noteworthy that these ordinances were made under the Articles
of Confederation, a document which was much more deferential toward
states' rights and state sovereignty than the United States Constitution
would be.440 At least two commentators have taken the position that the
Northwest Ordinance, by itself, is strong evidence that the right to edu-
cation was not mentioned in the Constitution because it was assumed to
be contained within a more general constitutional guarantee.441 They
find further support for this conclusion in the fact that the Founding
Fathers placed a high premium on the importance of education.44 2
Historical research does indeed reveal that such men among the
founders as George Washington, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson
made the wide dissemination of education one of their foremost con-
cerns, since they considered an educated populace essential to the sur-
vival and health of the fledgling republic. 443 However, perhaps no
American political figure is more renowned for his love of knowledge and
dedication to its diffusion than Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson was adamant
that democracy and good government could only be sustained if access to
education became pervasive.444 To this end, he envisioned public educa-
tion on a massive scale, supported by infusions of federal funding.445 He
is also said to have entertained the idea of establishing a centralized na-
tional school system, as well as a national institute for teaching and
research.446
While, for a variety of reasons, Jefferson was unable to bring most of
these ideas to fruition,447 as President he reinstituted the practice of en-
dowing new states with lands for public education, for the first time
20, 1785, in 4 JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS FROM 1774-1788, at 520-22 (Washington,
D.C. 1823).
438 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. III, 1 Stat. 50, 52-53 (1789).
439 BOURGIN, supra note 435, at 134.
440 Id. at 33-34.
441 Gard, supra note 67, at 11; Preovolos, supra note 68, at 109; but see TYACK ET AL., supra note
223, at 32 (arguing that the motivation for the 1785 and 1787 Ordinances was not Congress' desire
to promote education, but, rather, the need to raise money to reimburse revolutionary soldiers).
442 Gard, supra note 67, at 11-12; Preovolos, supra note 68, at 109.
443 BOURGIN, supra note 435, at 127-37; TYACK ET AL., supra note 223, at 21, 23-27; Gard, supra
note 67, at 11-12.
444 BOURGIN, supra note 435, at 133-34; TYACK ET AL., supra note 223, at 23.
445 BOURGIN, supra note 435, at 132.
446 Id. at 135-36.
447 Jefferson was impeded in his plans for large scale educational improvement by developments
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transforming the practice into "a fixed and binding policy of the federal
government." 448 Except for Texas, Maine, and West Virginia, every
state admitted into the Union since 1802 has received such an endow-
ment from the federal government.449 One historian has evaluated Jeffer-
son's land reservation policy as a clear indication that "[e]ducation was
... early taken under the protection of the federal government . ".. ,450
It should be emphasized that in his assumption of a primary, albeit
not exclusive, role for the federal government in providing education,
Jefferson was hardly a renegade. Both George Washington and James
Madison proposed the endowment of a national university.451 Benjamin
Rush favored a system of education spanning common schools through a
federal university.452 And, Noah Webster even devised a national curric-
ulum of sorts-a "Federal Catechism" to teach children republican val-
ues. 453 Moreover, such plans and hopes were nourished in a context
where conflict between the states and the national government over edu-
cation was unknown.454 It is probably safe to say that at that time "not a
single member consciously visualized the powers reserved to the states as
including the power to establish a public school system supported by
state taxes. '45
5
Standing by themselves, the attitudes and policies of the nation's
early political leaders, including authors of the Constitution, would seem
to indicate that the Constitution was drafted without any thought of rele-
gating the federal government to only a secondary, supplementing role in
the education arena. But this evidence does not stand by itself; there is
also in the history of the Constitution's drafting process a telling sign
that the delegation of powers to the federal government, referred to in
the Tenth Amendment, was meant to encompass implied or unenumer-
ated powers as well as express ones.
That this was the drafters' intention may be detected by comparing
the language of the Tenth Amendment with that of its predecessor, Arti-
cle II of the Articles of Confederation. Article II reposed in the states all
powers not "expressly" delegated to the national government. 456 How-
ever, the Constitution's framers deliberately dispensed with the word
"expressly" when they recast the rest of the language of Article II as the
in foreign relations which seriously depleted the national treasury. Id. at 132, 135-37. Congressional
lassitude and apathy also proved a restraint. Id. at 136-37.
448 Id. at 134.
449 Id. at 135.
450 Id.
451 Id. at 135-36.
452 TYACK ET AL., supra note 223, at 23.
453 Id. at 23-24.
454 BOURGIN, supra note 435, at 132-33.
455 Id. at 132.
456 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II (1781).
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Tenth Amendment. 457 This deliberate deletion is inexplicable-unless
the framers contrived by it to signal that under the Tenth Amendment
the federal government would retain those powers delegated to it,
whether enumerated or unenumerated. 458
Original intent, as gleaned from the evidence described above, sup-
ports the interpretation that there is an implied power over education
delegated by the Constitution to the federal government. As such, origi-
nal intent elucidates in the Constitution a schematic that comfortably
accommodates an implied positive right to education that would obligate
the federal government to assure fulfillment of the right. The recognition
of such a right and duty does not conflict with any provision of the Con-
stitution. To the contrary, the nascent right would be more consonant
with and expressive of the Constitution's meaning as it was originally
conceived by the nation's forefathers. 459
457 C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 16-17 (5th ed. 1981);
TRIBE, supra note 83, § 5-3, at 302 n.7 ("Article IX [sic] of the Articles of Confederation did reserve
to the states all powers not 'expressly' delegated to the national government, but the tenth amend-
ment deliberately omitted any requirement of an express articulation of the national government's
powers."); Phillip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's Accomodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 239, 315 n.286 (1989); James Huffman, Governing America's Resources: Federalism in the
1980's, 12 ENVTL. L. 863, 868-69 (1982); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406
(1819) (discussing the significance of the omission of the term "expressly" in the Tenth
Amendment).
458 The Supreme Court reads the omission of the word "expressly" from the Tenth Amendment
in a similar sense:
But there is no phrase in the instrument [the Constitution] which, like the articles of confedera-
tion, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that everything granted shall be
expressly and minutely described. Even the 10th amendment, which was framed for the pur-
pose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word "expressly,"
and declares only, that the powers "not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the
states, are reserved to the states or to the people;" thus leaving the question, whether the partic-
ular power which may become the subject of contest has been delegated to the one government,
or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument .... It's
[the Constitution's] nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be de-
duced from the nature of the objects themselves.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 406-07; cf Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignity: A
Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REv. 853, 855-58 (1987) (discussing
Congress' unenumerated power to regulate immigration); William A. Isaacson, Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: Antifederalism Revisited, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 147, 188
(1989); PRITCHETr, supra note 457, at 16-17 (intimating that because the word "expressly" was
omitted from the Tenth Amendment, the federal government should be understood to have implied
powers). But see Field, supra note 433, at 95 n.63.
459 It is interesting that in Rodriguez, the Court considered the possibility of a future positive
right to education without displaying any concern over a derogation of Tenth Amendment princi-
ples. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973); see also Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) (acknowledging that the status of a positive constitutional right to
education remains unsettled while omitting any discussion of the possibility that such a right could
run afoul of the Tenth Amendment). Long before Rodriguez, Thomas Jefferson indicated that he
believed in a far-reaching federal empowerment over education, without expressing any recounted
qualms over the fact that the empowerment was unenumerated. BOURGIN, supra note 435, at 135.
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IV. PALLIATIVE EFFECTS OF A POSITIVE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
A constitutional right remains a constitutional right even if it is po-
litically or philosophically distasteful to some sectors of the population.
If there is a positive right to education lying dormant in the Constitution,
ideally it should be recognized as such as a matter of principle.
The legal case for the right has been reviewed in some depth in Part
III of this Article and, if found persuasive, should suffice as reason
enough for recognizing the right. However, it would be irresponsible to
leave readers with the impression that this is simply a technical question
of law which can just as well be decided now or later. The education
debacle has persisted into the 1990s, and what is on the line is nothing
less than the future of our children individually and of the nation as a
whole.4 60 If a positive constitutional right to education could contribute
to setting in motion the dynamics for reversing the crisis and undoing its
pernicious damage, then there is some real urgency in recognizing the
right at an early date. It is important, therefore, to explore, from a policy
perspective, whether the right has the potential to engender or act as the
catalyst for a revitalization of American education.
At first glance, the right might seem superfluous, embodying a fine
sentiment, to be sure, but having little practical bearing on the education
crisis. After all, every state has enacted statutes requiring that children
of eligible age attend school;461 almost every state has adopted constitu-
tional provisions that require it to provide free public education.4 62
Moreover, the federal government, even in its supplemental role, already
has indirectly assumed a large share of responsibility for schooling4 63
through laws aiding and/or shaping education under the Spending
Clause464 and other provisions of the Constitution.465 What could an
affirmative right to education under the federal Constitution add to all
this that would be of any significance?
A. The Right Will Make the Federal Government into the Ultimate
Guarantor of the Provision of Education
Part I of this Article documents the depth and breadth of the educa-
tion crisis, detailing its degenerative effects on business and the nation's
At one time, Jefferson also proposed to address such internal problems as education, roads, rivers,
and canals under authority of a constitutional amendment which never materialized. Id. at 135.
460 See supra notes 32-35, 41-43, 51-71 and accompanying text.
461 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
462 See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
463 See supra notes 226-39 and accompanying text. But see Karen De Witt, U.S. Says Schools
Cost More but Achieve Less, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 29, 1991, at A30 (reporting that the federal role
amounts to no more than six to eight percent of the total dollars spent by the federal government).
464 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 1; see 1 RAPP, supra note 430, § 3.02[2], at 3-11 n.8.
465 See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
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economic health; on the United States' military and diplomatic capabili-
ties; on domestic peace and the maintenance of law and order; on the
continued viability of democratic government; and on the opportunity
for individual growth and fulfillment of the nation's children. From this
kaleidoscope of fragmented effects what comes into focus is a picture of a
crisis that is national both in its geographic indiscriminateness and in its
social, political, and economic consequences.
Yet the federal government is disabled from responding as if it were
faced with a national emergency requiring utilization of the most salu-
tary measures. The fact remains that under the current legal regime, the
national government is generally considered to be devoid of the power or
duty to guarantee to each school-age child that he or she will receive a
certain quantum of education.466 But it is precisely the lack of that cer-
tain quantum of education-the quantum that would constitute excel-
lence in education-which federal officials, governors, and prominent
education experts have pinpointed as one of the principal causes of the
crisis.467 In the meantime, state governments, despite laudable efforts,
have been unable to rehabilitate the schools sufficiently to defuse the cri-
sis and turn the situation around.468 This should occasion no surprise,
for many states are financially strapped469 and some state and local edu-
cation reform plans have become bogged down in local political
bickering. 470
Were a positive right to education recognized under the Constitu-
tion, the federal government would be obligated to strive, in conjunction
with the states, to assure a quality education for every child.471 The
466 See supra note 104, 430-31 and accompanying text.
467 See supra notes 35-39, 47 and accompanying text.
468 See supra notes 40-41, 44-47, 50 and accompanying text. For a review of some of the state
education reform efforts that have been tried, see NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N, THE GOVERNORS'
1991 REPORT ON EDUCATION: RESULTS IN EDUCATION: 1990, at 6-52 (1990); Karen DeWitt,
Vermont Gauges Learning by What's in Portfolio, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1991, at A23; Susan Chira,
Electronic Teacher: A Mississippi Experiment, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 24, 1990, at Al; Deirdre Carmody,
New York Moves to Help Poorly Rated Teachers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1989, at B10.
469 See, eg., Hugg, supra note 117, at 19, 22; Scott J. Paltrow, Cries for Help Go Unheard: State
and Local Governments Are on the Edge of a Fiscal Abyssa Much of the Country Is Becoming Meaner
and Harsher for Those Most Desperate for Assistance, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 4, 1991, § A, at 1; William
Celis 3d, Despite Economic Woes 2 Strapped States Seek More Money for Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
7, 1991, at A12; Michael Hinds & Erik Eckholm, 80's Leave States and Cities in Need, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 1990, at 1.
470 See, e.g., BENNETT, MAKING IT WORK, supra note 29, at 3; William Celis 3d, Texas
Lawmakers Confront School Financing Issue Anew, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1991, at A10; Isabel Wil-
kerson, Politics Trip up Chicago School Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1991, § 1, at 1; Peter Kerr,
Trenton Officials Reach Pact to Alter Florio School Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1991, at B2; Daley,
supra note 21, passim.
471 See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text (discussing the symbiosis of rights and duties).
Indeed, in 1987, 84% of Americans surveyed expressed the wish that the federal government would
require schools to meet minimum education standards. Chester E. Finn, Jr., A Seismic Shock for
Education, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1989, § 4, at 13 [hereinafter Finn, Seismic Shock]. But cf. Board of
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unique and untried element of this scenario would be that the federal
government could bring to the task the financial resources, the visible
leadership, the coordinating capacity, and the focus on national interest
which the states, struggling separately and disjointedly, are ill equipped
to provide. 472
It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt a blueprint for the
realignment of education responsibilities between the state and federal
governments which recognition of the right would inevitably entail. The
preservation of federalism in this context, with the concomitant goal of
making state-federal relations most conducive to fulfilling the right, is an
undertaking which will undoubtedly take years to mediate into a struc-
ture that is optimally balanced for those purposes. And, although it will
propel the federal judiciary into uncharted waters, the Supreme Court is
not unfamiliar with the general task of demarcating powers and responsi-
bilities between the state and federal governments. The Court has, after
all, grappled for over a century with such issues under the Commerce
Clause.473
However, while not presuming to advance any master-plan for the
realignment of governmental authority in providing education, I must
confess to a preference on one point: that in addition to endowing the
judiciary with power to ensure fulfillment of the education right through
adjudication, Congress should also be empowered to intervene in order
to protect the right with legislated, mandatory education reform meas-
ures directly applicable to the schools. 474 Such congressional empower-
Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 637 (1991) (in dicta, describing education as a matter for local
authorities).
472 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text; see also CARNEGIE STUDY, supra note 21, at
xiv-xv (characterizing the urban school crisis as a major failure of the present social policy which
relies on "a piecemeal approach to a problem that requires a unified response"); Ernest L. Boyer et
al., Former Commissioners of Education Speak Out, in GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE, supra note 29, at
448-49 (calling for new, far-reaching federal efforts in education); William Cells 3d, A Plan Aimed at
Improving Schools, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1990, at B8 (reporting that then Governor Michael Dukakis
of Massachusetts complained about inadequate federal financing of education); Karen DeWitt, Re-
port Urges Science Funds Be Used for Education, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1991, at A17 (reporting that
Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government recommended greater coordination
of government efforts to improve science education; also reporting that chairman of Commission
study group which prepared the report wishes the federal government would bring the best
pedogogical ideas to America's classrooms); Fiske, Bright Goals, supra note 75, at B8 (reporting that
Governor Roy Romer of Colorado urged the federal government to increase substantially its finan-
cial contribution to education).
Indeed, as things stand now, "our per pupil spending on kindergarten through grade 12 lags
behind that of five other industrialized nations...." Robert B. Reich, Who Champions the Working
Class?, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1991, § 4, at Ell.
473 E.g., New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824).
474 Although a fair number of commentators present analyses favorable to recognition of a posi-
tive right to education under the Constitution, the scholarly literature does not offer much in the
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ment would expand the federal government's arsenal in combating the
crisis by providing the option of legislated remedial measures imposed
nationwide, such as a national minimum core curriculum, national edu-
cation standards, and the like-a development which, polls have shown,
most Americans wish the federal government in particular to institute.475
There are, in fact, Supreme Court precedents which arguably may be
marshalled to authorize Congress' assumption of such a role.476 Their
deployment for this end, though, I leave to the ingenuity of others, since
way of extended discussion about how the responsibilities for providing education might be assigned
to the state and federal governments so as to maintain federalism while simultaneously giving the
federal government a more responsive role, including and going beyond the adjudicatory function.
The general assumption in many of the articles seems to be that the right will only give the federal
courts authority to adjudicate whether the right is fulfilled and to fashion remedies where the right is
violated. Compare Biegel, supra note 108, at 1099-16 (calling for litigation to enforce education
rights under the Constitution, but also briefly referring with approval to the imposition of a national
minimum core curriculum) with Gard, supra note 67, at 30-34 (assuming that litigation will be
utilized to enforce a federal constitutional right to education, with compliance to be ascertained by
reliance on outputs standards) and with Liebman, supra note 109, at 371-78, 380 (proposing that
state-legislated minimum educational-performance standards should be utilized in litigation enforc-
ing fulfillment of a right to education) and with Wright, supra note 68, at 54-55, 67-80 (seeking
judicial disposition of suits brought by individuals on behalf of the public to enforce a federal consti-
tutional right to education).
475 The call for such a nationwide curriculum was put in these eloquent terms by E.D. Hirsch,
Jr.: "To suggest that it is undemocratic or intolerant to make nationwide decisions about the exten-
sive school curriculum must not any longer be allowed to end the discussion. The 'pluralistic,'
laissez-faire view itself implies a nationwide extensive curriculum-the curriculum of cultural frag-
mentation and illiteracy." HIRSCH, JR., supra note 43, at 144; see also KOZOL, supra note 33, at 103,
121 (calling for a national campaign and the need for a national imperative in relation to education).
Much to the experts' amazement, Gallup polls show that a large majority of Americans want
federal interference in education on a much more pervasive scale. They desire national education
standards, a national curriculum, and national tests. 84% of those surveyed in 1987 "agreed that
one of the things the Federal Government should do is 'require states and local school districts to
meet minimum educational standards.'" (emphasis added). Finn, Seismic Shock, supra note 471,
§ 4, at 13.
476 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (approving Congress' legislative initia-
tives pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (approving congressional enactments legislated under the Commerce
Clause for the purpose of ameliorating racial discrimination in places of public accommodation).
One commentator has concluded that because the education crisis affects interstate commerce,
Congress is thereby empowered to legislate a national core curriculum under the Commerce Clause.
Goodwin, supra note 159, at 957-58; but see Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The
Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. Cr. R v. 341, 416. Professor Laurence Tribe
has taken a broad view of the powers with which the Morgan case endows Congress under section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Concern for individual rights, therefore, does not justify creating artificial internal limits on
congressional power to enforce the fourteenth amendment. Indeed, in an era when Congress
may in some cases exhibit a greater sensitivity to individual rights than the Court, it will be all
the more important that Congress be permitted to exercise the full range of its constitutional
prerogatives.
TRIBE, supra note 83, § 5-14, at 350; see also Daniel J. Lefiell, Note, Congressional Power to Enforce
Due Process Rights, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1265, 1277-95 (1980) (concluding that under any interpreta-
tion of Morgan, Congress is empowered to enact "expansive due-process-based legislation").
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the theoretical foundation for congressional empowerment over educa-
tion is at some remove from the focus of this Article.
B. The Right's Pedagogical Effect
The effects of the right stemming from the federal government's role
as the ultimate guarantor of education are palpable, involving, as they
would, the commitment of material resources and the observable imple-
mentation of policies and legal measures. However, the right also would
have another less obvious, but equally important, effect-that of
pedagogy.
Generally speaking, there is a pedagogical purpose inherent in virtu-
ally all law. Laws are made to be known;477 otherwise, they would be
ineffective as a means of governance or restraint. The educational impact
of law is perhaps most effectually realized by the reciprocal interplay be-
tween law and social values. Law draws its content from the values and
priorities of the people it governs, including norms which may exist on a
subconscious or subliminal level. In so doing, law articulates those val-
ues and priorities and disseminates them back to the populace to become
part of conscious conventional wisdom.478 In this process, law assimi-
lates not only a society's values and priorities as they are, but also those
values and priorities which comprise that society's goals and needs. It is
in this latter, initiatory phase that law has its most dramatic educative
effect because it crystallizes and makes visible the norms which constitute
a society's aspirations and ideals.479
477 Robert H. Bork has observed that "[l]aw is a public act." BORK, supra note 199, at 144.
Hegel even advanced the notion that law is not law unless it is known. GEORGE HEGEL, PHILOSO-
PHY OF RIGwr 135 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 1967).
478 "The judge interprets the social conscience, and gives effect to it in law, but in so doing he
helps to form and modify the conscience he interprets. Discovery and creation react upon each
other." BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 96-97 (photo. reprint 1982) (1924); see
also PAUL R. DIMOND, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL CHOICE 1, 4-5 (1989) (arguing that
there is a continuing dialogue between the populace and lawmakers over the meaning of the Consti-
tution); Anne Norton, Transubstantiation: The Dialectic of Constitutional Authority, 55 U. CHI. L.
REv. 458, 468 (1988).
479 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 952, 1105 (Richard Mc-
Keon ed., 1941); Plato, Laws VII, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, INCLUDING THE
LETTERS 1418-19, 1502 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 5th prtg. 1969) (A.E. Taylor
trans., 1934); David R. Barnhizer, Prophets, Priests and Power Blockers: Three Fundamental Roles
of Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50 U. PrTT. L. REv. 127, 162-63 (1988); Paul Brest, The
Thirty-First Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture: Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
175, 179 (1986); Keith Burgess-Jackson, Bad Samaritanism and the Pedagogical Function of Law, 8
CRIM. JUST. J. 1, 3-4, 26 (1985); Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster,
1967 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 180 (1967); Norton, supra note 478, at 459, 469; Philip Soper, The Moral
Value of Law, 84 MICH. L. REv. 63, 85 (1985).
The classic case of government taking a pioneering role through the medium of the law is
Brown v. Board of Educ,, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It will be recalled that in Brown, the Supreme Court
held that separate but equal public schools for black children violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The civil rights movement which followed on the heels of this decision
86:550 (1992)
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While a society's ideals may be expressed in many different types of
laws, perhaps none is so suited to this mission as a nation's constitution.
The United States Constitution is, indeed, conceived of as a proclamation
of the country's most cherished and fundamental beliefs. It is this almost
sacred quality which may have led Professor Laurence Tribe to declare
that the Constitution is the "only 'law' that it makes sense literally to find
encased in glass on display in the National Archives in Washington,
D.C.; the only law that we virtually worship as a nation; the only law that
has attained almost the status of scripture. ' 480 Because of this aura, the
Constitution is the source to which Americans may naturally be expected
to look for the manifestation of their ideals and, hence, their national
identity.481 It is this heightened credibility and accessibility that makes
the Constitution such an exceptionally powerful educative device.
An affirmative right to education, enshrined in the Constitution,
would have the potential to induce Americans to treat education as a
paramount national priority. The right, in partaking of the Constitu-
tion's "majesty," 482 would impart the idea that education, rather than
being simply a necessary rite of passage, is a matter of supreme impor-
tance; this idea, when understood collectively, would give rise to a popu-
lar ethos of esteem for intellectual development that would finally accord
with Jeffersonian notions of an enlightened society. Surrounded by such
an environment, children would grow up in circumstances more nurtur-
ing of their desire and will to learn while their elders would be able to
draw upon a new source of inspiration in endeavoring to halt the crisis
and redeem the schools.483
This concept of the power of the idea in reforming the public
schools has not been lost on education experts. Diane Ravitch, Assistant
Secretary for Educational Research and Improvement, and Counselor to
the U.S. Secretary of Education, has astutely observed that "[t]he effort
is a vivid testament to the leadership of the Brown Court in rejecting racial segregation as an accepta-
ble part of American life. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM 195, 198-
99 (1958).
480 Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in the Year 2011, 18 PAC. L.J. 343, 344 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter Tribe, Year 2011]; see also BLOOM, supra note 2, at 55 (remarking upon "a national reverence for
our Constitution"); PAINE, supra note 2, at 287 (referring to the Constitution as "the political bible
of the state").
481 ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 25-27, 375-76 (1987); LAURENCE
TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 26 (1985); Bamhizer, supra note 479, at 163; Brest, supra note
479, at 179; Norton, supra note 478, at 459; Tribe, Year 2011, supra note 480, at 344. But see
Herbert J. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 32 (M. Judd Harmon ed., 1978).
482 Cf. Cox, supra note 481, at 27, 378 (referring to the "majesty" of the Constitution).
483 Cf. Susan H. Bitensky, Educating the Child for a Productive Life: Articles 28 and 29, in CHIL-
DREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED
WITH UNITED STATES LAW 167, 167-68, 183 (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard A. Davidson eds.,
1990) (noting that a similar effect could be achieved if the United States were to become a party to
the Convention of the Child).
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to improve schools depends on the quality of ideas, for ideas ultimately
determine policies and actions," and that "[flor everyone involved, the
critical factor that must change is the attitude toward the importance of
good education. ' 48 4 In a similar vein, John Brademas has noted that the
federal government's commitment to education will be crucial in shaping
attitudes toward education and, ultimately, to education reform.485 Rec-
ognizing a positive right to education in the Constitution would, of
course, be the most authoritative and inspiring expression of this com-
mitment that it is within the law's capacity to provide.
C. The Content of the Right
It would seem common sense to assume that the more exacting the
content of the right to education, the more powerful will be its pedagogi-
cal impact and the more thoroughgoing will be governmental efforts to
fulfill the right. The issue, perforce, arises as to what quality of educa-
tion the right should guarantee. Will American children be entitled "to
receive an... education correspondent to their ability," as provided in
the Japanese Constitution?48 6 Or, will they be entitled to something less
or something more than their Japanese counterparts?
In fact, Americans do not start with a blank slate, the Supreme
Court having already expressed some thoughts on the subject in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.487 There, it will be re-
called, the Court left open the possibility of a federal constitutional right
to "some identifiable quantum of education.., to acquire the basic mini-
mal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process. ' 48 8 This conception of the right has
considerable appeal. It evidently would require the schools to produce
graduates capable of functioning politically in American society.489 A
second advantage is that the Rodriguez formulation could make govern-
mental compliance with the right capable of measurement in the sense
that the focus would be on outputs, i.e., the level of knowledge acquired
by students. Generally speaking, outputs can be assessed by standard-
ized testing of student performance, a device familiar to American
educators. 490
484 RAVITCH, supra note 29, at 155, 310; see BOYER, supra note 29, at 281; BENJAMIN DUKE,
THE JAPANESE SCHOOL 185 (1986); Chira, Nation Flunking, supra note 48, at B8 (quoting Chester
E. Finn, Jr. as stating that the nation needs "a purposeful populist uprising" with respect to the
acceptance of education as a priority).
485 BRADEMAS, supra note 30, at 62; accord Educational Visions Team, New World Found., in
GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE, supra note 73, at 429-30.
486 KENPO (Constitution) art. 26, 1 (Japan).
487 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
488 Id. at 36-37.
489 See Levin, Educational Adequacy, supra note 108, at 259-60.
490 See Gard, supra note 67, at 29-34; Preovolos, supra note 68, at 115-16. But cf Biegel, supra
note 108, at 1110-13 (arguing that such testing is inaccurate and unfair); Liebman, supra note 109, at
86:550 (1992)
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In spite of these advantages, however, the Rodriguez formulation
seems wanting. Why did the Court use the phrase "basic minimal skills"
in describing the quantum of education required? Is it the Court's view
that bare literacy is enough to ensure enjoyment of the rights of speech
and full political participation?491 And, should not the promised quan-
tum be sufficient to enable graduates' full participation in the economic
life of the country as well as in its political processes? 492 But, if the Rod-
riguez formulation is unsatisfactory, what should be the content of an
affirmative right to education under the Constitution?
To a large extent, the positive right to education, like so many other
constitutional rights, will have to be worked out over time and with the
help of experience. Although it might be preferable were things other-
wise, the fact is that constitutional rights do not often spring into exist-
ence full-blown like Athena from Zeus' forehead.4 93 It is only over the
course of decades that the Supreme Court has defined the First Amend-
ment's Free Speech Clause to include such implicit rights as the right of
association, 494 the right of belief,495 and the right to receive informa-
tion.496 The Court has likewise spent almost the entire twentieth century
struggling to coax a coherent theory of substantive liberty rights out of
the Due Process Clause.497 Thus, that the content of the potential right
to education may yet spark disagreement and require amplification
374-77 (contending that educational outputs standards and student competency testing have injured
rather than helped poor and minority children).
491 One commentator has suggested that the Rodriguez conception of a hypothetical right to
education under the Constitution does not go much further than ensuring literacy:
The very least that an exercise of the Court's pronouncement in Rodriguez would seem to
require is that every student acquire a reading level adequate for meaningful access to the polit-
ical system....
Therefore, one possible content for the right to education would prescribe demonstrated
achievement levels in certain basic skills sufficient for access to the political system. The nar-
rowest definition of such skills would simply require basic literacy ....
Preovolos, supra note 68, at 114-15.
492 In Plyler v. Doe, one of the Supreme Court's major concerns in applying equal protection
analysis to statutes denying illegal alien children free access to public schooling was that children
should be assured the opportunity to contribute to and benefit from the American economy. 457
U.S. at 221-24. There is a similar sensitivity to this issue in some state courts. For example, in
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 976 (1973), the New Jersey
Supreme Court construed the state's constitution "to embrace that educational opportunity which is
needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in
the labor market." Accord Seattle Sch. Dist. v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (1978). The wisdom of
adopting a right to education which prepares the child for the labor market as well as for other
responsibilities is noted by some of the commentators as well. Levin, Judicial Standard, supra note
103, at 709-13; Ratner, supra note 108, at 818-22; cf. Edelman, supra note 67, at 33-34 (noting that
participation in "America's democratic processes or the economy" requires some minimum amount
of education).
493 See Black, Jr., Further Reflections, supra note 148, at 1107; Edelman, supra note 67, at 32.
494 E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
495 E.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
496 E.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
497 See supra notes 172-92, 199-213, 241-51, 271-72 and accompanying text.
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should not preclude recognition of the right.498
While there are a number of possible definitions of the right which
are worthy of consideration, 499 I would call attention to one proposal
which may prove particularly useful in broadening and enriching future
discussions of the subject. The proposal is this: to recognize a federal
constitutional right to the minimum quantum of education necessary to
enable the development of children's mental abilities to their fullest
potential.
The gist of this right, in analogous phraseology, may already be
found in several international human rights instruments. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights states that the right to education "shall be
directed to the full development of the human personality." 5°° The In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides
that "education shall be directed to the full development of the human
personality and the sense of its dignity" and "shall enable all persons to
participate effectively in a free society. °501 This language was articulated
again, most fully and forcefully, in the recently adopted United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 29 of the Convention
provides that, "States Parties agree that the education of the child shall
be directed to... [t]he development of the child's personality, talents and
mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential." 50 2
The norm that children should be educated to enable them to reach
their fullest potential, then, has a most respectable lineage, having been
embraced by the international community for over forty years in some of
its loftiest and most well-accepted statements of human rights. As dis-
cussed in Part III.C. 1 of this Article, many scholars consider it appropri-
ate to inform interpretation of the United States Constitution by
reference to international human rights norms. Thus, finding a right
with such content in the Constitution would accord with authoritative
principles of constitutional construction.
498 As one commentator has stated:
Where was it written that single-ceiling is what the Constitution mandates in prisons? That a
particular level or degree of training and service is what makes a school for the mentally re-
tarded pass constitutional muster? There is no "right answer." Yet the courts have entered the
field and issued decrees.
Edelman, supra note 67, at 32.
499 See, eg., Kurland, supra note 147, at 419 (contending that "[t]he claim that will have to be
developed will be a claim to adequate and appropriate educational opportunity"); Levin, Educa-
tional Adequacy, supra note 108, at 260 (proposing that a baseline for the right's content may be
discovered in the Rodriguez formulation that children must be taught the "'basic minimal skills
necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process'"
and in the requirement articulated in several state court cases that children must be provided with
education that will enable them to compete in today's labor market); Wright, supra note 68, at 55,
60-67 (pegging the right to a guarantee of minimum civic competence).
500 Universal Declaration, supra note 385, at art. 26, 1-2.
501 Economic, Etc. Rights Covenant, supra note 381, at art. 13, 1 1.
502 Convention of the Child, supra note 380, at art. 29, 1(a).
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The proposed formulation for the content of a positive right to edu-
cation also has American antecedents. The proposal closely parallels, in
substance, the standard of education which President Bush and the na-
tion's governors pledged to achieve in their Jeffersonian Compact503 and
which the National Commission on Excellence in Education had earlier
recommended.504 The idea has also surfaced in American academic
circles.5O5
A constitutional right to education imbued with this sort of exacting
content could markedly enhance the ameliorative effects of the right. A
right of this ilk would teach American children that much more is re-
quired of them than the acquisition of basic minimal skills and that soci-
ety has faith in children's ability to reach their fullest intellectual
potential. Indeed, the right, so construed, would compel government to
provide children with the means for meeting the high expectation that
they will achieve such academic excellence. If the federal government
truly committed itself to providing the sort of resources and involvement
necessary to enable each child to reach his or her fullest intellectual po-
tential, it is conceivable that the education crisis would finally begin to
relent even in the nation's most beleaguered school systems.
Lest this proposal seem impractical and unwieldy, it should be high-
lighted that there is precedent for such an individualized approach in the
Education for the Handicapped Act, a statute which has proven worka-
ble for over fifteen years.50 6 Under authority of this legislation, Congress
appropriates federal funds to assist state and local agencies to educate
handicapped children. The appropriations, though, are conditional. To
qualify for such federal assistance, a state must demonstrate that it is
implementing programs assuring handicapped children a "free appropri-
ate public education. °507 A prerequisite to meeting this standard is that
503 The Jeffersonian Compact states as an objective that American society must enable "all chil-
dren [to] reach their highest educational potential." Jeffersonian Compact, supra note 44, at 1488.
504 "Our goal must be to develop the talents of all to their fullest. Attaining that goal requires
that we expect and assist all students to work to the limits of their capabilities." NAT'L COMM'N,
NATION AT RISK, supra note 4, at 13.
505 Professor Rosemary Salomone writes:
Then how can we defire the basic right underlying equal educational opportunity?... As
the country moves toward the end of this decade, we should recognize that each child has a
right to a minimally adequate education that is appropriate to its needs. Rather than merely
asking "How much education?", we should ask, "What type of education?" is necessary to
permit the individual to participate effectively in the democratic process and to enjoy the per-
sonal benefits that learning brings, within limits set by individual potential.
Salomone, supra note 39, at 201; cf Biegel, supra note 108, at 1110-11 (envisioning a right to "a
minimum level of equal access to basic skills and a clearly defined knowledge base," with opportuni-
ties for brighter students to advance far beyond the basics). But see Coons et al., supra note 103, at
373-74 (arguing that there can be no right to education because its content would be "radically
unintelligible").
506 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1485 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991).
507 Id. at § 1412(1). In Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982), the Court inter-
preted the "free appropriate public education" language to require that instruction and support serv-
640
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an "individualized education program" (IEP) must be devised to meet
the unique needs of each handicapped child.5 0 8 Moreover, a participat-
ing state must provide specified administrative procedures by which the
child's parents or guardians may challenge changes in the evaluation or
education of the handicapped child.50 9
At the time that this federal legislation was under consideration by
Congress, there were more than eight million handicapped children in
the United States requiring special education and related services.5 10 If it
is possible to devise and implement an IEP for each one of the several
millions of handicapped children qualifying for such services, it would
also seem to be feasible to take an individualized approach-sans IEP or
an equally singularized equivalent-to the education of other school-age
children as well, who are more likely to tend toward an educability mean
and, therefore, who would not generally require the same level of trait-
specific treatment as handicapped children.
Moreover, the proposed right presents no more difficulties in mea-
suring government compliance than the Rodriguez formulation. It
should be clarified that the proposed right would not guarantee that each
child must be educated so as to actually reach his or her fullest intellec-
tual potential. Rather, the right would merely guarantee that govern-
ment will provide the minimum amount of education necessary to enable
children to reach the fullest potential of their mental abilities. The mini-
mum education required could even be relatively uniform as long as it is
pegged high enough.5 11 In the event that a child's abilities demand a
more personalized accommodation, a flexible response should be feasible
since school systems have previously accommodated differences in ability
with such devices as tracking or ability grouping.5 12 In comparison, en-
forcement of the Rodriguez formulation, it should be remembered, would
require government to make the equally difficult determination of when
children are being taught enough so that they will someday be able to
have "the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in
the political process." 513
ices provided pursuant to the statute need only be educationally beneficial to handicapped children.
Inasmuch as the Rowley standard of education arises from statutory construction, it has little bear-
ing on discussion of the content of a right to education under the Constitution.
508 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(5) (West 1990).
509 Id. § 1415.
510 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 195 (quoting from S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (June 2, 1975),
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432).
511 One commentator notes that procedures for ensuring that each child is educated can serve
individual differences because of "the essential similarity of each child as a potentially functioning
human and responsible citizen." Dimond, supra note 110, at 1127.
512 2 JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 8.05[3]-[7] (1990). I do not mean to suggest that
tracking or ability grouping necessarily should be the means of fulfilling a right to education. I
merely cite these devices to show that the concept of measuring and catering to students' differing
potentialities is hardly new or impracticable.
513 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
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To reiterate, the content of a constitutional right to education will
inevitably require extended and thoughtful study. The standard pro-
posed here is not intended as the only or necessarily the best answer.
But, in view of its respectable history as an international human rights
norm and its consistency with American education policy and constitu-
tional objectives, the "fullest potential" standard should receive serious
consideration.
CONCLUSION
The Bible says that there is nothing new under the sun.514 For all its
apparent novelty, a positive constitutional right to education is not new
either. Rather, it has lain quiescent in the Constitution all these years,
occasionally glimpsed at through the musings of judges and legal schol-
ars. That it is not new-that it has existed all along-should be warrant
enough for its formal recognition. The Bible also says, however, that to
every thing there is a season. 515 If one season be more propitious than
another, it would seem that the education crisis has brought the season
for recognition of the right full upon us.
514 Ecciesiastes 1:9.
515 Id. at 3:1.
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